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The doctrine of the Self in the theology of Paul Tillich is not an
easy structure to isolate since it pervades the entire theological system.
It is, beyond any doubt, right at the heart of Tillich's thought as one of
the vital components of the basic ontological structure as he sees it. It
is my contention that the doctrine of the Self surreptitiously takes over
as the operative basis of Tillich's theological formulations, and that the
rest of his entire system can be viewed as a context against which this basic
doctrine might be put in perspective.
For Tillich the foundational structure of reality is expressed in the
Self-World correlation. In order to hold these together he seeks the ground
of unity, applying his "principle of identity", ae it is manifested in the
Absolute or Being-itself. His analysis tries to set forth this ontological
structure within a formal system of theological concepts. As long as he is
dealing in abstract categories and concepts he is consistent. He is able to
apply his methodology which aims at expressing the underlying identity by
holding correlated polarities in tension, while identifying levels of being
to resolve apparent discrepancies. This is the key to understanding his sys¬
tem. These aims and ideas developed in the course of his life and career which
was deeply invested in nineteenth century thought-forms and attitudes, but was
lived out and judged by the first half of the twentieth century.
The testing of his ideas end systematic formulations arose from the
historic and personal experiences to which he was subjected. His central
doctrine of the Self was challenged by his existential selfhood which meant
that his theological answers were given to existential questions. In this
sense at least his theology is autobiographical. The organization of his
Systematic Theology is his attempt to give theological answers to five human
existential questions. I have suggested that he was preoccupied with the
human situation and attracted to the existentialist position, especially in
hie understanding of anxiety, hubris, finitude and courage. Yet because these
were always discussed and analysed in an abstract and objective way, Tillich
tried to subordinate this subject matter within his formal treatment of ontology
and essential being. Tillich did try to give a large place to existence
within his system, although he could never surrender his nineteenth century
search for harmony and identity and this finally reduced existential reality
as experienced to symbols within his sssentialiet system.
The basic correlation of the Self and the world makes possible a way
for the Self to become aware of the world and also of itself. Self-awareness
is based in self-centerednessj whereas world-awareness leads to self-trans¬
cendence. From this proposition Tillich seeks to show how man rises from
his existential knowledge of his finitude to higher knowledge of ontology.
This is the "hinge" in Tillich's thought whereby he seeks to overcome the
basic tension between reality as experienced under the givenness of creation
Use other side if necessary.
within the bounds of human finitude and ontological reality. The
operating category is freedom which allows man to transcend himself
end fulfil his destiny as the "image of God". By transforming the
self into an essential being, however, the existential self loses
out. Tillich's use of spirit as a "symbol" suggests that he is aware
of this lack of reality and the need to employ more dynamic terms and
concepts. It is when he discusses the doctrine of the Self formally
within the system that Tillich uses the concept of spirit to set forth
the dynamic principle of the "totally centered self", which actualizes
its potential in such a way as to achieve self-transcendence. The
spirit is the motivating power which integrates life in the centre of
the self and moves this centre to rise to higher levels of being.
Tillich's overriding ontological concern, as the ground of unity
for the philosophieal tension with which he lived, itself became one
pole of a polarity between ontology and human experience. On the one
hand he was seeking for the grand rationalization, the system which would
identify all reality within an intellectual continuum, while on the other
hand he lived through times of tremendous change and upheaval. He was
rooted deep in traditional Christianity, trained in the Liberal era,
caught up in the social movements of his day in Germany, cast out of the
fatherland, exposed to many of the great and searching Issues of this
century, and faced with the task of systematizing his insights for his
classroom work. The only ground of unity between these poles is his
understanding of the Self. And because of this tension between these
poles, his doctrine of the Self shifts from abstract analysis, methodi¬
cally set forth, on the one hand, to the warm vibrant faith of a soul
searching for salvation and hope on the other. How to make sense out
of his own experience is Tillich's task. This underlying tension is
never completely resolved.
Summary of the Thesis
The doctrine of the Self in the theology of Paul Tillich is not an
easy doctrine to isolate since it pervades the entire theological system.
It la, beyond any doubt, right at the heart of Tillich'e thought as one of
the vital components of the basic ontologleal structure as he sees it. It
ie ray contention that the doctrine of the Self surreptitiously takes over
as the operative basis of Tillich'e theological formulations, and that the
rest of his entire system can be viewed aa a context against which this basic
doctrine might be put in perspective.
For Tillich the foundational structure of reality is expressed in the
Self-World correlation. In order to hold these together he seeks the ground
of unity, applying his "principle of identity", as it is manifested in the
Absolute or Being-itself. Hie analysis tries to set forth this ontological
structure within a formal system of theological concepts. As long as he is
dealing in abstract categories and concepts hs is consistent. Be is able to
apply his methodology which aims at expressing the underlying identity by
holding correlated polarities in tension, while identifying levels of being
to resolve apparent discrepancies. This is the key to understanding his sys¬
tem. These aims and ideas developed in the course of his life and career
which was deeply invested in nineteenth century thought-forms and attitudes,
but was lived out and judged by the first half of the twentieth century.
The testing of his ideas and systematic formulations arose from the
historical and personal experiences to which he was subjected. His central
t
doctrine of the Self was challenged by his existential selfhood which meant
that his theological answers were given to existential questions. In this
sense at least his theology is autobiographical. The organization of his
Systematic Theology is his attempt to give theological answers to five human
existential questions. I have suggested that he was preoccupied with the
human situation and attracted to the existentialist position, especially
in his understanding of anxiety, hubris, finitude and courage. Yet because
these were always discussed and analysed in an abstract and objective way,
Tillich tried to subordinate this subject matter within his formal treatment
of ontology and essential being. Tillich did try to give a large place to
existence within his system, although he could never surrender his nineteenth
century search for harmony and identity and thie finally reduced existential
reality as experienced to symbols within his essentialiet system.
The basic correlation of the Self and the world makes possible a way for
the Self to become aware of the world and also of itself. Self-awareness is
based in eelf-centerednessf whereas world-awareness leads to self-transcend¬
ence. from this proposition Tillich seeks to show how man rises from his
existential knowledge of his finitude to higher knowledge of ontology. This
is the "hinge" in milch*s thought whereby he seeks to overcome the basic
tension between reality as experienced under the givenness of creation within
the bounds of human finitude and ontological reality. The operating category
is freedom which allows man to transcend himself and fulfil his destiny as
the "image of Sod". % transforming the self into an essential being, how¬
ever, the existential self loses out. Tillich'a use of spirit as a "symbol"
suggests that he is aware of thie lack of reality and the need to employ more
dynamic terms and concepts* It is when he discusses the doctrine of the Self
formally within the system that llllich uses the concept of spirit to set
forth the dynamic principle of the "totally centered self", which actualizes
its potential in such a way as to achieve self-transcendence. The spirit is
the motivating power which integrates life in the centre of the self and then
moves this centre to rise to higher levels of being.
Tilllch's overriding ontologioal concern, ae the ground of unity for
the philosophical tension with which he lived, Itself became one pole of a
polarity between ontology and human experience. On the one hand he vac
seeking for the grand rationalisation, the system which would identify all
reality within an intellectual continuum, while on the other hand he lived
through times of tremendous change and upheaval. He vaa rooted deep In
traditional Christianity, trained in the Liberal era, caught up in the
social movements of hie day in Germany, cast out of the fatherland, exposed
to many of the great and searching issues of this century, and faced with
the task of systematizing hie insights for his classroom work. The only
ground of unity between these poles is his understanding of the Self. And
because of this tension between these poles, his doctrine of the Self
shifts from abstract analysis, methodically set forth, on the one hand, to
the warm vibrant faith of a soul searching for salvation and hope on the
other. Bow to make sense out of his own experience is Tillich'e task. This
underlying tension is never completely resolved.
ASfo9vl«Mre»nt8
I an indebted first and foremost to Paul Tillich himself, whose system
is a challenge to anyone and it is only after serious wrestling with his
terminology and ideas that it becomes clear, but when it does so it begins
to lay hold even on the unwilling student and orltle. The exercise of
studying for and preparing this thesis over an extended period of time
end serosa the wetere from my advisers has been both difficult and maturing
since the University of Edinburgh holds its standards high* I would like
to thank my advisers for bearing with me in this task and offering their
helpful comments and guidance* Principal Charles Duthie est me en the
course, then received a promotion and moved away from Edinburgh. Br.
Alieter Campbell, recently added to the teaching staff at Hew College,
attempted to fill in although until this spring ha had to correspond with
an overseas student whom he had never mat. Last but by no means least I
am grateful for the visa and incisive counsel supplied by my adviser and
teaoher at Hew College, the Rev. James B. Torrance who has guided me from
the beginning of thle investigation and has borne with me over the years
to completion.
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The doctrine of the Self in the theology of Paul Tillich is not an
easy doctrine to isolate since it pervades the entire theological system.
It ist beyond any doubt, right at the heart of Tillich's thought as one of
the vital components of the basic ontological structure as he sees it. It is
my contention that the doctrine of the Self surreptitiously takes over as the
operative basis of Tillich's theological formulations, and that the rest of
his entire system can be viewed as a context against which this basic doctrine
might be put in perspective.
For Tillich the basic ontological structure of reality can be ex¬
pressed in the Self-world correlation. He seeks to hold these two poles to¬
gether by the use of his "principle of identity" by which he seeks a ground
of unity in which both poles can be located. In this case the ground of
unity is Being-itself, the Absolute, or God who is all in all, holding to¬
gether in relationship both the objective world and the realm of the Self,
the subjective reality of human personal being.
This type of formulation by polarities within a basic correlation,
both finding meaning in a greater unity, is basic to Tillich's methodology.
The polar elements are not always opposites, but are balanced elements, often
representing the general on one side over against the particular on the
other. In the case of the Self-world polarity this is obvious, and it is my
contention that in such a polarity the subjective and the particular tends to
take precedence over the objeotive and the general. The world can be dis¬
missed by classification into abstract categories in a coherent system of
thought, but the Self defies classification by its very complexity and therefore
becomes the centre of investigation. The real subject beoomes the Self and the
world its context of relationships within the larger context of the being of God.
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In making auch a distinction* another of Tillieh's principal methods,
namely, hierarchical ordering, is seen* While Tillich argues that the
ontologlcal takes precedence over other concerns, it can also he argued that
the existential takes precedence aa I have just done. According to Tillich,
the priority of the ontological leade to the applieation of hie systematic
analysis in a universal way* This would seen that his doctrine of the Self is
universally for ovsxyean, or, ae he would put it, that it la the line of
development of the potentiality implicit in all men. In this way he la argu¬
ing from particular and concrete premises; the Self ae experienced directly,
the Self ea observed by science, the Self as manifested in Jesus Christ, tine
Self in anxiety, end so on, - to the general doctrine of the Self ae a self-
transcending personal being.
It is my contention that in fact the reverse is true. The further
away from the concrete Self which Tillich experiences, namely Tillieh's own
person, that he expands into his system of thought, the mere he is dealing
with contextual issues rather than with baslo reality* This is not to suggest
that the general issues are not real, they are; but it becomes a question of
priority within his systematic methodology.
It la my observation that in either approach hie Chrlstology suffers.
In effect he ie attempting to fit Jems Christ into his systematic categories
as it comes out in the Systematic Theology itself* To do so does net take
full account of the person of Christ, consequently it becomes necessary for
Tillich to suspend the rigid application of his theological methodology and
the entire section dealing with the estrangement of man in hie predicament
end tiie solution that Christ effects becomes a statement of faith, simply a
restatement of his basic Christian tradition to which he ie committed.
On the other hand, if Tillich'a doctrine of the Self is actually auto-
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biographical, aa I suggest, then Jesus Christ la asen as an extension of
the Self aa experienced and aa a fulfilled idealised form of Self* This
might be too blunt a way of expressing how thia approach cornea out, but it
haa a direct parallel with the symbolic effect that hia father*a strict
Lutheran position had for hia thinking in his younger days* Tillich admits
that the struggle he had for intellectual freedom, freedom from hia father's
authoritarian stance, was the greatest singls event in his early Ufa* Now
Jesus Christ for flllioh is the paradigm man, true humanity, the New Being
in whom the implicit potential in ereryman can be seen actualized reality*
Christ is mediator and saviour in that Bo la our example.
Sinoe Tillioh's doctrine of the Self can be considered from an auto¬
biographical point of view it ie appropriate to set out the development of
hia thought following its chronological davelopmant* Ibis I have dona,
beginning with the philosophical foundations laid in hia early years as a
theologian in Germany, noting hia thssla on the work of Sehelling in 1912
from whom ho draw hia basis patterns of thought, and his essay in 1944 on
Existentialist Philosophy whlob also had a tremendous offset on the later
development of hia thinking* The tension between the romantic Idealistic
viewpoint and the existentialist la never resolved by Tillich, but ha seeks
to hold the two together in polar relation, with the ground of unity between
thorn being hia ontologioal concern. This will account for ontology being a
preoccupation for him*
Within hie theology another polarity amarges in tha tension between th
one and tha many, between the social dimension of the faith which ha flrat in
veatlgatad in terms of hia kalros doctrine, and tha personal dimension of tha
faith which ha later developed in tarns of hia New Being doctrine which becae
the key to hia Christology, based on the doctrine of the Self* The ground of
6
between these two poles le not apparent in Tillioh*e system and leaves him
open to criticism of shifting his ground. In his 1948 "Protestant 8ra* he
discusses his kairos doetrine and its implications. Sis position on the
Hew Being, developed in his Systematic Theology Vol. XI, doss suffer frees
this unresolved tension end in some ways doesn't belong in the system ss it
reflects a departure from his methodology. Yet it is probably his study of
existential anxiety and other psychological factors in the decade between 194®
and 195? that brought him to this position. For this reason I have given
quits a large amount of space to some of the ideas, both from the era of
Biblical theology which erupted at this time as well aa from historical and
psychoanalytical studies, which must have influenced Tillieh as the in¬
tellectual climate of that decade. It ie no aocident that it was In 1952
whan ho wrote "The Courage to Bo" which focused on the problem of anxiety.
This predisposed him to consider the personal implications of his theology
which emerged in his doctrine of the How Being. Here we have &e existential
overcoming the systematic.
It is my contention that because Tillioh neglected the Biblical founda¬
tion, and especially the Hebrew understanding of the Self, that his
theological polarity was not adequately resolved and his doctrine of the
Self suffered accordingly. For this reason he shifts his emphasis of Self¬
hood.
Tillich's overriding ©ntological concern, as the ground of unity for
the philosophical tension with which he lived, itself became one pels of a
polarity betwaen ontology and human experience, (hi the cms hand he was
seeking for the grand rationalisation, the system which would identity all
reality within an intellectual continuum, while on the other hand ha lived
through times of tremendous change and strain on German people in particular.
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He vii rooted deep in traditional Christian tradition* trained in the
Liberal era* caught up in the eooial activism of hie day, cast out of his
fatherland, exposed to many of the great and searching issues of this century,
end faced with the task of systematising all this for his classroom work*
The only ground of unity between these poles is his doetrine of the Self*
But because of the basic tension between the two poles, hie doctrine
of the Self shifts from an abstract analysis, methodically set forth, on the
one hand, to the vibrant, verm faith of a aoul-search for salvation on the
other* How to make sense out of hie own experience ie Tillich'e problem*
low to fit this doctrine into hie system ie another matter, and me of these
problems we have been looking at briefly*
In terms of human experience, Tillich is caught in the tension between
Christian religion on the one hand and Biblical faith on the other. From
time to time he breaks into hie discussion, particularly in the Systematic
Theology, to dieouee either one or other of these poles. In hie discussion of
Christian religion or tradition, he tends to play down the significance of
commitment to a particular tradition* He would rather see religion as a part
of human culture, with creeds sad confessions and what haa been termed in*
etitutioaal religion of symbolic value only. Christian faith, however, for
Tillich is vibrant and real, personal and existential* Faith and anxiety are
in tension, but are resolved in the unity of s bssie acceptance, in terns of
being grasped by the ground of our being. 'The validity of Christian religion
for Tillieh becomes intensely personal and leads to a doctrine of the Self
which includes a spiritual destiny.
The other pole of Biblical faith ia correspondingly week in terms of
objective commitment, either as accepting or hearing the Word of Sod* The
Hebrew and the Greek theological approaches are in tension here, but they are

































let in the final analysis Tillioh's Self is isolated. It is a lonely
trip across the gap, and God seems very generalised and abstract, like the
immensity of the night sky. The analysis in Vol. Ill does not depend upon the
Christology of the New Being in Vol. II. Perhaps Tillieh intends that the
formal analysis must, in the first instance, apply to Jesus Christ, but He is
but one among many. Tillich sets this forth as applying to everyman, but
does it really? Or does it only apply to Tillich himself as his self-under-
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standing and aim in life, hopefully set out to be of assistance to others along
the way? The obscurity of his system presents a gap for eveiyman far greater
than the so-called Extra-Calvinisticum which is bridged by the Word of God
incarnate in Christ Jesus, the Mediator and Saviour, showing a Father's love.
PAUL TILLICHi HIS METHODOLOGY ATO APPROACH
1. The Life and Thought of Paul Tillich
2. Hie 1912 Riesis on Schelling'e Ontology
3. "The Protestant Era" (1948)
4. "EriatentialPhilosophy" (1944)
5. "Hie Human Situation
6• Tillich as an Existentialist Theologian
The Life end Thought of Paul Tillich
The eon of a Lutheran pastor in the small village of Starzeddel, in
the province of Brandenburg in Prussia, Paul Johannes Tillich was born on
August 20th, 1886. His father shortly was made superintendent of the diocese,
then about 1900 was called to Berlin to an administrative post within the
Prussian Territorial Church.
Paul was born into a generation distinguished by the fact that it grew
up between two important periods of histoxy. He enjoyed a normal childhood
and developed a strong appreciation for nature. He was educated at a local
school and the gymnasium or grammar school at a nearby city. As a youth he
was known to have a rather romantic imagination, but this settled or broadened
later into a philosophical imagination. Speaking of his early childhood, he
sayst
My tie with the country lies (deep) in my soul. Nearly all
great memories, and all strong longings are interlaced with
landscapes, with the soil and with the weather, with com
fields, and the smell of autumnal potato foliage, with the
forms of clouds, with wind, flowers and woods ...
Most important, however, was the fact that from my eighth
year onward annually 1 spent some weeks, later even months,
by the seaside. The experience of the infinite bordering
upon the finite, as one has it by the sea . . • supplied my
imagination with a symbol from which feeling could win
substance.
At the gymnasium the young Tillich studied classics, being deeply in¬
terested in classical Greek, both the language and the culture. This interest
led to his philosophical interest and by the time he entered the University
of Berlin he possessed a basic acquaintance with the history of philosophy,
and had been introduced to the ideas of Kant and Fichte. His university




The process of growing up included a major struggle for independence
from his father's authority which extended to the intellectual realm as well
as the normal process of growing up. He commentsi
My father's authority, which was at once personal and
intellectual, and which because of hie position in the
Church, coincided for me with the religious authority of
revelation, aado every manifestation of autonomous think¬
ing a piece of religious daring, and involved the critique
of authority in a sense of guilt. The immemorial experience
of mankind, and new knowledge can be won only through
breaking a taboo, that all autonomous thinking ie accompanied
by a consciousness of guilt, has bean a fundamental experi¬
ence of my awn life.
Working through to Independence from his father was a major step in Paul's
growing philosophical understanding of selfhood.
In university, Paul studied along two lines of thought. One lino was
the romantic where he was concerned about nature and identity* especially
Schleierraaeher'e theology of feeling, Hegel's philosophy of spirit, end
Gobel ling's philosophy of freedom. The other line was the social philosophy
of revolution dealing with history and social aotiviam, which he later
formulated as the "Protestant principle" which affected his understanding of
the "Kairos doctrine" and "justification by or through faith". Ksehler and
Sdialling had a great influence on his thought at this point.
Tillich is quite open about his dependence upon Sehellingt
The relation of these fundamental thoughts of theology to my
philosophical development was determined, first of all, by
die work of Schelling, particularly the ideas of hie later
period. 1 thought that, fundamentally, 1 had found the union
of theology and philosophy in the philosophical explanation
of the Christian doctrine through the older Schelling, in
hie founding of a Christian philosophy of existence in contrast
to Hegel's humanistic philosophy of essence and in his inter¬
pretation of history as the History of Salvation. I must
confess, that even today, I find more 'theonomoue philosophy*
in Schelling than in any of die other idealists. But to be
sure, not even Sohelling.wae able to bring about a unity of
theology and philosophy.
After concluding his theological studies in 1912* he serred as an
assistant pastor until the outbreak of the Great War* During the war he
served as a field chaplain in the German amy* For recreation at this time
he discovered the world of art forms* a new and liberating experience for him
personally* But at the same time the experience of tragedy in life left its
deep mark* leading him to modify his ideas of Sehslllng's philosophy of
history to inoluds the necessity of struggle in history* expending his idea
of a dynamic ontology where both being wad becoming in history art acan in
relationship*
After the war he returned briefly to pariah work for about two years
during which time he took part in organising and leading the German
Religious-Socialist movement* Shis movement was for the moat part a scholarly
movement attempting to interpret the times over against the popular idealistic
utoplanism of Marxist teachings* and at the seme time attempting to bo poli¬
tically active in the cause of reform* Tillieh's "kaires* concept, closely
akin to the "Protestant principle", denied the permanence of any socio¬
political structure in history* and taught that through crisis new and creative
forms emerge in time* It was en idea of continuous reform and social trans¬
formation*
In those years of ferment in the European situation fallowing the
firet World War* Paul Till!eh and Karl Barth ware both actively developing
their ideas along widely divergent lines* flllieh waa beginning to think in
terms of a theology of eulturo and history* while Berth* in Bar Bomerbrief.4
argued that God stood in judgment over against the creation including man
and human culture* Per Barth the Word of God was a word of judgment pointing
man may from himself and away from the world to the reality of God revealed
a.
in Christ* For Tillich, man's creativity, cultural potentialities and
achievements was the way the new creation, the New Being, was realized in
history through the ongoing process of renewal, this basic difference was
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seen in clear focus in an exchange of views in 192J.
From 1919 until 1924, Tillich taught in the University of Berlin and
was developing his ideas on his theology of culture. He lectured on subjects
which included the relation of religion to politics, art, philosophy, depth
psychology, and sociology. At this time he was very close to Ernst
Troeltsch, many of whose views he shared. Troeltsch and Gogarten, Berth's
friend, had an exchange of views in a leading theological journal, and soon
both Barth and Tillich had also contributed articles. Tillich's article was
entitled! "Critical and Positive Paradox1 A Statement of Views in Opposition
to Karl Barth and P. Gogarten"
Tillich's criticism of Barth and Gogarten rests on a rejection of the
principle of judgment or crisis as a negative critique of man and his
struggles in history by a transcendent God. He is afraid of dualism, arbi¬
trary authority in revelation, and absolutizing Jesus of Nazareth and the
community that is formed around him. He feels that this does violence to the
nonobjectifiable character of faith, and brings back a new form of legalistic
absolute religion which is dehumanized. In fact, this is Tillich's re-
7
jection of Transcendentalism of the Extra Celvinisticum concept.
Karl Barth made a spirited reply and Tillich ended the discussion by
attempting a restatement rattier than reply to Barth' s points. Neither man
basically changed, his basic stance from that time. Tillich argued for a
principle of immanent dynamism, conceiving of the Unconditional as the ultimate
source of both the "Yes" and the "No" in the on-going processes of creation
and destruction, grace and judgment, in history. Barth affirmed a tran¬
scendent, dynamic, and personal God existing apart from the creation who had
freely and uniquely revealed Himself is the historic event of the Incarna¬
tion of Christ of which the Scriptures witness. Neither man pursued the
dialogue further.
In 1924* he accented, somewhat reluctantly, a theological chair at
the University of Marburg but stayed there only briefly. The following year
he moved to the University of Dresden to become Professor of the Science of
Religion. While there he continued hie interest is the Religious-Socialist
movement, writing "The Religious Situation of the Present" in 1926. He also
began work on what became eventually hie "Systematic Theology". No major
shift in hie ideas seems yet evident. Then later, in 1929, he was appointed
professor of philosophy in the University of Frankfurt where he continued
until he was forced by the Nasi regime to leave Germany when they came to
power in 195?* It was after hie move to Frankfurt that he became increas¬
ingly active in opposing the authoritarian ideology of the National Social¬
ist© and he was quite outspoken. Hitler had him dismissed from Frankfurt.
In America, Reinhold Niebuhr had been impressed with hie writings and,
while visiting Germany in 1933, urged him to oome to New York. Tillich
accepted the chair of Philosophical Theology in the famous Union Theological
Saminary, New York, in 1933, and continued there for twenty-two years. It
ia an irony of history that tha cohesive authoritarian structure of the
Roman Catholic Church in Germany provided a stronger basis of opposition to
the Nazi government In Germany than did the Religlous-Soeialiat movement
which wee openly opposed to authoritarian structures on the "kairos"
principle. This truth impressed itself upon Tillich and may help to account
for a shift in his definition of man and aooiety* While this struggle was
going on in Germany, Tillich settled into America. About the tame time as
it
Dietrich Bonhoeffer caught the last boat back to hie native Germany to join
 
preoccupation with the broad eocial-polltloal dimensions of
hiatory In order to offer a formulation ("New Being") more
open to individualistic applications.
In the ertiole In the Christian Century, Tillich points out that the
influences leading to his change of mind include the emphasis placed on
social ethics in America, a new and deeper appreciation of "therapeutic or
depth psychology"11 and the "more recent existential philosophy as developed by
Heidegger, Jaspers, end Sartre."11 And under these influences he wrote hie
"Systematic Theology", having first worked out many of the individualistic
dimension® of his thought in the 1950 Terry Lectures at Tale which were later
published as "The Courage to Be". Throughout all hie writings, however, hie
philosophical ideas were rooted consistently in ontology. His basic meta¬
physical interest is the ground of hie system of thought.
In order to understand Tillich's ontologies! frame of reference
underlying his system including his kairoe doctrine and hie Hew Being con¬
cept it is necessary to go back to his 1912 treaties on "Jfystieism and
Guilt-consciousness in Schelling'e Philosophical Development". Here is the
development of the central categories of hie ontology which are later ex¬
pounded in hie "Systematic Theology".
At the age of sixty—nine when most people would think of retiring,
Tillich moved from Union Seminary to take up the position of University
Professor at the Harvard Divinity School in Harvard University. There he
gave only special lectures to packed classrooms of advanced students. He
also gave the esme kind of special lectures at the Chicago Divinity School
in the University of Chicago until his death in 1965.
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1. The Interpretation of History. (Kew Yorki Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936)
p. 7. Paul Tlllieh personally relates his developing thought in three
places of hie voluminous works, i.e., The Intfrpyeta^lpn 9f qistoxy,
The Protestant Bra (Chlcagoi Phoenix Books 1957 ed.) p. v - xxv, and in
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Theology of Paul Tillich (Hew York» The HaoHillan Co. 1964). References
to other essays are not so valuable as his definitive presentations in
these three instances mentioned.
2. Ibid., p. 22, 23.
5* P« 35*
4. Karl Berth, Bar Homerbrief (Bern* B. A, Rasehlin, 1919)f "English
translation by Sdwyn C. Hoskyns from the sixth German edition (Londont
Oxford B. Frees, 1933)*
5. Thaologiaohe Blatter, ed. Karl Ludwig Schmidt, (1923). Vol. II, p. 263 -
269.Paul Tillich*s article "Critical and Positive Paredoxt A Statement
of Views in Opposition to Xarl Berth and Friedrich Gogarten" is as close
to an actual confrontation of views that he comes in his reaction against
Berth's position.
6. Ibid., p. 263 - 269.
7. cf. Kagley and Bretall, The Theology of Paul Tillich. p. 5 where Tillich
is discussing the early influtnees upon bin, including his romantic
communication with nature as "mystical participation", the impact of the
German romantic poete, and his Lutheran background1
Theologians knew that one of the points of disagreement
between the two wings of the Continental Reformation, the
Lutheran and the Reformed, waa the so-called 'Extra-Calvinist-
icum', the doctrine that the finite is not capable of the
infinite (non capsx inflniti). and that consequently in Christ
the two natures, the divine and the human, remained outside each
other. Against this doctrine the Lutherans asserted tie 'Infra
Luthsranum' 1 namely, tie view that in Christ there is a mutual
indwelling of tie two naturae. This difference means that on
Lutheran ground the vision of the presence of the infinite in
everything finite was theologically affirmed, that nature
mysticism was possible and real, whereas on Calvinistic ground
sueh an attitude ie suspect of pantheism and the divine
transcendence is understood in a way which for a Lutheran is
suspect of deism.
8. George Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message. (Hew York,
Charles Serlbner's Sons, 1962) p. 112. Tavard recognises that there
is a shift in Tlllieh's thinking at this time, but he adds the
observation that his focus shifts from the "kairos doctrine" over
to the "Hew Being doctrine", which he sees as evolution in thought.
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His 1912 Thesis on Schilling*s Ontology
Tillich throughout his 1If•time Is conoemed with the ontological
questions. His ideas reveal a unity in his point of view at all stages of
his life, even in his "ohange of mind". Fundamentally he remains unchanged
in his deepest understanding of this frame of reference. To uncover the
roots of his philosophical presuppositions* we must go hack to his early
training.
In 1926 while involved with the Religious Socialism movement he
wrotei
It may he noted that at the present time the metaphysics of
being is less highly developed than is the metaphysics of
history* The fact is not due to chenoe. Medieval metaphysics
was a metaphysics of baing because it arose out of the soil of
static* non-historieal mysticism. In the Protestant world the
dynamic* moving spirit of historical reality has come to pre¬
vail In an increasing degree. The meaning of history seems
more important to the mind than does the meaning of being ...
The metaphysics of history naturally reacts on the metaphysics
of being.1
He ia concerned to show the relationship between the two aspects of
metaphysical thought and their deeper ground of unity. Tillich was always
prepared to stress that ths metaphysical questions should not be treated in a
secondary way in relation to history* but should be seen as foundational or
primary in order to see meaning in historic process.
To investigate Tillioh *e metaphysical understanding: which pervaded
hie point of view we need to read hie dissertation prepared for the degree
of Licentiate of Theology in 1912* entitled "Ifysticiam and Guilt-Consciousness
2
in Schelllng's Philosophical Development". In this book la the outline of
his philosophical frame of refersnee, setting the ontological boundaries of
hia thinking. Here Tillich defends Sehelling as a thinker and arguee that
ha le one of the great philosophers to be reckoned with.
26
le divides his thesis into three parte* The first section deals
with the major problems that Schelling sets oat to tackle* This section is
largely an historical definition of the various approaches to the philosophical
problems that Schelling and others of hie day faced. The second pert sets out
the firet attempts that Sehelling makes to provide some answers end the
resulting shortfall of these attempts. Then the third part sets out
Sehelling'e "second period" of his "positive philosophy" which Tillich
regards as a conclusive "solution"* Thus the first and third sections
provide us with the background of THlieh*s own ontological position,
le opens with this paragraph!
Mysticism end guilt-consciousness* feeling of unity with the
Absolute and consciousness of opposition to God* the principle
of the identity of the absolute and individual spirit and the
experience of the contradiction between the holy Lord and the
sinful creature! this is an antinomy the solution of which
has been earnestly sought by religious thought in the Church
down through the centuries - and it must ever again be
sought. On the one side the will to truth finds satisfaction
where the unity of the knower and the object known is
attained* where the Absolute is as much the subject of know¬
ledge as the object of knowledge. On the other aide* the
moral law - where it is grasped in its depth - discloses the
God-defying Quality of the will, the enmity of the subject
towards God.*
Tilllch feels that the tension between truth and morality in the
history of Western thought arc represented in the conflicting symbols of
the Greek vision of timeless* self-contained truth on the one hand* and of
the holy* exalted God of Israel who le a consuming fire. If one is stressed*
the other side becomes ignored. But Tilllch feels that Schelling has
deViSad a synthesis of truth and morality by holding both mysticism and
guilt in balance within his ontology.
Tillich's main concern* carrying through from hi® student days under
the influence of Schelling, is to produce an ontological structure that will
reconcile the basic paradoxes and cleavages In reality* Hence in hie
h® »»*•« ot the dialeotieal method of Betting up
polarities and then seeking the greater unity which will hold then together,
albeit in tension, e*g* self-world, subject-object, etc.
Much of his basic position which is later expanded in the Systematic
Theology ie outlined in the ontologleel arguments in hie 1912 Myetlolan and
Gullt-Conacioueneaa. although the definitive work ie the later one. She
first principle he makes use of extensively in his methodology is what he
terms ^gradualist!© metaphysics" or hierarchical ordering of reality into
levels of being, thus discovering the principle of identity which will hold
them together in a greater unity* Ha pointa this outt
In its philosophical transformation monarchical monotheism
appears aa gradualietic metaphysics* The religious hierarchy
is transformed into * hierarchy of powers of being ('The
Great Chain of Being* )• Ever since Plato wrote hie Symposium
end Aristotle his Metaphysics this type of thinking has influ¬
enced the Western world in many ways. The absolute ie the
highest in a seals of relative degrees of being (Plotinue,
Diooysius, the Scholastics)* The nearer a thing or a sphere
of reality is to ths absolute, the more being ie embodied in
it* God ie the highcat being* The terms 'degrees of being*,
•more being*, *leea being', ere meaningful only if being ie
not the predicate of aa existential judgment but rather if
being means 'ths power of being'* Leibnls's menadology is
an outstanding example of hierarchical thinking in modern
philosophy* The degree of eonsoioue perception determines
the ontologieal status of a monad, from the lowest form of
being to God as ths central monad* Ths romantic philosophy
of nature applies the hierarchical principle to the different
levels ef the natural and the spiritual world* It is a
triumph of hierarchical thinking that evolutionary philosophers
einee Hegel's time have employed the formerly static degrees
ef being as standards of progress in their schemes of dynamic
development.4
Tlllieh makes use of the hierarchical principle throughout his
Systematic Theology but it is interacting that he feels he must go to great
lengths in volume three to attaok "levels" ae such sines hs suggests that
often ths idsa of level is used as a means of Isolating reality into
separate categorise without noting the interaction and hence destroying
the greater unity* However he does in fast make use of levels within his
hierarchical ordert
They decide the establishment of the animal dimension above
the dimension of the vegetative* They decide that the
dimension of inner awareness surpasses the biological end
is surpassed by the dimension of the spirit* They decide
that nan ia the highest being because his center ie all-
embracing* In contrast to all other beings, man doss not
have only environmentj he has world, the structured unity
of all possible content. This end its implications make
him the highest being*5
To avoid the problem of "levels", he prefers to use "dimensions" in his own
hierarchical ordering and time preserve the unity of being*
From Sohelling, Tillioh learned his second principle of methodology
to eliminate ontological conflict, that of the principle of polarisation.
It la an adaptation of the old coincidence of opposltee. It is a balance
between the separate though related elements, rather than strict cppoaltes.
Tillieh sets up the polar opposites, not to show their complete disparity,
but rather to point to the ground of unity between them, each taken alone
is but a distortion or extreme within the ground of unity* Dialectics,
for Tillieh, ere thue much closer to Hegel *• principles than to Kierke¬
gaard's paradoxes* God, for Tillich, is in the last analysis e synthesis,
containing polar balance within belng-iteelf*
The polar character of the entologieel elements ie rooted in
the divine life, but the divine life ie not subject to this
polarity* Within the divine life, every ontological element
include® its polar element completely, without tension and
without the threat of dissolution, for God ia being-iteelf*
However, there is a difference between the first and the
aeeond elements in each polarity with regard to their power
of symbolising the divine life. The elements of indlvidu-
sllsatlon, dynamics, and freedom represent the self or sub¬
ject side of the basic ontological structure within the
polarity to which they belong* The elements of participation,
form and destiny represent the world or object side of the
basic ontological structure within the polarity to which they
belong. Both sides are rooted in the divine life. But the
first side determines the existential relationship between
God and man* which is the source of all symbolization.®
From this key passage we ere given a clue as to the basic self*
world polarity within the synthesis of the divine absolute or belng-itself•
And here is the core of Tillioh'e ontological concept* as well as his
understanding of the human position within this concept. Ulllch* s doctrine
of the self can only be understood in the light of his methodology as well
ae this basic ontological structure. This is the context of hie thinking
and directs the course of hie doctrine of man.
He oontinuee in the same chapter to express this same thought*
Han is a self who has a world. As a self he is an individual
person who participates universally* he is a dynamic self*
transcending agent within a special and a general form* and
he is freedom which has a special destiny and which partici¬
pates in a general destiny. Therefore, man symbolizes that
which is his untilate concern in terms taken from his own
being. From the subjective side of the polarities he
takes * or more exactly* receives * the material with
which he symbolizes the divine life. He sees the divine
life as personal, dynamic* and free. He cannot see it any
other way* for God Is man's ultimata concern* and therefore
he stands In analogy to that which man himself is. But the
religious mind * theologically speaking man in the correla¬
tion of revelation * always realizes implicitly, if not
explicitly, that the other aide of the polarities aleo is
completely present in the side he uses as symbolic material.
God ie called a person* but he is a person not in finite
separation but_,in an absolute and unconditional participation
in everything.
fillieh proceeds to show hew God transcends both self and world since
the absolute includes both but cannot be identified with either one. God
cannot be a "self", he says* because this term implies separation from
all that is not self* since it stands alone in isolation and particularity.
Just aa God cannot be identified with self* neither can he be identified
with world for the same reason. Particularity can symbolize only belng-
itself, and therefore can be analogous at best for basie ontological
structure*. One element cannot stand for the whole though it participates
in the whole* Selfhood, therefore, for Tlllloh represents the individualised
person*
milch*b third principle of methodology, which he alio learned from
Sohelling se revealed in hie 1918 thesis, is that of tho prinoiplo of
identity* In discussing Rant and his influsnos on Schelling ha makes it
very clear it la in the ares of assthstio judgment human reason virtually
takaa over ell aspeots of tho personality, the logos becomes the key to
the structuring of the self*
Reason se the structure of mind and reality is actual in
the processes of being, existence, and life* Being is finite,
existence is self-contradictory, and llfs is ambiguous.
Actual reason participates in those characteristics of reality*
Actual reason moves through finite categories, through self-
destructlve conflicts, through ambiguities, and through the
quest for what is unambiguous, beyond conflict, and beyond
bondage to the categories* • • fhe structure of this finitude
is described in the meet profound and comprehensive way in
Kant's 'critiques*. The categories of experience are categories
of finitudo* fhey do not enable human reason to grasp reallty-
in-itself) but they do enable man to grasp his world, the
totality of the phenomena which appear to him and which con¬
stitute hie actual experience.6
In a footnote on the same page he points outi
Kant is more than this. His doctrine of tho categories la a
doctrine of human finitude* Bis doctrine of tho categorical
imperative le a doctrine of the unconditional element in the
depth of practical reason* Bis doctrine of the teleologloal
principle in art and nature enlarges the concept of reason
beyond its cognitive-technical sense toward what wa have celled
'ontological reason'*"
Tillich goes on to suggest that after Kant the dootrine of finitude was
sadly neglected leading to tho enthronement of reason in a deification or
idoliaation as it vara by Bagel which was rightly rejected* But "the baby
want out with the bathwater" and teohnical reason was left without tho
depth of the universal dimension of 'bntologleal reason"* What ho means
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by the tera "ontological reason" le seem in hie definition of "subjective
reason"i
Subjective reason ie the structure of the mind which enables
it to grasp and to shape reality on the baeie of a corres¬
ponding structure of reality (In whatever way this corres¬
pondence may be explained)* fhe description of 'grasping*
and 'Shaping' in this definition is based on the fact that
subjective reason always is actualised in an Individual self
which is related to its environment and to its world in tanas
of reception end reaction, fhe mind receives and reacts* In
receiving reasonably* the mind grasps its worldf In reacting
reasonably, the mind shapes its world* 'Grasping' in tills
context, has the connotation of penetrating into the depth,
into the essential nature of a thing or an event, of under¬
standing and expressing it* 'Shaping', in this eontext,
has the connotation of transforming a given material into a
Gsstalt, a living structure which has the power ef being. • •
Subjective reason ie the rational structure ef the mind,
while objeetive reason ie the rational structure of reality
which the mind can grasp and according to which It ean
stupe reality* Reason in the philosopher grasps the reason
la nature* Reason in the artist grasps the meaning ef things*
Reason in the legislator shapes society aoeordlng to the
structures of social balance* Reason in the leaders of a
community shapes communal life eooording to the structure of
organle Interdependence* Subjective reason le rational if,
in the twofold process ef reception and reaction, it expresses
the rational structure of reality*10
Tillich proeeeds to explore the source of the creative impulse in
human personality and at the sane time to relate it to lte potential uni¬
versal incidence* Since ho la dependent upon the aesthetic philosophy ef
Kant and Sehelling, he struggles with this relationship, trying to widen its
baas of application. It la one thing for a man to have a creative experi¬
ence! it ia another for this to bo a universal principle. But ho trios to
relate the actual experience to a universal realm of values and moaning
without which there ean bo no value, meaning, future, goalo, or purpose
for human life. There la a difference in the contribution of philosophy
and theology in the 'grasping' end 'shaping* function hare*
In th« final analysis it la meaning and value which beckon
Ufa, which define purposes and instill in nan the power 'to
be'. With this broadened interpretation of man's 'shaping'
function, one decries what lies behind Tillich's different!-
ation of philosophy and theology. 'Philosophy deals with the
structure of being in itself.1 (s.T. 1 p. 22). . • Theology ie
Involvement with value* it le passion, it le 'ultimate con¬
cern'. Examination of Tillich's 'two formal criteria of
theology' (ibid. p. 11-15) helps chart the universal basis
of 'religion'. Amidst all the manifold concerns and purposes
of man* there must be for every men an ultimate concern, a
value aott#*t, in part realized, that determines his 'being
or not being'. All man who choose to live, who address them¬
selves to tomorrow, are religious and theological in this
degree. (S.T. I p. 24-25). Though himself convinced that
being-itself, the ground and power of being, God, should be
the final, conscious focus of man's ultimata concern, (ibid,
p. 275), Tillich, in hie definition of faith, allows for
lass, because he aeea in being-itself an active power uphold¬
ing all things and transcsndsntly directing them - in their
freedom - to an ultimata and. 1 God, Tillieh declares, ie no
spectator (of. ibid. p. 266), 11
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"Wis Protestant Era" (1948)
Not only does Tillich uphold an lntsrsst in an interdisciplinary
approach to the study of the whole of life and human experience, hut his own
life and activities have borne out euoh a position* Ho is a philosopher and
a theologian, with a great interest in psychology and sociology as well a«
in history «ad politics* This interest in the events of his own time led to
hie participation in the Religious-Socialist movement which triad to provide
a religious Interpretation of history in the light of the kalros doctrine
and the Protestant prinoipla that ha enunciated.
Religious socialism was always interested in human life as a
whole and never in its economic basis exclusively. In this
it was sharply distinguished from economic materialism, as
wall aa from all forms of •economism'* It did not consider
the economic factor as m independent one on which all social
reality ie dependent. It recognized the dependence of economy
itself on all other social, intellectual, and spiritual fac¬
tors, and it oreated a picture of the total, interdependent
structure of our present existence. We understood socialism
as a problem not of wages but of a new theonoray in which the
question of wages, of social security, ia treated in unity
with the question of truth, of spiritual security. • • %
entrance into the religious-socialist movement meant for me
the definitive break with philosophical idealism and theo¬
logical transcendentalism.1
Hls 1948 publication of "The Protestant Sra", which was a collection of
his writings covering a period of two decades put together in book form
around the central theme of expounding the Protestant principle, centres
around the relationships of three main concepts. Ihese are "theonomy",
"Kairoe", and "demonic". These three taken together are intended to provide
the key to understanding the Protestant meaning of history* fy "theonomy"
Tillich understands the substance of religion and culture which he eees as
continuous! "Religion ie the substance of culture, culture ia the ex-
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presaion of religion." By "kalros" he refers to the "moment in which the
eternal breaks into the temporal, and the temporal is prepared to receive
it*"' ~8y "demonic" he explains, "The idea of the demonic is the mythical
expression of a reality that was in the centre of Luther's experience as it
was in Paul's, namely, the structural, and therefore inescapable, power of
evil.*^ The eim of the divine mm* breaking into history and establish¬
ing the theonomoua culture, is to conquer the limitations of the demonic and
through the establishment of the divine structure produce the "Geetalt of
grace." This la, in other words, the Protectant principle in history.
This theme is central to his understanding of his own life and times,
K
and was the inspiration behind his involvement in Religious-Socialism^ with
several other corollaries. This theme is developed in a chapter on sacra¬
mental thinking, with a romantic stress on the place of Nature as the con¬
text of religious meaning in life* His view of Christ is seen in this light
as the basic sacramental reality, the Hew Being, through whom the "Geetalt
of grace" is seen in a unique way* And in this context is set the chapter
"The Idea end the Ideal of Personality" in which,
the relation of the personal centre, first, to nature,
second, to community, and third, to its own unconscious
basis is discussed, and the ideas for the transformation
of these relations in the coming period of history are
suggested*6
Finally a further application of the Protestant principle is to induce
theologians to reexamine the Scriptures, "as the original document of the
event which ia called 'Jesus the Christ* • • • the manifestation of the
Protestant principle*"^
In the chapter entitled, "The Idea and the Ideal of Personality"*
Tillich gives ua acme important definitions as a clue to his understanding
of the human Self, which definitions are set out like propositionsj
B
Personality is that being which has power over itself.
Personality is that being which has the cower of eel^determina¬
tion, or which is free* for to be free means to have the power
over one's self, not to be bound to one's given nature.0
Personality can also be defined as that individual being which
is able to reach universality. Freedom is the power of transcend¬
ing one's own given nature) but it would not be reel freedom if
the individual merely exchanged its peculiar nature for another
one • • • but loss of one's self."
Personality and world may bs understood as correlative con¬
cents. » • Through confronting the macrocosm, the personal self
becomes aware of Its own character as a cosmos, and by being a
microcosm the personal self is able to apprehend the macrocosm,
the world ss world. Human freedom is a function of this struc-
tural^^nterdependenoe of sslf and world, of microcosm and macro¬
cosm.
Personality, the possession of control over one's self, is
rooted in the structure of being as being. The depth of reality
is freedom, the ultimate power of being is power over itself.
And the individual personality is the place within the whole
of being where this becomes manifest and actual. The uncon¬
ditional character of the demand to become personal is the
ethical expression of the ontologies! structure of being
itself. This is the religious foundation of toe idea of
personality."
The experience of the ultimate power and meaning of the
personal is expressed in myth and dogma whenever they symbolise
toe unconditional, the ground and abyss of all beings in
personalistic terms • • . The danger of toe personal symbol
is only that its symbolic character may be forgotten and that
a judgment about toe depth and meaning of reality may be trans¬
formed into a judgment about a special being beside or above
us ... it becomes an idol,12
With tils series of propositions Tilllch fills out his Idea of self¬
hood as self-powered, self-determined, self-transcending, self-contained, and
self-realizing personality, focused in a free microcosm of being and exist¬
ing in polar relation to the macrocoamic ground of all being.
This idea of selfhood reflects his basic ontologiesl presuppositions,
but Tillich here is leaving himself open for the critic!bus of not doing
justice to the idea of "personality" either philosophically or psycho¬
logically. In other words he is fitting selfhood into his ontologies!
 
la defining these In the wear he is using then*
But taking these propositions together it becomes clear that this
essay in this oelleetioa does not try to giro a Ml definition of
personality after all, hut only to show how the particular idee that Tillich
le advancing en he fitted into hie system of thought. Ho loaves tee much
unexplored to he a full definition. Rather it is en approach to the idea
of personality within a certain perspectives i.e., hie entologioal under¬
standing as It pertains to the principle of theonomy in an expansion of the
Protestant principle in history. Soon in this light wo eon appreciate what
ho 1s trying to do, oven if tho language used suggests that ha has in fast
tons morat "Having established and interpreted the idea ef personality in its
different Implications,1,12 le how ho puts it. Perhaps his first hook in
English should he excused for a distinctly German turn ef phrase.
At this point ho goes on to contrast sharply the idea of personality
with the ideal of personality* She idea le aa ho has defined it in the
propositions above, whereby tho personality la in a self-conscious relation
with the unconditioned ground of its being) whereas the ideal la the develop¬
ment of the individual at the expense of a relationship with the eternal
dimension. He examines title contrast in a number of relationshipst person¬
ality and tilings, personality and community, and personality and soul (which
he points oat is tho fundamental one).
with regard to things, the ideal ef personality seeks to objectify all
things over against the personality which tends to control things. In this
way tha true relationship, according to Tillieh, is disrupted nod the created
order le violated, fhe idea ef personality, on the other hand, sees all things
as symbols ef the ground ef ell being and enjoys a sense ef related harmony
and unity in tho created order through which a true fulfilment of reality
can bo appreciated. Things are sacramental.
With regard to community, the basis of relationship with others can
be seen either as one of competition and power, or as one of brotherhood.
The ideal of personality seeks to develop the individual at the expense of
others, making relationship difficult, distorted, or impossible. The idea
of personality, on the other hand, rests on the fulfilment of the "I-Thou"
relationship in depth realising the social dimensions of the ground of all
being in and through true humanism and culture. This is the basic philoso¬
phy behind Religious-Socialism in personal terms.
With regard to the soul, Tillich examines the relationship between
the personality and individualism, contrasting the ideal and the idea again.
We shall define 'soul' in this context as the vital and
emotional ground from which the self-conscious centre of
personality arises. The body, of course, is included in
this definition in so far as the body is the immediate ex¬
pression and the form of the self-realization of the soul.
The relation of the conscious centre to psychic foundation
of the personality corresponds to the inter-relation of the
personality with things and community.1*
Tillich then makes an historic study of the increased incidence of
repression as the symptom of the idealized personality whioh loses its vital
power as it is increasingly subjected to rationalization and intellac¬
tual!nation through the process of individualization. He says that at
the Reformation the Church and society together imposed new laws or standards
on people.
This created a repression of vital forces which was very
successful in the beginning. But the repression was always
partially opposed, and it beoame more and more untenable
until it finally broke down in the first decades of the
twentieth century. The disintegration of the conscious¬
ness-centred personality is now proceeding on a terrifying
scale. . . Freudian and the other schools of depth psychology
brought to light: the mechanisms of repression in the bourgeois
Protestant personality and the explosive re-emergence of the
vital (unconscious) forces. ^
This is the contradiction of the ideal of personality* Tillioh
points oat that the so-called "religious personality" ie the ultimate fore
that this ideal assumes. But einee the ideal rell&lous personality is
trying to stake the person conform to en imposed standard, grace itself end
the growth of the soul ie repressed and denied* "This", says Tillioh, "is
the decisive erltieiea ef the 'ideal ef personality'.1^
what ie the answer? Bew dees the psychic foundation ef the person¬
ality develop in a full nod creative way? liilieh uses the incident ef the
healing ef the demoniac by Jesus as the key to e new form ef personal life*
But Jesus end hie disciples and followers did not overcome the
stage ef possession by proclaiming the ideal ef personality
but by embodying e »constructive structure', originating in
the divine ground, that ie, in graoe. Grace la, so to apeak,
theipoaseeelon from above', overcoming the pooeooolon from
below* while the letter destroys the personal eerntre
through the invasion of 'darkness', the former re-establishes
it by elevating the creative power ef the ground into the
unity of a personal life. Every personality stands between
possession end grace, susceptible to both. Personality is
the open arena ef the struggle between them**"
Shis chapter in the "Protestant Bra", a book which covered two decades
of hit thought end emphasis on tbo spiritual-historical situation, dots
servo to show how the shift in Tlllich's thinking during the 1940'e began
to focus on the individual without revising hie ontology* From this point
on his emphasis on the New Being further develops hie ideas of the soul and
personality* this Interest, cooing at e time when he was admittedly influ¬
enced by existentialist writers, when the rapid growth end influence of the
eoeiel sciences (including depth psychology) was felt in ell disciplines
especially theology, and also at the seas time as the revival of Biblical
theology, ltd to ?llllch further adding to hie understanding ef personal
selfhood by developing hie thinking in this direction*
1* Pool Tillich, gho Protestant Bra. (Chicago* Phoenix Books 1957
ed, originelly published 1948;Introduction p* xiv
2# P yjii
3. Ibid. P W
4* Ibid. P xirl
5* Ibid. P xvii of.
6. Ibid. P XX
7# Ibid. P xxiil, xxiv
6* Ibid. P 115
9. Xb^d* P 116
10. Ibid. P 117
11. Ibid. P 118
12. Ibid. P 119
15# Ibid. P 131
14. Ibid. P 135
15. Ibid. P 135
16. Ibid. P 134
"Existential Philosophy" (1944)
Tlllioh developed hie Ideas over against tint ontological frame of
reference that ha had accepted from the "positive philosophy" of Sehelling.
Ha regarded Schelling as a precursor or bridge standing between the idealism
of the nineteenth century and the existential philosophy of the twentieth.
In hie 1944 essay, "Existential Philosophyi Its Historical Meaning", Tillioh
traces the historical linkage and acts out the modern problems as he sees
then. In many ways this essay is biographical, netting out the way his own
thinking developed.
The distinctive way of philosophizing which today calls
itself Hxistenzphiloeophie or 'Existential philosophy'
emerged as one of the major currents of Sermon thought
under the Weimar Republic counting among its loaders such
men as Heidegger and Jaspers. But its history goes back
at least a century, to the decade of the 1840's, when its
main contentions vera formulated by thinkers like Sehelling,
Kierkegaard, and Marx, in sharp criticism of the reigning
'rationalism' or panlogiem of the Hegelians} and in the
next generation Hietssehe and Dilthey were among ita
protagonists.
Existential philosophy thus seems a specifically German
creation. It sprang originally from the tensions of the
German intellectual situation in the early nineteenth
oentuxy. It has been strongly influenced by the political
end spiritual catastrophes of the Germans in our own
generation.
Tillich refers to several lectures and books produced between 1640
and 1850 by Sehelling, Feuerbaeh, Marx, Stimer, Kierkegaard, Sehopaohauer,
ae examples of the way existential thinking wee developing. He points out
that Sehelling linked hie "positive philosophy" as he called it to earlier
thinkers including Pascal, Jacob!, Banana, Ctehme, Kant and right back to
Plato, in an attempt to show that the problem of existence rune right
through the history of philosophy. Unfortunately the impetus of this move¬
ment in the 1640'a was'disregarded to the popularity"of the Neo-Kantian
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idealism or naturalistic empiricism. Then in the 1880'b Bietzche and
Bilthey again focused on existence* And men like Bergson and William James
followed similar lines of thought.
The works of these early thinkers hare been rediscovered in the
twentieth century end developed by thinkers like Heidegger and Jaspers,
Kierkegaard and Marx have (me into tholr own. And movements like the
Beligious-Socialiam school havo tried to give an existential Interpretation
to history, Tillich calls this lest group the third stage or period. Ho
then offers a comparison of certain ideasi methods, ontologies! problems,
ethical attitudes, and draws his conclusions about their significance.
In his examination of the methodological foundations of the existential
philosophy, Tillich begins by examining the distinction between essence and
existence in the history of philosophy, showing that the two are held to¬
gether in the scholastics* concept of the Unconditioned Absoluts, but in
Kent and Hegel essence ie given priority absorbing existence. In the 1840's
the attempt was made to destroy this Hegelian all-embracing system of con¬
ceptualising everything, including existence. Kierkegaard ie quoted as say¬
ing, "Pure thought is a recent invention and a 'lunatio postulate*. The
negation of a preceding synthesis requires time. But time cannot find a
place in pure thought,*^
Tillioh points out that reason can only deal with possibility* whereas
existence ia the realm of actuality.
Only in the aesthetic attitude - in Kierkegaard's psychology,
the attitude of detachment - can we be related to 'essence',
the realm of possibility. In the aesthetic attitude, which
includes the merely cognitive, there are always many possibili¬
ties, and in it no 'decision* is demandedt in the,ethical
attitude a personal decision suet always be mads.
The problem of philosophy ie how to deal with reality, Since existence can-
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not be approached rationally it nm&t ha approached empirically.
Ml of the philosophers of Existence approached reality experimentally,
focusing on the immediate inner personal experience of the subject, 'Chen on
the basis of this personal experience, each developed a theory.
Thus for Sehelllng the approach to Existence ie through the
immediate personal experience of the Christian, the traditional
faith - although rationally interpreted, for Kierkegaard it is
the immediate personal experience of the individual in the face
of eternity, Ms personal faith - although interpreted by a
most refined dialectical reasoning, for Feoerhaeh it is the
experience of mm as mm in his sense-existence • although
developed into a doctrine of Fen. for Marx it la the experience
of socially determined sen, his Existence as a member of a
social Mass • though interpreted in terms of a universal socio¬
economic theory, for fietssehe it is the experience of a
biologically determined being, hie Existence m an embodiment of
the Will to Power - although expressed in a metaphysics of Life,
for Bcrgson it is the experience of dynamic vitality, aim's
Existence as duration and creativity - a1 though expressed in
words taken fro® the realm of non-existential space, for
Mlthey it is the experience of the intellectual life, man's
Existence in a special cultural situation - although explained
in a universal QMategphiloseoMe. Vox Jaspers it is the ex¬
perience of the inner activity of the Self, man's Existence as
•self-transcendence * - although described in terms of an immanent
psychology, for Heidegger it le the experience of that kind of
being who is 'concerned* with Being, with his Existence as care,
anxiety* end resoluteness - although Heidegger claims to describe
the structure of Being itself, for the Religious Socialist it ie
the immediate personal experience cf man's historical Existence,
the pregnant historical moment - although expressed in a
general interpretation of history.
Tillich points out that because of this approach to reality through
personal experience, toe existentialist thinkers have to use indirect means
of communication since their pupils can only think out of experience. 5hie
problem of personal or non-objective thinking poses many difficulties.
It is significant to note toe links he includes in toe chain cf
thinkers between Schelling and himself (to® exponent of to© Religious
Socialist school), end how he sees himself related to toe philosophers of
existence, differing in method and approach but having such in common. He
then turns to a consideration of ontologioal problems faced by the existen¬
tialists.
Sines he is dealing with existence, the existentialist thinker tries to
avoid the distinction between subject and object and deal with experience.
Like many other appeals to Immediate experience, it le trying
to find a level on which the contrast between •subject* and
•object' has not arisen. It aims to cut under the •subject-
object distinction• and to reach that stratum of Being which
Jaspers, for instance, calls the 'Ursorung* or 'Source'. But
in order to penetrate to this stratum ws mast leave the sphere
of •objective1 things end pass through ths corresponding •sub¬
jective' inner experience, until we arrive at the immediate
creative experience or 'Source'•5
In order to provide a special vehicle to describe this immediate per¬
sonal experience, in suoh a way as to avoid transforming humans into ob¬
jects on the one hand, and on the other lapsing into subjective terminology,
psychological concepts are employed by existentialist thinkers. However
these concepts are redefined with s non-psyohological connotation in an
attempt to describe toe structure of Being itself. These terms are not
exactly definitive, but must be understood to be half-symbolic and half-
realistic approximations, part of the problem of indirectness in communica¬
tion. But this does leave the persistent problem of distinguishing ontologi-
cal concepts from toe psychological and Heidegger for one admits that he was
unable to do this clearly. Tillich points out that in many places, includ¬
ing Sehelling*a "Human Freedom".
we find the belief in an essential relationship between human
nature and Being, the belief that toe innermost center of
Nature lies in the heart of man. An especially important
example of this ontologioal use of a psychological term is
the conception of 'Will* as the ultimate principle of
Being."
In seeking to understand this ontologioal use of terms like "Will",
"Will to Power", "Unconscious", for example, Tillich points out that in
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order to got behind the objective world, as it were# this raises the problem
of the relationship between the finite and the infinite* According to
idealist thinking the finite is identified with the infinite at essentially
one and the sane* According to mystical thinking the difference io tempor¬
arily overeats®. But in existential thinking the difference io reestablished.
He quotes Kierkegaard as saying, ^Existence is a synthesis of the infinite
and the finite,® then he underlines that a synthesis is tha opposite of
identity as it rather establishes the difference first of all. fhle implies
that man's* finitude Is "the very etrueture of the human mind®, to be accepted
net faulted as shortcomings, error, or sinfulness.
Thta acceptance of fAttitude is necessary to sn understanding of man,
for aa Tillieh points cut, it is through finitude that man finds hie centre?
Ac cntslegioal doctrine of nan develops the structure of
flmit&de as man finds it in himself es the center of his own
personal Existence# He alone of all finite beings is aware
of his own flnltudof therefore the way to ontology passes
through the doctrine of man. But of course, in traveling
this way he cannot oeeapo hie finitude* the way to finitado
is itself finite and cannot claim finalityi such la the
limit sot upon the Kxiatentlal thinker.«
Tlllieh then goes on to show that the discussion of finitude leads to
an analysis of Time. Existence is distinguished from essence by its temporal
character, although this character has been analysed in many ways by the
various existential thinkers. Immediately experienced Time with its
personal meaning as it is experienced must be distinguished from the timeless-
noss of oseentioliot thinking, end also from the objectively measured Tim of
scientific thinking, existential or qualitative Time is described in various
ways, but many have soma idea of a"pregmant moment" of groat import in
personal experience (as Kierkegaard), or In history (as Religious Socialism)*
Existential Time places a mm in history, related to the past, acting
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in the present, but directed towards the future. To understand human nature
it is necessary to consider this historical dimension to life and to eee that
a man relates to life meaningfully in time* This is the only way he can find
meaning, purpose, and community for himself.
Since Tillich has examined a large group of "Existential" philosophers
covering a period of over one hundred years, his own position and interests
become apparent. He points out in his conclusion that the group he has sel¬
ected are "existential" philosophers only in certain areas of their thought
and concern, some almost incidentally, but their ideas arise out of a common
situation in European history over the last century. All oppose the de¬
humanizing effects of mechanism, rationalism, secularized humanim, and
institutionalized religion. All ettempt to discover "Reality as men experi¬
ence it immediately in their actual living .... to discover the creative
realm of being which is prior to and beyond the distinction between objec-
8
tlvity and subjectivity." This is his own concern which he puts this way*
"the essence of objectivity could be found in the depth of subjectivity -
8
in which God could be beat approached through the soul."
In another essay, written in 1955* entitled "The Theological Signifi¬
cance of Existentialism and Psychoanalysis", he acknowledges his debt to the
Existentialist thinkers as far as his own position is concerned*
Existentialism is now taken in a much broader sense than it was
a few years after the Second World War. At that time exis¬
tentialism was identified with the philosophy of Sartre. But
existentialism appears in decisive forms early in the 17th and
in the 19th centuries, and it is incorporated in almost all
great creations in all areas of life in the 20th century. If
you understand existentialism in this broader sense, it suggests
very definitely a relationship between existentialism and psy¬
choanalysis. A basic assertion to be made about the relation¬
ship of theology and psychoanalysis in that psychoanalysis be¬
longs fundamentally to the whole existentialist movement of the
20th century, and that as a part of this movement it must be
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understood in ite relationship to theology In the sasie way
in which the relationship of existentialism generally must
he understood."
For Tillich there Is no distinction between theology end philosophy to all
intents and purposes since both are ways of interprsting the wast range
of human existential experience. So sees psychoanalysis ss veil es other
disciplines simply as tools in a common task#
It ia then possible to disregard those people who tell us to
stay in this or that fieldi here a system of theologioal doc¬
trines and there congeries of psychological insights. Ibis
ia not so. The relationship la not one of existing alongside
each other? it is a relationship of mutual interpenstration.10
He goes on to say that many people in different ways, in philosophy*
and art* and science* and religion* and others too all try to stress the
study of life itself rather then man's thoughts about many things. Hs shows
that in all ages, certainly from the time of the Reformation* this existen¬
tial search has gone on, but now it greatly aided by Ibsudt
All the things which is these man were ontologieel intuition
or theological analysis now through Fraud became methodologi¬
cal scientific words. Freud* in hie discovery of the un¬
conscious* rediscovered something that was known long before,
and had been used for amy decades end even centuries to fight
the victorious philosophy of consciousness, what Freud did
waa to give to this protest a scientific methodological founda¬
tion. In him we mat see the old protest against the philosophy
of consciousness*
J. H. Thomas sums up his orientation to life and thought briefly* show¬
ing how he wss influenced greatly by his time and teachers*
Life in Berlin did not encourage this romantic strain* though
the influence of his parents' strong personalities tended to
increase the pressure of the sociological and psychologies!
restrictions of his early life. Consequently Tillich soon
realised that the belsnoe of the romantic and revolutionary
motives was one of the basic problems of hie thought sad life.
The same kind of tension was produced by the intellectual
forces which influenced him during his university careers*
The decisive lesson he learned was that the Protestant theology
far from being stagnant was able to incorporate strictly
scientific methods without losing its Christian foundations
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The other dynamic influence wee that of Kierkegaard whora
Tillieh discovered during this period.
Kierkegaard*® dialectic shook hut did not break fillich*s
nineteenth-century conservatism. And despite the Aspect of
both Biblioel Criticism and of Kierkegaard, Tillicfe end hie
contemporaries still hoped that the great synthesis between
Christianity and humanism could be achieved with the help of
German classical phlleeophy. This is not to say, however, that
Kierkegaard*e influence on Tillich hae been negligible} for it
le easy enough to chow the Kierkegaardian origin of much of hie
thought* What it doee seen ie that Kierkegaard** thought re-
sained for Tillieh in a very real sense enclosed in ite nineteenth-
century expression* It is significant that he regards the
philosophy of Sshelling** second period ae being the beginning of
Ihdstsntiaii&gu * • Fbr ©Lllich Kierkegaard does not represent
a new force in philosophy but the continuation of the kind of
break with Segal which had been effected in Sehelling**
•positive philosophy**
One final point on this subject suet be mentioned* In so far
as Tillieh can be said to fc® in the *existentialist* tradition he
must also reflect the influence of Uusserl whose phanomenologicai
philosophy fonts the link between Kierkegaard and contemporary
philosophy, the popularity of this philosophical school in Germany
a generation ago makes it extremely probable that this was the kind
of philosophy Tillieh was taught* In which case the influence of
Buseerl case from two directions.
When we consider tillieh*s biography hare along with hi® essays m
existentialist thinkers, we can see that he is using the tens "existentialist*
and "existentialism" in ways that are peculiarly his own* In ens way he usee
the ten in a restricted way, since it reflects the background of nineteenth-
century thinking and therefore is rather undeveloped in the light of subse¬
quent ussage* But this Is also rather unrestricted, since it opens the door
to unwarranted generalities which result almost in a tautology* In order to
understand the meaning (and meanings) he attaches to these tens we met see
how he uses the words and whose philosophy he indicates on his list*
From the essays it is apparent that Tillieh is using the terra
"existentialist" to «s>ply to any thinker who dealt with human problems of
existence in the broadest sense of the tens. % pointing out the diversity
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eaong the "philoeophere of existence" as ho calls then, including Plato and
Kant, ho argues for this broadsr understanding which includes the whole of
the psychoanalytic school as well as the literal? and artistic ethos of our
century. By such en all-sabracing approach, he certainly includes hlasclf,
hut he also makes it much more obscure: as to his exact position. Be seems
to argue that he has learned audi from the "existentialists* he cites and
in a general sense would be one with then. Re does, however, leave room for
his own developing system of thought, especially his eotolegieal investiga*
tions, to go beyond any strict definition of "existentialists* which might
be identified with the position of Jaspers, Heidegger, or Sartre, for
exanpls. In that he commits himself to an approach which begins with the
doctrine of Man based on human experience . approaching God through the human
soul • he would bo forced to aoeept the tor® "existentialist* in s narrower
sense whan speaking of this approach, although ha would not bo comfortable
with the term as a blanket category for all his thinking.
Tillich ia not alone in resisting the "existentialist" label.
Heidegger, Marcel, Jaspers and others have all repudiated the label although
they are still classified as existsntlsllst thinkers by most philosophers and
historians. Perhaps it is bassos# it is so inexact a description, or perhaps
it is because of the diversity of approaches within the category, that the
confusion exists* Tillieh's method of trying to sort ou£ the range of
approach of ooverel thinkors is a common and necessary exeroies in tackling
the problem. But each author selects his own list so suit his own ends*
Tillich's inclusion of Plato, Kant, Sehalling, Marx, Bergson, Fraud and
Religious Socialism opens the door to the broadest possible interpretation of
what existentialism includes both in philosophy and beyond to other die*
ciplines, indeed extending to the whole of human experience. She problem of
time, and history requires the setting of bounds, but there la tremendous
variation in the ways those bounds can be set* the problem of understanding
ontology raises both the question of the existential boundaries and the
question of when those limits are pssssd over end the discussion is no
longer "existential" in nature*
Tillich's reference to Religious Socialism in his list of existen¬
tial thinkers apparently is an attempt to oontraet his own position with that
of the others# The dietinetive ho claims is "the immediate personal experi¬
ence of man's historical &cietenee, the pregnant historical moment * *
Put this way, hie position is indeed a narrow and specific definition of
"existentialist1'* If hie further discussion of finitudo* time, end history
ie consistent with this understanding, as we have seen it certainly was in
hie earlier period ae reflected in "the Protestant Era" which spanned twenty
years, then it becomes clear that Tillich usee the term in both a general
sense mad in this concrete specific sense*
The confusion in tens teems to arlcc when he goes on to discuss
ontology* In many ways his position in this groat search la very similar to
that of Heidegger, net just that they shore a common goal and concern* Both
Heidegger and ¥illieh ware trained in elassloal philosophy end both carried
forward many beeie concepts they learned from Aristotle and Plato respectively
with respect to ontology* For Heidegger, the basle question la not knowledge
about the empirical world that la important, but the way wo are in relation
to the world affords uo direct knowledge of the being which ie in us, in the
world, and is manifested in the way we relate to Being-ltself* Abstraction
is to be abhorred? involvement In existence includes caring in history* for
Tillich, abstraction le not to be abhorred but rather is the goal of our
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THE HITMAN SITUATION
Tillich'a interest in the existentialists and hie appreciation of the
tremendous contribution of the psychoanalytic school of psychotherapy led
him to take the stanee of an existentialist in probing the human situation*
He vrestled with the fallemneee of man in his alienation and estrangement
in all its dimensions, with anxiety and courage, and with faith in God. His
aarsons and popular writings refleot this on-going concern. Then he
incorporates his insights into his Systematica in a more formal manner. The
importance of those existential concerns cannot be overrated in their influ¬
ence upon Tillich since he does not live end write in an ivory tower* In his
lectures he la recorded to have made the following comment»
This discovery of existentialism has a great significance for
theology. It has seen the dark elements in man as over against
a philosophy of consciousness which leys all the stress on man's
conscious decisions and good will. The existentialists allied
themselves with Fraud's analysis of ths unconscious in protest
against a psychology of consciousness which had previously ex¬
isted. Existentialism and psychotherapeutic psychology ere
natural allies and have always worked together. This redis¬
covery of the unconscious in man is of ths highest importance
for theology. It has changed the moralistic and idealistic
types which we have discussed; it has placed the question of
the human condition at the center of all theological thinking,
and for this reason it has made the answers meaningful again.
In this light we oan say that existentialism end Freud, together
with hie followers and friends, have become the providential
allies of Christian theology in the twentieth century.*
In e broad sense Tillich can be called an Augustlnlan theologian in hie
understanding of ths fslltnness of ths human situation. He differs from
exietentislist theologians of ths past who have attempted to ignore ths
realities of sin and unbelief, or at least to treat them less seriously.
Be is enough of an existentialist to hold to ths radical nature of ths fall.
2
In Volume II of the Systematica, Tillich begins with an analysis of the
existential condition of oreaturely existence living in the power of being
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which is derived from being*-itself. In this power, life oan be affirmed
over against r.onbeing. Man, however, is a self-conscious being, a completely
centered self, and in the struggle to assert self-consciousness over against
nonbeing this resistance is translated into a resistance against the ground
of being-itself. Both being-itself and nonbeing are resisted as threats to
the centered self without properly distinguishing the two. This is possible
because of the element of freedom, albeit a finite and relative freedom.
Man uses his freedom to oppose the source and ground of his life and freedom.
Hence it is through his freedom that man finds himself isolated and afraid.
Tillich's analysis of this condition is that in freedom man denies
his finitude, yet because he is aware of finitude impinging upon him, limiting
him in so many ways, forcing him to accept his present and ultimate limits
in terms of his personality and his experience in the world, he becomes
anxiety-ridden. His attempt to live an independent existence heightens his
anxiety since it is a fundamental denial of his self-centeredness. This
anxiety is of several separate types, each affecting different levels of his
personality, bxit ultimately ontologioal anxiety in the face of nonbeing,
death, faces every man. Tor Tillich this constitutes a basic defiance of
the Absolute. Such autonomy of the self in its struggle for complete in¬
dependence, disregarding the limitations set by human finitude, is sin.
In estrangement, man is outside the divine center to which hie
own center essentially belongs. He is the center of himself
and of his world. The possibility of leaving his essential
center - and, with this possibility, the temptation - is given
beoause structurally he is the only fully centered being. He
alone has not only consciousness (which is a high, but incom¬
plete, centeredness) but selfconsciousness or complete centered-
ness. This structural centeredness gives man his greatness,
dignity, and being, the 'image of God'. It indicates his ability
to transcend both himself and his world, to look at both, and to
see himself in perspective as the center in which all parts of
his world converge. To be a self and to have a world constitute
the challenge to man as the perfection of creation. But this
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perfection is, at the came time, his temptation. Man is tempted
to make himself exietentially the center of himself and his
world. What looking at himself and his world, he realises his
freedom and, with it, his potential infinity. He realises that
he is not bound to any special situation or element in it. But,
at the same time, he knows that he is finite. • •
The word hubris cannot be adequately translated, although the
reality to which it pointe ie described not only in Greek
tragedy but also in the Old Testament. Zt is most distinctly
expressed in the serpent's promise to Ere that eating from
the tree of knowledge will make man equal to God. Hubris is
the self-elevation of man into the sphere of the divine.
Mzls is not one form of sin boeido others. It is sin in its
total form, namely, the other side of unbelief or man's turn¬
ing away from the divine center to which he belongs. It la
turning toward one's self es the center of one's self and one's
world. This turning toward one'a self is not an sot dons by a
special part of men, such as his spirit. Man's whole life,
including hie sensual life, is spiritual. And it is in the
totality of his personal being that man makes himself the
center of hie world. • • Its main symptom is that man does
not acknowledge his flnitude.*
The self-contradiction of hubris leads to the destruction of selfhood
and estrangement from God as "existential finituds". Since each of the basic
expressions of men's existential state (unbelief, hubris, and concupiscence)
contradicts man's essential being, it drives the polar elements of this
being into oonflict with each other. This he calls the "structure of
estrangement".^
Hare Tllllch is his analysis of existential estrangement in the human
situation takes material whloh reflects his existential concern for the great
contradictions in human life end ineludee them in hie framework of thought
which is expressed in terms of esssntlallst universale. He doss not try to
avoid the ambiguities in an attempt to gain a consistent presentation, but
rather, ha would prefer to leave room for ambiguities cub polar extremes within
a unifying whole of a category, e.g. "the structure of estrangement" (a novel
way of expressing the disruption of fallennsss). The existential ambiguities
of the Sslf constantly challenge this method.
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Another example of how Tillieh seeks to bring together matters of
existential concern end Include them In his systematic presentation is that
of courage and anxiety, which is closely akin to freedom and hubris. We can
see this most clearly set forth in hie book "The Courage to Be" of 1952*
The existential condition of human life has a greater potential than
hie analysis of estrangement would indicate. It is only one side of the coin
as it were, and Tillieh seeks to show how the Self might be transcended, how
human personality slight be redeemed. Like John Raemurray in hie Gifford
Lectures,' Tillieh is concerned to ahow that the Self ia to be conceived in
dynamic relationships rather than in static categories. In order to do this
the contributions of modern psychological investigations must be taken into
account, but at the same time he ie concerned to explore the metaphysical
implications so that he might systematise hie thinking. Consequently, he
chose terms which have a philosophical background and yet have not become
overloaded with psychological overtones by being put to use in completely
different and modern contexts. Calling upon his classical background, he
developed the notion of courage.
Courage as the universal and essential self-affirmation of
ons*s being ie en ontologies! concept. The courage to be ie
the ethical set in which man affirms his own being in spite
of those elements of his existence which conflict with his
essential self-affirmation. In Plato's Republic courage ie
related to that element of the soul which is called thymes
(the spirited, courageous element), and both are related to
that level of society which ie called ohylakee (guardians).
Thymes lias between the intellectual and the sensual element
in man. It is the unreflective striving towards what is noble*
As such it has a central position in the structure of the soul,
it bridges the olsavage between reason and desire. • • But it
is remarkable that Plato saw the thymoeidee (middle of man's
being) as an essential function of man's being, an ethical and
sociological quality. * • The Greek word for courage, andrela
(manliness) end the Latin word fortitude (strength) indicate
the military connotation of courage. As long as the aristocracy
was the group which carried arms the aristocratic and the
military connotations of courage merged • • • • but the
aristocratic line was revived in the early Middle Ages. Courage
became again characteristic of nobility.
Tillich points out in his discussion of Aquinas* use of eoursge as one
of the four cardinal virtues (wisdom, courage, temperance, end Justice) that
since Thomas comes down on the primacy of the intellect, then wisdom in foot
subordinates the others end leads into static rationalistic thought.
Protestants, on the other hand, so emphasised the will that courage became
autonomous in effect, subordinating wisdom and Justice in activism. The same
is true in much of the existentialist thinking which lays each great stress
on decisions of the will. -The careful background given in researching this
tera is typical of Tillich*e appreciation for history as well as his search
for metaphysical roots for his systematic thinking.
He argues that from the times of the ancient Greeks until the
Renaissance Stoicism was "the only real alternative to Christianity in the
7
Western world".' The Stoical attitude is one of cosmic resignation, while
Christianity stands for cosmic salvation. Both require courage. In the
Western world both theee attitudes can be seen} the Stoical attitude coming
out in the renunciation of the world associated with asceticism, and the
Christian attitude of faith coming out in world affirmation, in looking to
the future end creatively taking a hand in shaping it.
While the ancient world valued the individual not as an individual
but as a representative of something universal, e.g., a virtue,
the rebirth of antiquity sew the individual as an individual,
a unique expression of the universe, incomparable, irreplaceable,
and of infinite significance. . • Modern humanism la still
humanism, rejecting the idea of salvation. But modern humanism
also rejects renunciation. It replaces it by a kind of self-
affirmation which transcends that of the Stoics because it
includes the material, historical, and individual existence.
Nevertheless, there are so many points in which this modern
humanism is identical with ancient Stoicism that it may ba
called Beo-Stoicism.8
He goes on to show that in Spinoza, this Keo-Stoicism finds an exponent and
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self-affirmation is seen as participation in divine self-affirmatio®.
Nov self-affirmation does not take plaoe in a vacuum. It ia the
affirmation of being by the Self over against the existential conditions
which threaten being, that la nonbeing. It la a part of the process of liv¬
ing as a creature in this world subject to the limitations of time and
space. These limitations form the boundaries for the Self and awareness
of them produces anxiety in the person who le thus self-conscious. Since
nonbelng ie in feet a fear of the unknown it produces anxiety not fear which
has an object. Fear can be faced and thus taken into one's self-affirmation
a
with courage, but anxiety lies beyond the boundaries of our finitude. The
courage to face anxiety requires ue to go beyond our Self.
There are at least three distinguishable types of anxiety for the
normal man facing life, according to Tillioh. Just aa all anxiety la related
to the threat of nonboing as man becomes aware of his finitude, the three
types of anxiety are related to three different ways in which a men faals
emptiness and loneliness of the loss of meaning in life? and also in terms
of feelings of guilt and condemnation. In each of these wsys there is
sufficient grounds for anxiety of a distinctly different type. Each of these
threats to life is a part of the existential reality of normal life. Bare
Tillich is indebted to the contributions of depth analysis of personality.
The anxiety of death is the threat of extinction. This does not always
appear in such a bold form, but may impose itself in terms of the arbitrary
hand of fate. It le profoundly disturbing to feel that one is merely a victim
of blind forces which affect our Uvea without respect to anything we have or
have not done. Death ia the and of this process. Tillich refers to this type
of anxiety as that which threatens our "ontic self-affirmation* and it is
always present along with other anxieties.
57
The anxiety of meaninglessneea threatens can's spiritual self-affirma¬
tion, This refers to the shattering of the structures of life and personality
that sight he called spiritual emptiness, a sense of isolation and lostness.
Meaninglessaeee and futility is prominent in tfssteen society.
The anxiety of condemnation threatens man's moral self-affirmation.
It is true that pathological anxiety rests on aubjaotivo guilt, hut it ia
objective guilt that Tillieh has in view here as he is speaking of normal
existential conditions under awareness of finitude, Man's whole being ea a
moral creature ia at stake, Such awareness might follow an existential
moment when remorse brings fresh insight or whan the oonsequenees of actions
overtake the person. Again all three levels ere present together.
In all three forms anxiety is existential in the sense that it
belongs to existence as such and not to an abnormal state of
mind ea in neurotic (end psychotic) anxiety* • • However, it
must be stated that the difference of type does not mean mutual
exclusion, • * the courage to be as it appears in the ancient
Stoic conquers not only the fear of death hut also the threat
of meaningleaanoaa. In Hlstsaehe wo find that In spits of the
predominance of the threat of meaningleaaneee, the anxiety of
death and condemnation U passionately challenged. In all
repreaentativas of claesloal Christianity death and sin art seen
as the allied adversaries against which the courage of faith has
to fi#it, The three forme of anxiety (end of courage) are
immanent in each other but normally tinder the dominance of one
of them.10
Courage for Tillich is self-affirmation in the face of the fact of
existsntial threats to being producing either fear or anxiety. Courage ia
sufficient for fearj but courage in the form of faith, or rather courage
grounded in faith which means transcending the self, le needed to meet all
the levels of normal anxieties threatening our life. Faith implies a
relationship over end beyond the boundaries of human finitude with what
Tillich terms the "ground of all being".
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Since the relation of man to the ground of his being must be
expressed in symbols taken from the structure of being, the
polarity of participation and individualization determines the
special character of this relation as it determines the special
character of the oourage to be* If participation is dominant,
the relation to being*itself has a mystical character, if
individualization prevails the relation to being-itself has a
personal character, if both poles are accepted and transcended
the relation to belng-itself has the character of faith.11
At this point ve see the subtle shift from Tillich the man wrestling
with existential concerns, matters of fear and anxiety, courage and faith,
to Tillich the systematic theologian neatly defining items within his system
of thought so that these definitions will fit into a metaphysical scheme.
He has chosen terms that can be used in this way* Sow he introduces the
idea of "symbols" so that he can bridge the gap between existential concerns
and ontologlcal thought-forme* These symbols become the categories into
which the existential issues are placed ae polarities within a larger uni^r*
This application of his method is what he calls "correlation".
The process of moving from the existential situation over to toe
♦
philosophical system of thought-forme is clearer In "The Courage to Be" ae
outlined above, but it is incorporated into toe "Systematic Theology" in a
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discussion of flnitude in relation to infinitude. There his study of
anxiety is compressed so as to fit into toe several categories under which
he Is discussing human finitude* For examples
Flnitude ie awareness in anxiety* Like finitude, anxiety is
an ontologlcal quality* It cannot be derived* it can only
be seen aid described* Occasions in which anxiety is aroused
met be distinguished from anxiety itself* As an ontological
quality, anxiety is as omnipresent as is finitude* Anxiety
is independent of any special object which might produce it?
it la dependent only on toe threat of nonbeing - which is
identical with finitude. In this sense it has been said rightly
that toe object of anxiety is 'nothingness* - and nothingness
is not an 'object*. Objects are feared. A danger, a pain, en
enemy, may be feared, but fear can be conquered by action*
Anxiety cannot, for no finite being can conquer ita finitude*
Anxiety ie alwaye present, although often it ie latent* There-
for#, it can become manifest At any and every moment, even in
situations where nothing is to be feared. The recovery of the
meaning of anxiety through the combined endeavour# of existential
philosophy, depth psychology, neurology, end the arts ie one of
the achievements of the twentieth century.**
Tillich, while discussing estrangement, employe both the language and
the approach of an existentialist in order to wrestle with the actual situ*
ation of the human condition. The same ia true when he ie seeking to
analyse fear and anxiety over against courage and faith. He ie not being
unduly subjective, but he ie in faot looking at these problems from the
"inside" aa it were. Then when he seeks to place this discussion in the
context of hie theoretical structure he becomes objective and abstract in
his approach, dealing with flnitude and infinitude, being sad nonbelng. At
this point we need only note this shift. Perhaps it ia unavoidable in the
theological task, but from our vantage point we can distinguish the data
of reality as experienced and the secondary task of reflecting upon this and
setting conclusions forth in a consistent style. More weight, it seems, in
practice at least (sermons, lectures, and popular writings) is given by
Tillieh to the existential starting-points. Tillich ia aware of this tension
and it ie never resolved for him since he attempts to hold both in view as
polar extremes within his ontologleal structure as he conceives it.
Anxiety is an ontologleal concept because it expresses finitude
from 'inside'. Here It met be said that there ie no reason
for preferring concepts taken from (outside* to those taken from
'inside*. According to the self-world structure, both types are
equally valid. The self being aware of itself end the self look¬
ing at its world (including itself) ere equally significant for
the description of the ontological structure. • • It would seem
adequate therefore, to give a description of finitude from both
outside and inside, pointing to the special form of anxious
awareness which corresponds to whatever special form of finitude
is under consideration.*4
He seems almost to apologise for giving such weight to existential concerns
while carrying out the systematic task of the theologian. At any rate he
does attempt to include these concerns although in an abstracted form.
Another example of Tillich*s existential wrestling with reality over
against hie systematic presentation of hie conclusions is in the way he deals
with faith. In "Th® Courage to Be", he has defined faith as "the state of
being grasped by the power of being-itself"^ and the exercise of faith is
the experiencing of this power.
We have defined courage as the self-affirmation of being in
spite of non-being. The power of this self-affirmation is the
power of being which is effective in every act of courage.
Faith ie the expertmice of this power.
But it is as experience which has a paradoxical character,
the character of accepting acceptance. Being-iteelf trans¬
cends every finite being infinitely; God in the divine-human
encounter transcends nan unconditionally. Faith bridges this
infinite gap by accepting the fact that in spite of it the
power of being is present, that he who ie separated is accepted. • •
Faith ie the existential acceptance of something transcending
ordinary experience.1®
Turning to his discussion of faith in the Systematise Volume III, his
different style of presentation indicates clearly that he regards the
systematic task as quite different from that in "The Courage to Be**.
... faith is tha state of being grasaed by the transcendent
unity of unambiguous life - it embodies love as the state of
being taken into that transcendent unity. From tele analysis,
it is obvious that faith logically precedes love, although in
actuality neither em be present without tee other. Faith
without love is a continuation of estrangement and en ambiguous
act of religious self-transcendence, love without faith is an
ambiguous reunion of tee separated without tee criterion and tee
power of tee transcendent union. Helteer of teem is a creation
of tha Spiritual Presence, but bote result from religious dis¬
tortions of en original Spiritual creation.
These statements presuppose a full discussion of faith mi love
in order to bo understandable. Such discussion could fill a large
volume. (I myself have dealt with faith and love, each in a mall
book. Faith* Dynamics of faith* lovei Love. Power and Justice.)
However, this is not tee present task, which is to determine tee
place of the tec concepts within tee theological system and to
show in this way their relation to other theological concepts
and religious symbols.1'
Clearly In hie Systematic Theology Tillich is not prepared to discuss
faith and love themselves, that is sxistentlally; hut only the concepts of
faith and love, that is essentially or abstractly. He sees hie task in the
systematic approach on quite a different level from that of his existential
wrestling with the realities themselves. The human situation is one thing:,
hut theologizing shout concept® derived from participation in the human
situation is separated for Tillieh into a different activity.
The question before us, therefore, ie whether the existential problems
of the eelf simply address and illustrate the doctrine of the Self as far so
Tillieh is concerned, or whether the doctrine of the Self is grounded In and
upon the existential self as experienced directly. Since Tillioh does in
fact take the teaching® and insights of existentialism seriously it ie
possible that the existential self takes priority over the esaentialiet Self
(concept or doctrine). But on the other hand, Tillich's commitment to
essentiallet patterns of thou^t and ontologteal concerns say vail be his
overriding consideration in maintaining the consistency Of the doctrine of the
Self becoming far removed from the self as experienced. At any rate this
tension between the two is apparent and it is my thesis that this la not
resolved within hie theological system as such.
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miich as an Existentialist Theologian
Although Tillich is usually regarded as an existentialist theologian
and there ia evidence for such a conclusion when we consider his popular
writings, his sermons, his kalros doctrine of history, and his use of
Biblical material which abounds in existential content, we need to ask if
he really la* We need to distinguish between theologizing about existential
questions and writing theology as an existentialist* Such a distinction is
required when we consider that his Systematic Theolo&y ia organised about
fire existential questions {human rationality, human finitude, human sin,
human selfhood and spirit, human destiny) which then give rise to their
theological answers. When he launches into theology Itself in order to
answer the questions does he continue his existentialist stance or rather
does he leave that behind as he crosses over to systematic and abstract think¬
ing?
When this question was put to Tillioh himself, he refused to accept the
label "existentialist" end made it even more difficult to "place" him by this
answer<
But there are two possible ways of looking at man. The one way
ia essantlalist which develops the doctrine of man in terms of
his essential nature within the whole of the universe. The other
way is existentialist which looks at man in his predicament in
time and space, and sees the conflict between what exists in time
and space and what is essentially given. • • for me essential!s®
and existentialism belong together. It Is impossible to be a pure
essentlaliet if one is personally in the human relation and not
sitting on the throne of Sod. • • On the other hand, a pure exis¬
tentialism is impossible because to describe existence one must
use language. low language deals with universale. In using
universale, language is by its very nature eseentialist, and cannot
escape it. • • Existentialism is possible only as an element in a
larger whole, as an element in a vision of the structure of being
in its created goodness, and, then as a description of msn*s exis¬
tence within that framework.
Is it possible to hold both assent!aliem and existentialism together





courage to be, and of discovering the reality of faith as being grasped by
the power of Being-iteelf. Such an approach on Tillieh's part he haa learned
fro® the existentialists and haa included aa a real part of his thought.
Later ve will in that these existential concerns, real aa they are, are
fitted into hie system of thought with more or lees success. At any rata
they are part of hie life and approach, even though he instate on setting
them against an eaasntlaliet frame of reference.
Although he differs radically from Heidegger aa to his basic method
whereby he denies the necessity of bringing everything to an existentialist
basis in order to proceed to m understanding of it, Till!oh does cone very
oloee to Heidegger in many of his approaches and conclusions since he does
take seriously the existential concerns of the human situation. This is seen
clearly whan the discussion turns from ontology to temporality. In both
personal and historical matters this agreement la moat striking.
Heidegger explains "anticipatory resoluteness'* as the way toe human
potentiality for wholeness is expressed in authentic possibility. Resolute¬
ness is the way Casein deals with anxiety about itself, facing the possibility
of nullity through guilt and death. In order to deal with anxiety, the
limitations of Casein must be faced, forcing Casein aa limited to be con¬
sidered as a whole with boundaries. How toe wcy in which Casein approaches
those boundaries ie toe way that authentic existence opens up. Anticipation
leads to resolution, especially regarding death and guilt.
adetentially, however. Casein* e ,l^afiy0jcaB=M' impli*®
Being-frwasfls-toe-end. A# being-ftwfflrdq-thy-«nd which
understands — that la to say, aa anticipation of death —
resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be. Resolute¬
ness does not just •have* a connection with anticipation, aa
with something other than itself. It harbours in itself
flffiaafto poagj&a abstention
modality of ita own authenticity.0
Since according to Heidegger, anticipation looks ahead, eeee the
boundaries, and also raises the possibilities, then resolution manifests
this potentiality* Bsnoe "anticipatory resoluteness" relates existentially
to wholeness within the dimension of temporality. This he tame "care".
Only on the basis of £as*in's whole Being doss anticipation
make Being-guilty nsnifest. Care harbours in itself both
death and guilt equiprlmordially. Only in anticipatory
resoluteness is the potential! ty-for-Beii^guilty understood
authentically and wholly — that is to say, primordial!?. '
For Heidegger the feeing of 1ho boundaries is not an escape from
reality, tot rather the way that life can be faced authentically. In his
Interpretation of the real connection between resoluteness and anticipation
in terms of exletenoe he sees this as the opening up of possibilities.
Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated
for the ♦overcoming* of doathi it la rather that understand¬
ing which follows the call of conscience and which frees for
death tha possibility of acquiring power ewer £asein*s ml&»
tenoe and of basically dispersing all fugitive Self-Conceal-
manta. Nor does wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which has been
determinate as Being- towards-death, signify a kind of ssoluaion
in which one floss the world) rather, it brings one without
Illusions into toe resoluteness of * taking notion* • Neither
does anticipatory resoluteness stem frost Idealistic exactions
soaring above existence and Its possibilities) it springs from
a sober understanding of what are faotieally toe basic possi¬
bilities for Baaeln. Along with tot sober anxiety which brings
us faea to face with our individualised potential!ty-for-
Belng, there goes an unshakable Joy in this possibility. In it
Pasein becomes free from toe entertaining *incidentals* with
which busy curiosity keeps providing Itself — primarily from
toe events of toe world.9
TiHi«h comes very close to Heidegger*a position in his discussion of
toman finituds. Be toochae that to undarstsnd being, ws must understand the
threat of non-being, that ia, toe boundaries of our being. This gives him
his definition of finltude, "being limited by nenbeing". Although he has
been discussing ontological categories and concepts, when he turns to discuss
finituds he uses existential language.
Selfhood, Individuality, dynamic®» and freedom all include
raanifoldness, definiteneas, differentiation, and limitation.
To be something is not to be something else. To be here and
now in tha process of becoming ia not to be there and then,
ill categories of thought and reality express thla situation.
To be something is to be finite.
Finitude is experienced on the human level} nonbeing is
experienced as the threat to being. Tha end la anticipated.
The process of self- transcendence carries a double meaning
in each of ita momenta. • . In order to be aware of moving
toward death, man must look over his finite being as a whole}
he must in some way be beyond it. He must also be able to
Imagine infinity} (although) ... only as an abstract
possibility. Tha finite self faces a world} the finite
individual has toe power of universal participation.10
Heidegger outlines toe steps he followed in developing his method of
existential interpretation, always avoiding the importing of ideas from
eesantiallet categories so that Dsaein can impose itself.
Under toe guidance of this idea tha preparatory analysis of
too evaxydayness tost liaa closest to ua has been carried out
as far ee toe first conceptual definition of 'care*. This
latter phenomenon has enabled us to gat a more precise grasp
of existence and of ita relatione to faotioity and falling. And
defining toe structure of care has given us a basis on which to
distinguish ontologieally between existence and Reality for toe
first time. This has led us to too thesis that tha substance
of man is existence.1*
He then wrestles with toe concept of Being which he has just expressed
in an ontological formula as a part of his Interpretation at this point,
as well as toe baeio primordial experience of Pasein which is toe clue
to our existence and toe way we grasp toe significance of our Being. This
raises the charge of a * circular argument*, simply proving one's pre¬
suppositions, which he then addressee:
When it is objected that the existential Interpretation ia
'circular', it is said that wa have 'presupposed* toe idem
of existence and of Being in general, and that Daseln gets
Interpreted 'accordingly', so that toe idea of Being may be
obtained from it. But what does 'presupposition♦ signify?
In positing the idea of existence, do we also posit some
propositions about too Being of Tteeein, in accordance with
formal rules of consistency? Or does this presupposing have
have the character of an understanding projection, in such a
manner indeed that the Interpretation by which such an under¬
standing gets developed, will let that which la to be
interpreted p\rt Aftfr? mflff ,l9F UrTtflr f*??* W9*
eo W ^.ciae of its own accord whether, as the
** *ft ^ kftft tftat state of Being fof whl.fr
oaed in the projection with regard to lte
For Heidegger Being imposes itself upon the consciousness as it la ex¬
perienced and words are employed tentatively to express what la thus experi¬
enced. The interpretation la circular as these 'tentative ideas are linked
together, further clarifying progressive experience. The ideas must not,
however, become detached from the experience of Baeein in the name of a
logical theory or consistent deduction without negating their validity,
which validity derives not from logic but from what is described. Heidegger
defends the uss of tee circular presentation primarily on the grounds teat
it is "common sense" of the "they-Self" white sets up tee rules of logic
in tee first plaes in order to escape confronting Being. The "they-Self"
tries to live in the third person, avoiding Being-itself. Ha rejects such
logic as advancing from abstraction to further abstraction, getting further
sway from reality, limiting experience only to faetieity (the objective data
of "facts"), white, in its fallannaaa and "thrownees" (tee way things are)
blocks understanding. Heidegger's comment sums this upt "Common sense
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misunderstands understanding".
To understand understanding requires an openness to Baseim
Vhen one talks of tee 'circle' in understanding, on* expresses
a failure to recognise two thingst l) teat understanding as such
makes up a basic kind of Bscsin's Being, end 2) that tela Being
is constituted as cere. To deny tee circle, to make a secret of
it, or even to went to overcome it, means finally to reinforce
tele failure. We suet rather endeavour to leap into the •circle',
primordially and wholly, so teat even et the start of tee analysis
of Basein we make sure that we have a full view of Basein'a
circular Being.14
According to Heidegger to do otherwise than to "leap into the circle" ie
to posit some other artificial and abstract base Object from which to argue*
standing over against Eaeein (the Being of the Self)* with the result that
ve restrict ourselves to the theoretical aide* always consistent with our
abstract baas* with the result that anything practical ie tacked on as an
appendix or "ethic" which flows as a conclusion or deduction. While Heidegger
is satisfied with the circular concept, I would like to suggest that the model
of a spiral might be a more useful one than that of a repetitious circle*
Undoubtedly reality lies in the centre and must be experienced directly,
but surely one rises in understanding "each time round", so to speak* as
ideas are related to one another and r©checked,
Heidegger's methodology is also the key to his "Being and Time" which
Is as much training in this method aa it ie existential interpretation* He
concludes with this observation!
This may suffice to clarify the existential meaning of the
herseneutieal Situation of a primordial analytic of Dasein.
% exhibiting anticipatory resoluteness* ve have brought
Dasein before us with regard to Its authentic totality, so
that vs now have it in advance. The authenticity of the
potential!ty-for-Beingwone'e-Self guarantees that primordial
existential!ty la something we see in advance. *
It is apparent that Heidegger's method is diametrically opposed to
Tillich's since he submits all essentialist ideas and concepts to the
existential basis of human Being sad experience. Since TilXich holds
to an essentialist framework of thought against which to give his interpre¬
tation of existential concerns he Is not an "existentialist".
While Tillich can discuss finitude from an existentialist point of
view as he explores the limitations of the human situation, he soon finds it
necessary for him to return to esaentialist categories for his systematic
thinking. He goes on to discuss finitude and the categories that his mind
requires to grasp the ideas. He lists feus' sain categorical time, space,
causality, and substance, but indicates that *ve oust la each case consider
not only the positive and the negative elcaents 'from the outside*, namely,
in relation to the world, but we suet consider then also 'from the inside*,
namely, in relation to the self,Vise, he says, is not only the first
but also the central oategory, within each category he discusses being and
nonbeiag, courage and anxiety.
The distinction between essence and existence represents the basic
stance of any theological system of thought and is far froa arbitrary as but
one side lesue. How these two elements relate together, if they do, ie of
prime importance. In comparing Tlllloh with Heidegger we can understand
elearly where Tillich stands and how ho relates existential concerns to the
all-pervading eaaentialiat framework of his thought. Bow he defines these
two torne (which can be very ambiguous at times) is important.
Essence can mean the nature of e thing without any valuation
of it, it ean mean the universale which characterise a thing,
it can mean the ideas in which existing things participats, it
can moan the norm by which a thing must be judged, it con mean
the original goodness of everything created, and it eon scan
the patterns ef all things in the divine mind. The basic
ambiguity, however, lite in the oscillation of the meaning
between an empirical and a valuating sense. Essence as the
nature of a thing, or as the quality in which a thing partici¬
pates, or ae a universal, has one character. Essence as that
from which being has 'fallen', the true end undietorted nature
of things, haa another character. In the second ease essence is
the basis of value judgments, while in the first ease esacnee ie
a logical ideal to be reached by abstraction or intuition without
the interference of valuations. . • Essence empowers snd judges
that which exists. It gives it Its power ef being, end, at the
came time, it stands against it ae a commanding 1aw.1'
Where essence end existence ere united ae one there ie no contradic¬
tion, hone# the law has no power to enter into judgment* In praetlee, how*
ever, this le not the ease and the law takes precedence, even destroying
itself*
Existence can mean the possibility of finding a thing within
the whole of being, it can mean the actuality of what is poten¬
tial in the reals of essence, it can mean the 'fallen world',
and it can nean a type of thinking which is aware of its exis¬
tential conditions or which rejects essence entirely. * • •
(In Aristotle) the aotdal is the real, hut the essential pro-
rides its power of being, and in the highest essence poten¬
tiality and actuality are one. • • A complete discussion of the
relation of essence.to existence ie identical with the entire
theological system.
With these definitions 71llieh is preparing the way for fitting hie
existential concerns into his system of thought, giving the preponderant
weight to essentialist ideas which give power, definition, standards of
judgment, end an aim or potential by which to form human life and society.
Hie previous discussion of flnituds, however, raises issues which cannot be
fitted neatly into any system. He identifies selfhood, individuality*
dynamics* and freedom as existential elements of finitude. These are real
issues to be taken seriously, not simply covered over by a blanket classifi¬
cation. Sach self la unique, living as a person whose life haa meaning and
purpose because of what happens in the Interaction of daily living in a
particular time and place, relating to specific persons and events, reacting
to certain conditions and circumstances. General or universal truths tell us
little about the selfhood of a person who is known by his own name. Individu¬
ality may be described analytically as participation in biological, social,
and psychologies! tendencies, but this tails us littls about the individual
that is thus described. Eynamies are both general and specific to situations
and circumstances. These are of limited value in understanding a person him¬
self, although the light they shed on the context of a person's life may go
far toward explaining how and why a person livsd as he did. Yet even with
a specific eat of dynamics bearing upon a person the unique self may well
assert freedom to react in an unforeseen way without explanation. Freedom
by its very nature, even though carefully proscribed as a limited freedom,
is still freedom and expresses itself as such. Simple reference to such
existential conditions in another frame of reference is to deny their
validity. Yet Tillich is careful to deny that they may be glossed over.
Here is the dilemma which Heidegger refers to as the action of the
"they-self", the attempt to treat in an impersonal and objective manner that
which can only be experienced by direct encounter on an existential level.
The "they-self" avoids such an encounter by resorting to abstractions, one
step at least, removed from the reality thus being described. This is the
price paid by most essentlalist thinkers in their attempt to be objective
and universally inclusive. In fact they miss the reality they point toward.
Tillich is trying very hard to avoid this pitfall, hence he gives full
weight to the existential nature of the human subject. Yet his persistent
need to generalize leaves him open to the charge that in the end of the day
he misses the concreteness constantly impressing itself upon him. He ri^itly
says that his whole system is an attempt to sort out this question. His
existential concerns threaten to undermine his whole essentialist approach
and vice versa.
J. H* Thomas makes an extended contrast between Tillich and Heidegger
in hie discussion of Tllllch's doctrine of finltude with its four basic
categories which relate to the doctrine of oreatio ex nihilo since both
men have a definite idea of non-being over against the creature and the
resulting anxiety produced by awareness of this possible non-being. Thomas
goes on to show that Tillich's understanding of existentialism is quite
different from Heidegger*s even where he claims to be closest to him. Tillich
in fact is much closer related to a nineteenth century understanding due to
his dependency upon Schelling rather than to a twentieth century approach,
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although using the language and problems of the twentieth century In his
system*
There are two things which must be said about this eonneotion
between Tillieh end Heidegger* first, it is significant that
for miieh the decisive beginning of existential philosophy
is to bo found in Scrolling* s later work, and that the prepara¬
tion for his sooeptanee ef Heidegger wee hie acquaintance with
Klerkegsardu and the tsbensohiloaoahie movement* this, 1
suggest, mcfces hie brand of iuetsnti&iem (which is in any
oase a vary dangerous blanket tore) much nearer to the mood
of nineteenth-eentury philosophy then it is to die mood of
contemporary philosophy, a mood of ioonoelasm and metaphysical
seeking which it shared by existentialist and linguistic
philosophies* Secondly, however close Tillich may think
Heidegger is to the Christian interpretation of human existence,
neither Heidegger himself nor his best interpreters have so
understood his d*ath-eentared evaluation of human existence*
So we may repeat that die appearance of modernity in Tillieh
is like that which a duly edited version of Sehelling with a
preface by Sartre could be imagined to possess.1"
Tillich,s compulsion to bring all things into harmony mesne that he
never left his nineteenth-century teachers while he himself was caught up in
a period of history unprecedented for change and conflict* History and
harmony are contradictions diet cannot be reconciled by retreating into
the thou#t-forms of a former era without one or other threatening to ruin
the scheme* This Is Tillich's stance and therefore this is his basic
problem* Me will see that this basic contradiction, imported into his
system in the form ef polar tensions, underlies the system et every point
and weakens its credibility even thou# many useful Insights are set forth
in the process*
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The Centered Self
Tillich58 "method of correlation" of what he terms the "existential
Question© and theological answers" indicates that the theological answers
are of a different order from the existential questions. In the opening
pages of hie second volume of the Systematic Theology.1 he uses the illustration
of a door and the house into which it opens, setting forth the interrelations
of questions and answers* Boss the form of the question determine the final
shape of the answer? Does the theological "house", on the other hand, shape
the "door" or approach to the house? Admitting that the questions are of
an existential nature, should the theological answers be of the same coin?
For Tillich, the theological answers are independent of these questions*
While the materiel of the existential question is the very
expression of the human predicament, the form of the question
is determined by the total system and by the answers given in
It* 'She question implied in human finitude is directed toward
the ensweri the eternal* The question implied in human estrange¬
ment Is directed toward the answeri forgiveness* This directed-
ness of the questions does not take away their seriousness, but
it gives them a form determined by the theological system as a
whole* This is the sphere within which the correlation of,
existential questions end theological answers takes place.
For Tillich the basic ontological structure for his theological system
is the relationship between the Self and the World. These are the basic
correlates upon which the system is built* From this starting point the
whole of the ontological structure is expounded aa an answer to this very
complex dialectical relationship*
Man experiences himself as having a world to which he belongs* * •
Self-relatedness is implied in every experience. * • the question
is not whether selves exist* The question is whether we are aware
of eelf-relatednese. • • A self is not a thing that may or may not
exist} it is an original phenomenon which logically precedes all
questions of existence.3
Tillich then goes on to provide his definition of Self and World!
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The term 'self* ia more embracing than the tens •ego1* It
Includes the subconscious end the unconscious 'basis' of the
self-conscious ego as veil as self-consoiouemese (cogitatio
in the Cartesian sense)• Therefore, selfhood or salf-centered-
nesa must be attributed in seae measure to all living beings and,
in tarns of analogy, to all individual Costaltan even in the in¬
organic realm.* Man ia a fully developed and completely
centered aelf.*
and Beoauae man has an ego-self, ha transcends every possible
environment* Man has a world* Like environment, world ia a
correlative concept. Man has a world, although ho is in it
at the same time* 'World* la not the mm total of all beings -
an inconceivable concept, ia the Greek koaeos and the Latin
univergura.-indicate, 'world* ia a structure or a unity of mani-
Since tie human self is self-centered, being aware of what it ia and
what it la not, the fact of man's finitude impresses itself upon him* fat
at the same time the relation of the self to lte world ia such that it ia
able to transcend this unity due to the ordered nature of that world* Man
eon rise in thought to vreetlo with the problems imposed by his limitations,
probing beyond to ultimate boundaries or horisons of concern* Hence the
question of the being of "God* arises from these ultimate concerns.
'Cod* ia the answer to the question implied in man's finitudei
he ia the name for that which concerns man ultimately. This
does not mean that first there ia a being called God and than
the demand that man should be ultimately concerned about him*
It means that whatever eoneema a man ultimately becomes god
for him, and, oonvaraaly, It moans that a man ean be concerned
ultimately only about that which ia god for him* • • Gods arc
beings who transcend the realm of ordinary experience in power
and meaning, with whom man have relations which surpass ordinary
relations in intensity and significance* • • They are images of
human nature or subhuman powers raised to a superhuman realm* • •
The realm against which the divine images are projected ia not
itself a projection. It ia the experienced ultiraacy of being
and meaning. It ia the realm of ultimate eonecrn*®
From this phenoraanological description of God and man's ultimate con¬
cern, Tillich seeks to show that we met not atop short of ultim&ey in any
concept of God or also wo will fall into the trap of projecting human
characteristics and making gods out of these* Only with ultimate being and
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meaning should ve he concerned in this quest* He seeks to fulfil this remit
by means of his analysis of the structure of ontology in his system* for
Tlllleh* the "being of God la being-ltaalf*.^ God is not just another being*
albeit raised to the highest power of perfection, along side of other beings)
but rather Sod is the Absolute* transcending both eadstenoo and essence (the
structures end forms of finitude as created). Hen* being bound to flnitude,
sen only know God through symbolic expression* whereas God as the ground of
all being is not subject to the structures of being*
Therefore, it is not prselsa to identify God with the infinite*
This can be dene on some levels of analysis* If man and hla
world are deeeribed aa finite, God is infinite in contrast to
then. But the analysis must go beyond this level in both
dtreetions* Men is aware of his flnitude because he has the
power of transcending it and of looking at it. Without this
awareness he could not call himeelf mortal* On the other hand,
that which ia infinite would not be infinite if it were
limited by the finite. God is infinite because he has the
finite (send with it that alemsnt of nemhelng whlehAbslongs to
finituds) within himself united with hie infinity*
Ae the ground of all being* God mat be beyond all limitations* yet embrace
all.
la it meaningful then to speak of creation or creaturelinese? Tillich
argues that sines the ground of all being embraces both finitude end infini¬
tude* it is characteristic of the divine life to be creative* to actualize
itself*
She divine life and the divine creativity are not different*
God is creative because he is God. • • He eternally •creates
himself•* a paradoxical phrass which atatas God*a freedom.
Hot le creation contingent. It does not •happen* to God* for
it it identical with hie life* Creation ia not only God*a
freedom but also his dsstiny* But it is net a fatej it ia
neither a necessity nor en accident which determines him. The
doctrine of creation Is not the story of an event which took
pises tones upon s time*. It is the basic description of toe
relation between God and the world. It la toe correlate to
toe analysis of man's finitude* It answers the question
implied in man's fortitude and in finitude generally. In giv^>
lag this answer* it discovers tost the meaning of finituda ia
creaturelinees. 9
It is at this point that Tillich comes close to a doctrine of pantheism,
the implicit danger of every imaanentalist system of thought. 8s is careful
to point out that pantheism in fact means that the divine life is so identi-
fisd with the structures of being that it becomes bound by them in the
process of identification* It is sn open queation, however, whether such a
distinction is little more than academic in the end result, ibis, moreover,
raises many questions including the basic one of human freedom and
accountability in the exletential situation* Tillich repliant
The doctrine of creation out of nothing expresses two funda¬
mental truths. The first is that the tragic character of
existence is not rooted in the creative ground of btingt
consequently, it doss not belong t© the essential nature of
things* In itself flnltude is not tragic, that is, it is not
doomed to self-destruction by itc very greatness* Therefore,
the tragic 1c not conquered by avoiding the finite as much as
possible, that ia, by ontologies! asceticism. The tragic ic
conquered by the presence of being-itsslf within the finite*
The second truth expressed in this doctrine is that there is
an elament of nonbeing in creaturslinesst this gives insight
into the natural necessity of death and into the potentiality
but not necessity of the tragic*3'0
As a thoroughgoing pantheism would have the effect of limiting human
life under the yoke of determinism with God the all in all, Tillich here
parte company with those who confuse the oreaturely with the divine and lays
the groundwork for true human freedom and accountability. 8s gose wot
But man's being Is not only hidden in the creative ground of
the divine life? it also is manifest to itself end to other
life within the thole of reality* Man doss exist, end his
existence is different from his essence* Man and the rest
of reality are not only 'inside' the process of the divine
life but also 'outside' it* Man la grounded in it, but he
Is not kept within the ground. Man has left the ground in
order to 'stand upon* himself, to actualize what he essen¬
tially is, in order to be finite freedom*11
We have now come to the "hinge" in Tillich'a thought, the way he re¬
lates his ssssntislist framework to the existential situation* It is -the
essential man who is "inside" the ground of his being, the divine life, and
the existential man who is "outside", standing on his own ground* When
"inside", though unactualized in existence, man is not free, but he is not
limited by the conditions of finitude. When "outside", human freedom,
though finite freedom, is reel enough to make him accountable for the
tragic character of existence sine# this is not necessarily so because of
the mere fact of existence itself* While "outside", man is bound by finitude
and the structures of life "outside* including time and space* The challenge
before nan "outside* the divine life is to actualize his being according to
what he is essentially or "inside" the divine life* This is man as he is in
existence, somehow lees than hie potential or essential nature*
To sum up the discussion* being a creature means both to
bs rooted in the creative ground of the divine life end to
actualize one's self through freedom. Creation is fulfilled
in the creaturely self-realization which simultaneously is
freedom and destiny* But it is fulfilled through separation
from the creative ground through a break between existence and
essence* Creaturely freedom is the point at which creation
and the fall coincide.12
One further point regarding the position of man in existence as a
creature charged with manifesting the divine life is -he concept of man as
"the image of God"* Human life is the telos or end, fulfilling the destiny
of the divine life to actualize itself in existence. Han is unique among
the creatures since he alone qualifies as a totally centered self*
Man is the creature in which the ontologies! elements are com¬
plete* They are incomplete in all creatures, which (for this
very reason) are called 'subhuman'* Subhuman does not imply
less perfection than in the case of the human. On the contrary,
man ae the essentially threatened creature cannot compare with
the natural perfection of the subhuman creatures. Subhuman
points to a different ontologies! level, not to a different
degree of perfection.1*
With the introduction of this tsleological idea of the "image of God"
imposing a destiny upon the human creature, the most urgent task than is to
consider how s man might become aware of this "high calling"* la this little
more than the persuasion of ontologlcal ideas taking- man to this conclusion?
Is it possible for the human self to be in intelligent contact with the
ground of his being? low dose one rise to a knowledge of Cod exietentially
or is this only a matter of human concern and reason? To answer such
questions will involve a detailed analysis of the self.
In his discussion of the multidimensional unity of life in Volume III
of the Systematic Ecology, fillich explore® the meaning of "spirit* as one
of the dimensions. He points out that the term spirit changed from its
original meaning of "breath", representing the power of life animating the
body, through philosophical development until the spirit became separated
from the body. From the time of Descartes the term spirit merged with
"mind" or "intellect", losing the force of "spirit". Yet for Tillich
"spirit* is important for the doctrine of man and ha seeks to relate it to
other terms in current use, namely, eoul, mind, and reason. Although the
semantic confusion over the years has often rendered terms like spirit
vacuous, the adjective "spirited" has still managed to retain something of
its original force as power.
Hie term "soul* (psyche) has gone through a similar change? although
the word is used widely in poetry and liturgy it is ambiguous.
Modern psychology is psychology without s psyche. The reason
for this is the rejection of the soul as an immortal •sub¬
stance' by modern epistomology since Hume and Kant. The word
•soul* has been preserved mainly in poetry where it designates
the aeat of the passions end emotions. In the contemporary
doctrine of man, the psychology of personality deals with
phenomena attributed to the human soul. If spirit is defined
as the unity of power and meaning, it can become a partial
substitute for the lost concept of soul, although it trans¬
cends it in range, in structure, and in dynamics. • •
Although the word "mind" (nous) cannot become a substitute
for *spirit* it has a basic function in the doctrine of life.
It expresses the consciousness of a living being in relation
to its eirroundinga and to Itself. It includes awareness,
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perception, intention. It appears In the dimension of ani¬
mal ity as soon as self-awareness appears; and in rudimentary
or developed form, it includes Intelligence, will, directed
action. Under the predominance of the dimension of spirit,
i.e., in man, it is ralated to the universal® in perception
and intention. . . .
Beason in the sens© of logos is the principle of form by
which reality in all its dimensions, and mind in all its
directions, la structured. * • Spirit as a dimension of
life includes more than reason - it includes eroe, passion,
imagination - but without logos-structure, it could not
express anything. Reason in the sense of technical reason
or of reasoning is one of the potentialities of man's spirit
in the cognitive sphere. It is the tool for the scientific
analysis and technical control of reality.1^
By subordinating soul, mind, and reason to spirit, Kid by defining
each of the three as epeelfic functions of spirit, Tlllich does not bridge
the separation of spirit from body originating in ancient Greek philosophy*
Yet he has hereby set the stage for discussing relationships between spirit
and Spirit, discussing all of personality in terms of personal functions
of spirit or of Spirit, The interehangeability of spirit and Spirit ie
accomplished by means of his concept of dimensions of life* and it is
supported by his understanding of the actualization of the ground of all
being in a specific personality. What does this do to the unity of life?
Constellations of oonditions make it possible for the organic
to appear in the inorganic realm. Constellations in the in¬
organic realm make it possible for the dimension of self-
awareness to become actual, and in the same way constellations
under the predominance of the psychological dimension make it
possible for the dimension of the spirit to become actual , , •
The question is rather how the actualization of the potential
follows from the constellation of conditions.
Tillich places great emphasis upon his idea of "dimensions" of
personality rather than erne of "levels" in his attempt to maintain a unity
of the self, By insisting on "dimensions", he allows for mutual interpen©tra-
tion and interaction, The mergence of spirit in man is a form of self-
transcendence as the self in its development focuses in the spirit dimen¬
sion.
Man cannot not ba man, m animal cannot not be animal* Bat
man con partly miss that creative act in which the dominance
of the psychological is overcome by the dominance of the
spirit* Aa we shall see, this ia the essence of the moral
problem*
Thee© considerations reject implicitly the doctrine that
at a precise moment of the evolutionary process God in a
special act added an 'immortal soul' to an otherwise complete
body, with this soul bearing the life of the spirit* This
ides - in addition to baing based on the metaphor 'level*
and a corresponding supematuralistic doctrine of man - dis¬
rupts the miltidimsnsianal unity of life, especially the
unity of the psychological and the spirit, thus making the
dynamics of the human personality completely incomprehensible.
Instead of separating the spirit from the conditioning
psychological realm, we shall try to describe the rise of an
act of the spirit out of a constellation of psychological
factors* Every act of the spirit presupposes given psycho¬
logical material end, at the same time, constitutes a leap
which is possible only for^a totally centered self, that is
to say, one that is free*
The unity of life is maintained in this continuum by this concept of
the "totally centered self". Here is the actualiaation of personality in
this focus in the dimension of spirit, which, for Tillich, is what humanity
as such is ell about* This is the personal centre in man, the eslf.1^
Tillich fssle that this concept of the centered self provides the
unity of life and personality needed to counterbalance any form of dualism
contrasting "spirit" either with "soul" (or mind, etc.) or with bodyt
The preceding description of acta of the spirit implicitly
refutes both a dualiatic contrasting of the spirit with the
psychological and a dissolution of the spirit into the
psychological out of which it arises* The principle of
multidimensional unity denies dualism as wall as peycho-
logistio (or biologlatic) monism.10
How Tillich seems to have departed from his definition of spirit as
"power" with which ha began* Also the psychological elements, which he had
related to spirit by way of subordinating them, now appear to function in a
dimension parallel to spirit; yet spirit transcends them, remaining distinct
fro® them, and transforms -fee® la the process. He denies "levels* la the
personality, while obviously making use of the ides under the term "dimen¬
sions'1* 3h® "spirit" is obviously above the psychological elements* While
stressing unity of the self, he threatens to split it.
Tillich is so concerned to srgue against a concept of an "immortal
soul" that he hae chosen to ignore the term soul altogether. At best he
has conceded that the psychological dimension fulfils this function in a
partial way, while the spirit dimension fulfils other functions. While the
few Testament makes little distinction between "soul" and "spirit", the Old
Testament is clear that mm is a soul, having a body and a spirit. The
Biblical term "soul" is Quite distinct from the philosophical notion of the
"immortal soul" which has its roots in Greek philosophical thought. Tillich*s
argument is actually against classical Greek concepts, but by Ignoring the
rich Biblical material he falls into contradictory abstraction.
Rsiahold Hisbuhr1^ has pointed out that the Biblical understanding (if
cms can generalize about this which is more properly the Hebrew understand¬
ing) of man was based on relationships rather than on ontological analysis.
Sin and responsibility must be taken seriously, as must death to a dying self,
in order that the renewal of resurrection might also take place through divine
grace. The Biblical concept of freedom is freedom in relation to grace,
rather than the freedom of finitude rooted in creation. For Slebuhr, Tillich
is so committed to the philosophical approach that he ignores the historical,
thus he finds fulfilment in potentiality not in actuality. He is suggesting
that Tillich is in the position of speaking about the existential but denying
it in practice.
In his Biblical study of the term "spirit", Tillich doss try to owe
to gripe with the traditional concepts in a fresh way. To do so he has made
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When nan's uneasy conscience ie heightened, it leads to
repentance, to a dying to self (that ie, the eelf in ite
narrow self-centeredness) which has the eoneequence of
a new eelf* The faith by which the aelf apprehends Hod
aa judge and redeemer presupposes repentance even as
repentance presupposes faith. Faith in the Bible ie. • •
en apprehension of the divine made possible by a des¬
truction of the idolatry of the eelf, and a destruction
of the idolatry of the eelf by the recognition that the
ultimate source end end of life stands against the
pretensions of the eelf. In this Biblical eeneept,
despite the paradoxical relations between fate and
freedom, the emphasis lies upon freedom and responsi¬
bility.
The Hebrew View of Han
In hie Alexander Lowe Lectures of 1955 in Melbourne, R. G, Smith pute
forth the generally accepted conclusion that the Biblical view of man ie one,
that it is a Hebrew understanding and not Greek, and that in the course of
history the Auguatinlan-Aquinas static definitions of sen and hie world have
led into the falsifying of life, and finally that throu# the Renaissance and
the Reformation the Biblical basic understanding was recovered. Since then
it has been present although obscured by rationalism, nso-scholasticism,
idealism, and so on. The recovery of the Biblical insights, however, along
with the work of all those involved in the "existentialist movement" (defined
broadly as Tillich does), has given to theology e new lease on life, coming
at a time when philosophy as a discipline is facing stormy weather. What
was recovered at the Reformation produced a fundamental shift in understand¬
ing both of the individual and of man1# place in history.
The Old Testament raid Hew Testament insight into the Integrity
of human life was recovered. Human life involved not two
worlds, but ons world; not a two-fold system with nature
and super-nature ne&ily dovetailed into one another, but one
world, Into which Ood'e Word penetrated.
As we proceed now to examine human experience and the development of
selfhood this would seem to be the piece to analyse the Biblical under¬
standing of mm and society, particularly the Hebrew background. This be¬
comes very important in evaluating Tillloh's work on the subject since he
tends to overlook the tremendous contribution that the Hebrew mind has to
make, often verging em a Mercian!te approach to the Scriptures, the same error
made by the eseentialiat philosophers he criticises.
The Old Testament emphasises the frailty of men, and yet the dignity
of man as God1a creature. It also emphasizes the unity and integrity of the
Individual, as well as the solidarity of the individual in his social con-
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text. It is interesting to note how these elements com through in the
term used to designate man. 1. Jacob points out,
If it ie true that 'adorn insists on the human kind, 'enosh
on hie feebleness, 'ish on hie power, gabsr on his strength,
then we can say that added together they indicate that man
according to the Old Testament is a perishable creature, who
lives only so the member of s group, but that he is also a
powerful being capable of choice and dominion,2
Hebrew psychology has been summarised by Jacob,
Man is s psycho-physios! being end psychical functions
are bound so closely to his physical nature that they
are localised in bodily organs thick themselves only
draw their life from the vital force that animates
the®.2
For the Hebrew a man is a body animated by the life which has its
various aspects and expressions. Although it is difficult to distinguish
absolutely in any clear-cut way what is implied by the different terms used
to describe this life or soul which pervades the body, some sort of analysis
is possible if the basic perspective of a totality is remembered.
The early creation myth in Genesis 2s? helps to make clear the
basic Hebrew concepts "And the Lord God formed can of the duet of the
ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and the men
became a living soul." (A.7.) The Hebrew term for "breath of life" is
CJ'nn J7 Vp u>3 and the final clause is /TV ySji Q 7 K/? This
might be compared to the late expression from the period of the Wisdom
literature (Seel. 12»7) "Then shall the duet return to the earth as it
vest and the Spirit ( fM 7/7) ) shall return unto God who gave it."
We can see that man is msde of dust and returns to dust, while at the
same time man has a God-breathed spirit which comes from God end then re¬
turns to God. But man, as a totality, is a "living soul", the expression
of God's "breath of life". Greek notions of a dichotomy of soul and body
or » trichotomy of body* soul* end spirit are foreign to the Hebrew concept
of nan ae a "living oeul*» a unitary entity. God does not supply • soul to
man, but God's creating breath transforms the day into a man. It is
Interesting to nota that th« Egyptians had a similar understanding and a
*
similar creation eyth.
This turn, in his totality* with his own particular stamp or combina¬
tion of characteristics is a soul or neohfah ( u) 0>3)* In the Old Teste*-
sent the word ie also applied to animal epeciea* The recognition of the
oenheah depends upon the mental impressions that are made on other people
through various associations. Psderson eeyst
All sensations act together in the making of the cental image.
To the soul of a man pertains Ma appearance, Me voice, the
more or leee hairy quality of Ma din* Me email. To this
must be added hie manner of noting* all that ha has dona* all
that bdonge to him* which elements together constitute Me
soul. Among all the impressions received of Mm continuity
obtains* the one immediately calling forth all to# others* and
of course, first end foremost, those which stamp the essence of
Me being with its special characteristics.
Therefore* the soul le at ton cams time something visible
and invisible. Instinctively one senses only individual
parts of toe man cms masts* Cms perceives a figure with a
certain expression, certain movements* a certain maimer of
speech, ate. This momentary impression only becomes toe idea
of a soul whan the whole of its background is imaginsd* so
that it finds its plaee in a whola. Thus we get toe idea of
the man in question, and this is what primitive peoples call
soul. It la always present in toe man, lies behind all that
he does, msnifssts itself therein. If that is known* then
all the individual impressions of too man in question will
immediately call forth too totality.4
The soul is associated with life. Ufa la manifested in to# breath or
in the blood for to# Hebrews* but toe soul ie more closely associated with
toe breath as indicated in Gen. 2t7« There are three terms denoting toe
"breath-soul" in Hebrew* neahasaah (n>> ^1), nephesh ( (i) 3 ) and ruach
( /f?-| 7 ). Nffiwhomah oocure least often and denotes toe breath as a
principle of lifei as when God breathed into Ads»*e nostrile (of. also
1 Kings 17$17I and Job 2?»3). Keoheah occurs 754 tines and might refer
primarily to life (of* I Kgs. 19*10), or to the seal in its psychological
processes, cor simply to designate the person (either the speaker car the
deed) as e person (cf. Lev* 11?43? 22?11). Ruaoh occurs 376 times and might
mean wind, breath, or spirit, and in some senses ia need ae a synonym for
neoheah vhan stressing the idea of life ee manifested in the breath* It is
interesting that the basic word for soul, neoheafa. has counterparts in all
Semitic languages which are varieties in torn of one basie root*
Aside from this basic general meaning of "life*, neohesh ia also used
to cover certain parts or functions of mac through which life or the soul is
revealed. Such might include the breath (Is* 57*16? 1 Kgs* 15*29? Job 26?4)
32i8? cf* also A* R. Johnson, The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought
of Ancient Israel" p. 82 ff*), the throat (used aa the location of the breath),
the heart (Seek. 11*19} 36*26), the bowels (Jer. 4*19l U. 19*3} Pa. 5*10} I
Kge. 3*26), the will (the Hebrews had no word for will, but the idea is pres¬
ent in I Sam, 2?35f H Kgs. 9*15), the desires (Sent. I816? Is. 26?8; Ps. 21»3),
or the blood (Lev* 17*11} Jer* 2?34l Oen. 9*4} Reut* 12?23). Perhaps it is
most significant that the heart ( 17 A ), which often designates the soul
with reference to the mind and the character, is interchangeable with neohesh
in this sense. Pedersen comments,
She heart is the totality of the soul ae a character and
operating power, particular etrees being laid upon its
capacity? neohash is the soul ia the sum of its totality,
«ich as^it appears? the heart is the soul in its inner
values.
The heart is the hidden centre of man over against the faoe which is
the outward register of the heart (Jer. 10*6} Is. 13? 8? Ezek. 2?4| Prov.
























































































The prophet seye that the head of God coraee upon hia (II Kge.
5*15), it seizes him (Is. 3iil). But it does not aeon that it
ie en external force guiding him. God forme him by entering
into hie soul and filling it; the roach acting in him ie God's.
It ie called that God's spirit comes upon him (I Sam. 10*6, 10),
falls upon him (Beak. 11*5)* enters into him (Seek. 2*2; 3*24)*
ie given in him. The moet vivid expression ie peviug»e that
God dons him like a garment (Judg. 6*34t I Chr. 12*19; II Chr.
24*20).!°
The situation reflected in the Old Testament stwa.de in oentrsat to
the later situation in the New Testament when Greek culture and ideas had
peaetratad into Palestine. The Hebrews developed their own lines of
thought based en their existential experience and insulated from Greek
influence until post-exilic times after the conquest of Alexander. Greek
power and education, and the use of the LXX no doubt served to introduce
Greek culture to the Hebrews, but it was vary much of a foreign element
in their thinking. Han, for the Hebrews, la a neohaah. a soul, but ha has
a spirit, a heart, and a mind, etc. In spite of the openness of the
spirit to eessaaniestc with other spirits in human contact as well as in
dlvino-human encounter, it is still in this context of the dynamic moti¬
vator of the soul* Greek thought provided an alternative understanding,
but not a synthesis with the Hebrew. Greek analysis of the components of
personality resulted in dualistle thinking.11
Wo should note that tha terra "body" as we use it today ie not a
Hebrew concept, but has in faot coma from the Greek frame of reference.
Current usage of the team "flesh**, referring to the soft muscle or moat In
a narrow sense, ie net the usual meaning of baser, but rather "flesh**
(body, men, or soul) ie intended to convey the idea of en animated body or
a soul of flesh and bones. It le extended to include also marriage (one
flesh) and kinship (of ay flesh) in the O.T. The flesh is associated with
that which is transient and weak, but is not considered to bo sinful as
 
This is because the body for the Hebrew, like the
flesh, is what ties men up with each other, rather
than what separates them as individuals, (cf. Hebrews
15* 3 "yourselves also in the body".)-^
Here he is suggesting that the flesh is a general term, a general substance
or category, representing our common humanity. This is not to suggest either
a "collective body" or a "collective soul". Human solidarity in the bond of
a common humanity must not eclipse the O.T. emphasis on human solidarity
and responsibility.
A. R. Johnson points out that the Hebrew mind seeks to grasp things
as totalities, including man himself. He says of the term basar»
The conception of man as a psycho-physical organism may be
seen equally clearly when one examines the use of the
terminology for the various parts of the body. • . This is
even true to a slight degree of the flesh ( 1(^1 7£^)»
which incidentally is often referred to in sucii a way as to
mark man off as belonging to a different order of being from
that of God, and is sometimes clearly used by synedoche
(pars pro toto) for the body itself. . • Indeed the parallel¬
ism with Q p J3 is occasionally so marked that the use of
the term for 'flesh• almost approaches the common use of the
former term as a periphrasis for the personal pronoun.15
Although the concept of the "bundle of life" is a useful one to bring
out social solidarity in the flesh, the flesh is at the same time the basis
of our particularity in concrete form. It is our own body.
Another term, Kol baser (all flesh) is used as a technical term for
the solidarity of all that is creaturely. A. R. Hulst1^ makes a detailed
study of this term, showing that it is used by the priestly writer (P)
throughout the Pentateuch and by the prophets of the exile and afterwards.
The term includes both man and beasts in such cases as the Noah narrative,
in II Isaiah, and in Jeremiah. He suggests that it involves the creature-
liness of the whole cosmos as a fallen creation in relation to God, hence
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Man is his soul} however he has a heart and a spirit, cf. Pedersen,
Israel. Vol. I, p. 104 where he points out* "The heart is the soul as
an operating force, and the same holds good of the spirit, ruach.
But whereas the heart is at the same time the centre of the soul and
the substance gathering round it and determining its strength, the
spirit is more particularly the motive power of the soul. It does
not mean the centre of the soul, but the strength emanating from it
and in its turn, reacting upon it. Man in his totality is s neohesh.
but he has a ruach and a heart. The heart and the spirit act upon the
centre and urge it in a certain direction toward action."
Op cit.. p. I65
Op cit.. Vol. I, p. 160. It follows from Pedersen's description that
dreams and visions can also be the vehicles of the divine ruach ex¬
panding the soul to receive the message, insight, or Word which is to
be incorporated into active reality in the individual or community.
Under the influence of the human spirit, the soul is motivated to ful¬
fil the potentialities of the heart. But the divine Spirit can "come
upon" a man to enter his soul and to inspire him to erupt or expand
the usual limits set by his own heart and spirit.
When we consider the soul and the body, we find that any clear distinc¬
tion which might suggest a dualism between the two does not apply in
Hebrew thinking. Rather the unity of soul end body is so close as to
make it possible to identify the two. H. V. Robinson comments:
"The whole conscious life might have found its explanation
along the line of either soul or body} had this contrast been
realized dualistically, we should have expected at least that
the higher attributes would be assigned to the soul and the
lower to the body. But this is distinctly not the case in
Hebrew psychology, which car assign the highest intellectual
or spiritual activities to the working of a physical organ,
and the sensation of animal hunger or sexual passion to the
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'soul*. No clearer proof could be given that the term
'Dualism' is inappropriate and misleading in relation to
Hebrew psychology." (Christian Doctrine of Man. Londoni
Duckworth Press* p. 21}
12. J. A. T. Robinson, The Body. (Londoni S.C.M. 1952), p. 29 goes on to
examine the phrase "in the bodyMi
"The characteristic emphasis comes out very plainly in
a sentence in the Epistle to the Hebrews! 'Remember them
that are in bonds, as bound with them)... as being your¬
selves also in the body • . in life's bundle together".
13. A. R. Johnson, The Vitality of the Individual. (Cardiff! U. of Wales),
P. 37ff.
14. A. R. Eulst, "Kol Basar". Oudtestamentische Studien. Vol. 12, p.
38ff.
The Heart of the System
Tillich's doctrine of the human spirit is an attempt to bridge the
gap between existence and essence which gap is apparent in hie development
of the centered self. We noted the "hinge" in hie presentation which he
related to the doctrine of creation* We noted the tension between man's
existential finitude and his essential destiny aa image of Cod. We noted
his idea of dimensions of personality which related to his understanding of
the spirit* Then in detail we noted how the Hebrew understanding of man
reflects nan's totality in all hie relationships* including the relationship
of the human spirit to the personality and of the human spirit to the body,
giving an existential basis of interpretation which opposed Greek essen¬
tial!em* We must inquire whether Tillich's doctrine of the human spirit is
not something quite different from the Biblical understanding, as Niebuhr
charges, using Biblical language but in feet giving it new meaning in terms
of his theological system, k grasp of the system will assist us in this task*
When considering the system we should bear in mind Tillich's use of
"symbol". For example, allusion haa been made to Tillich's use of the
Biblical material aa symbolic* His comment on the Fall is helpful to illus¬
trate this i
When a Christian symbol such as the Fall is confronted with
philosophies like idealism, naturalism, or neo-StolcIsm, one
may well ask whether it is possible to relate ideas which lie
on different levels, the one on the level of religious symbolism,
the other on the level of philosophical concepts. But, as ex¬
plained in the section on philosophy and theology in the first
volume, there is an interpenetratlon of levels between theology
and philosophy. If the idealist or naturalist asserts that
'there is no human predicament', he makes an existential decision
about a matter of ultimate concern. In expressing Ms decision
in conceptual terms, he is a theologian. And if the theologian
says that existence is estranged from essence, not only does he
make an existential decision, but, in expressing it in onto¬
logies! concepts, he la a philosopher. The philosopher cannot
avoid existential decisions, and the theologian cannot avoid
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ontological concepts. A1though their intentions ere opposite,
their actual procedures are comparable. This justifies our
comparison of the fall with Western philosophical thought and
the alliance of existentialism and theology.1
Here the contrast is between the theologian who deals with the exis¬
tential questions and the philosopher who deals with the esssntialiet or
ontological systematic structures of thought. The liblieal materiel, in
this case the Fall, Is clearly in the existential category as grist for the
theologian's mill, although with ontological implications for the
philosopher's interest. These two "levels" are quite distinct though inter¬
related at points and these points of interrelationship at which the levels
intersect to eome extent are what Tillich refers to a® "symbols". The
symbol addresses both levels. How successfully does he use the idea of
spirit as symbol in this sense?
Bearing these questions in mind, we turn to the system as a whole.
The holding together of the "coincidents of oppoaites" by his method of
polarising balanced elements, setting one over against the other, then
synthesizing the two in the principle of identity within a greater unity,
is Tillich*s main organizational approach to reality for systematic purposes.
V/ith each pair of oppoeltes we have a reflection of the basic correlates,
the Self-World correlation, which for Tillich is the central problem to which
he addressee himself. His methodology, as developed by Schelling for his
"dynamic idealism", a form of romanticism, and taken over by Tillich for his
2
own purposes, still retains overtones of its past association. Conse¬
quently, Tillich'a system has parallels with romantic idealism in his onto¬
logical understandings, but modified by the psychological and historical re¬
search of the past few decades. Since he attempts to take both poles
seriously he reflects the tension between the two when he tries to present a
unified system of thought.
 
uses in developing hie cysts® within these five areas of analysis either
explicitly or illicitly contain the esse sets of coordinates. 'Che Keif-
World correlation underlies them all. The essentialist-exlstentlallst
correlation is huilt into eaoh discussion in a variety of ways. Likewise
the relationship between mankind in general end the individual reoccurs.
In fact* his whole system turns on these three basic correlations.
When we consider mm of the polarities in fillioh*s system,
aider that the three underlying coordinates are also operative, the
in this method can be sees in such problems as the relation between
aiid theology. This in particular is ?illich*s own problem since he
hold both these together in his own life and work. He sayst
The divergence between philosophy and theology is counter¬
balanced by an equally obvious convergence. From bote sides
converging trends axe at work. The philosopher, like the
theologian, * exists*, and he cannot jump over the eonerete-
ness of Ms existence and his implicit theology. He is
conditioned by his psychological, sociological, and historical
situation. And, like every human being, he exists in the
power of an ultimate concern, whether or not he is fully con¬
scious of it, whether or not he admits It to himself and to
others. There is no reason why even the most scientific
philosopher should not admit it, for without an ultimate
concern his philosophy would be lacking in pasaion, serious¬
ness, and creativity, wherever we look in the history of
philosophy, we find ideas and systems which claim to be
ultimately relevant for human existence. « . Svery creative
philosopher is a hidden theologian in the degree to which his
existential situation and Ms ultimate concern shape his
philosophical vision. * * But the philosopher dose not
intend to be a theologian. He wants to serve the uni real
logos. He tries to turn away from his existential situation,
including Ms ultimate concern, toward a place above all
particular places, toward pure reality. The conflict between
the intention of becoming universal and the destiny of remain¬
ing particular characterises every philosophical existence.4
Here, in a word, is the position of a man who is living Mon the
boundary" (as Tillieh*s autobiographical portion in Interpretation of





his own life). Tillich lived with the tension between philosophy and
theology*
The ground of unity which conjoins the philosopher and the theologian
as polar extremities in correlation is the nature of reason. For Tillich,
reason is both subjective (the grasping and shaping functions of the mind)
and objective (the logos or order in the world which the mind can grasp).
The task of the philosopher is to uee his subjective reason in order to
grasp reality and to shape it by the application of his mind to problems
arising from the objective reason in reality. The task of the theologian
is to use hie mind to grasp the essential nature of reality and then to
shape that reality into a "Gestalt*, a living structure which has power of
being within itself. Bits for Tillich ie true creativity.
Subjective reason is the structure of the mind which enables
It to grasp and to shape reality on the basis of a corres¬
ponding structure of reality (in whatever way this corres¬
pondence may be explained). She description of 'grasping*
and *shaping* in this definition is baaed on the fact that
subjective reason always is actualized in an individual self
which ie related to its environment and to its world in terms
of reception and reaction, the mind receives and reacts. In
receiving reasonably, the mind grasps its worlds in reacting
reasonably, the mind shapes its world. 'Grasping' in this
context, has the connotation of penetrating into the depth,
into the essential nature of a thing or an event, of under¬
standing and expressing it. 'Shaping', in this context, has
the connotation of transforming a given material into a ^
Gestalt, a living structure which has the power of being.
The process for the philosopher and the theologian is one and the same,
since the unifying ground is in the nature of reason. Both are seeking uni¬
versal®, the essential nature of reality, and both seek to give expression
to this in truth, presented in each a way that It is a living wCfeataltn.
The differences lie mainly in the place of existential reality for both, and
in the type of expression demanded on each in order for it to be a "Gestalt".
The actual work of both is in the area of essentlalist grasping/shaping. In
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This ia another example of the existential being fitted into the
system in m abstracted way, losing its existential nature in the process*
Here is a result of his methodology being consistently applied, hut the end
result does not add to the subject under discussiont rather it subtracts
that which makes it real, leaving only a formal relationship within the login
of a system* Revelation for fillich becomes little more than the correspond¬
ence of the structure of the self by mesne of reason to tha structure of
being-itself of which the self is represented as a microcosm.
Finitude is the operating category by which the self becomes aware of
the limitations to life and the structures of its world, including itself,
and the self becomes aware of these limits by means of revelation* the
accepting of the revelation, impressing Itself upon the reason whereby the
human spirit becomes aware of the native of reality, of being-iteelf, and of
human limitations and destiny, the self (through the spirit and by the reason
faculty} is brou^it Into relation with 'His Self of the Absolute*
8
flnitude la set over against revelation within His dynamic interaction
of faith, the particularity of selfhood over against Hie universality of Hie
divine life* One main problem with this analysis la that it la aet in the
context of a discussion of faith, yet faith hardly eaters into the picture
except in an almost incidental way* These existential setters are set forth
so that they apparently yield ontologieal conclusions. Furthermore this does
not jibe with the Biblical understanding of man as a person in relation with
God through faith, faith being the vital characteristic of revelation*
We have seen that the philosophical-theological tension within the
unity of reason resulted in the distortion of his methodology to Hie extent
that the solution offered by Tillieft was achieved at the expense of his
existentialist concerns* 1st he is very much sxistentlally involved in the choice
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of this particular solution right from his early life sad training, sines
his search for meaning was to provide the context for all hie preaching and
teaching. This existential compulsion led him to try to make sense of all
the boundary situations in which he found himself. As the Self-World
correlation lies behind each of the other polarities, ve can see in Tillich'e
own life an existential search for selfhood, leading to an autobiographical
Q
approach to theology and philosophy which from time to time emerges into
clear view.
If the polarity between philosophy and theology reflects Tilllob's own
ontological search in his understanding of the self over against hie under¬
standing of the world, the polarity within his system between religion and
faith reflaota hie existential concern alec. Experience of a deep and
spiritual nature characterised the man Paul Tillich, impressing all who mat
him.10 His search for faith in, through, and beyond religion is an example of
the polarity referred to at this point. When ve considered his concept of God
above the gods of religion, we had an example of this polarity seeking a
greater unity in the realm of the spirit.
It is not enough to say that religion for Tillich represents the social
dimension and faith the personal. Both religion and faith go beyond that.
Religion11 represents everything from his childhoodi the entire Christian tra¬
dition including culture, dootrine, liturgy, art, learning, and so on. On the
cultural side religion shares the stage with history, psychology, sociology,
end other human pursuits in a wholeness of life. On the creedal side religion
is symbolic to men, according to Tillich, not useful in itself, but in terms
of the personal mysticism and social agaos generated. Religion is a part of
human experience but it le limited to certain levels of self-actualization, like
philosophy, it le a useful tool, but having used it it must be transcended.
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In this way religion la fitted into hie ontological framework of thought. It
becomes in symbol.
I seriously doubt If religion can bo aa neatly elaaaiflad aa that*
Religion la a whole range of activities, institutions* attitudes* aaaoolatlona
and experiences, To generalise under a definition which must be too narrow to
neet the existential realities la to mock the reality* Tillleh exemplifies
the width of the range of religion* Including the whole cultural context* yet
his definitions do not refloat this actual range*
Religion oust be transcended according to Tillloh and this la to be
achieved through ontologioal thinking and developsent. Yet religion is axis-
tentially alive for Tillioh since it is the basis upon which his whole system
la founded. If religion is but one level of human life it is a lively level
motivating ordinary people and theologians alike to a consuming passion. Since
religion ie for Tillieh much more than just liturgy or philosophy of religion*
although each of these is a large segment of Christian experience* it is the
ground for many of the existential problems and experience which address them¬
selves to Blotters of faith and action. In many ways the distinction between
religion and faith it an artificial ona since they are bound closer together
than the method of polarisation practically allows. They may or may not bo in
tension) therefore* they are not true oppoeites.
12
Faith for Tillich tees have a place of honour in his system* however,
even if it cannot compete with philosophy according to hit methodological com¬
mitment. Faith does represent the relation of the centered self over against
the threat of anxiety* which denies the eenterednese of the self, and provides
the courage to affirm life on the strength of having been accepted by the ground
of belngwitself. This tension between anxiety end courage is within the great¬
er unity of finitude and issues in faith when this tension is transcended.
Faith ia not primarily a relationship for Tillich, whether to the Word of God
or to the New Being in Christ* but it is a participation in the divine life1'
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whereby th® self might manifest the Self. This is possible by the spirit of
man relating to the Spirit of God.
For the spirit to be understood as a symbol, the man of faith is seen
to be engaged in an existential struggle to be properly centered or inte¬
grated in order for hist to be in a position to transcend himself. The wily
guarantee that this is possible is that the human spirit is the highest order
of being in the creation, ontologieally built into human nature ae the true
potential of everyman. The fact of the inadequacy of the human spirit to
have value in Its own right is suggested by the process and the need for self-
transcendence. Since the divine Spirit deals directly with the human spirit,
without Christ, the Bible, or the Church (these may or may not be useful as
symbols to faith), faith for Tillioh in the end is a process of psychological
integration of the personality and right thinking of the mind. Just as revela¬
tion in effect becomes a function of philosophy, so faith as the existential
expression of revelation becomes s function of psychology without any particu¬
lar contact, Christian or otherwise* The logic of this position takes us
beyond the point where Tillieh himself stood, since be was existent!ally com¬
mitted to the Christian faith in spite of the system.
In each of the polarities within the system there exists tension. But
this tension is not only that of the nature of th# polar elements themselves,
it ie also a tension which reflects the basic coordinates underlying the whole
system. The polarities have bean chosen by Tillioh so that they might be dis¬
cussed in a parallel way on an existentialist level. This hs doss consistently
and this makes the system what it is. But this deeper tension between the
Self-World interaction which defies essantialist classification because of the
existential nature of the self is ever reel end present. It gives the note of
unreality to a purely eesentialist discussion about the nature of things which
exist. The system as a formal classification of relationships has its merit,
but it claims too much. Tillich does not see litis basic contradiction between
hie professed interest in ontology and his real involvement in the self at a
level and to a degree that he cannot simply abstractly define his way out of
it, remaining in effect detached or transcendent as he would like to think he
can do.
We have tried to consider the heart of the system in terms of the basic
relationships dealt with* Self-World, Philosophy-Theology, Revelation-Finitude,
and Religion-Faith. We have not considered doctrines within the system which
have a bearing on the way these relationships are worked out, but we will
consider two of these* the Self, and the New Being, in the next chapters.
Meanwhile there is one other relationship which we should consider end that is
the relationship between the spirit of man and the Spirit of God. As pointed
out before, this for Tillich ie a basic symbol within the system.
The spirit of man, including the reason, is an existential reality which
is the dynamic of the eelf making a man self-conscious end canable of rising
to the heights as the image of God. This element of the Self keeps the self
from becoming abstract. In spite of the philosophical description of tie self
and its potentiality it is the spirit which gives it life. All the relation¬
ships of life are meaningful only as the spirit is involved. Otherwise, the
Self is a creature of definition and speculation.
The same word is used of God. He too is described as Spirit. He too
is creative, living, dynamic, actualizing, and real. The same type of
language is used, suggesting that the divine Spirit also ie an existential
reality. But it ie at this point that Tillich reflects the basic contradiction
which he has not resolved within himself between thinking and becoming? since
hs defines th® dirins Spirit »• pur® «nbm vhieh actualists itsslf in
oxistsneo. Svvn tor Ms ooneopt of agrafes! ho oannot ovoroono this contrs-
diction whioh shifts tho asoaing of words and idoss sssoeistod with spirit
soross tho gqp*
Footnotes to Chapter 9
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1» P«ul Tillioh, Systematic Theology. Volume II, p. 50-31, of. Vol.
Ill, p. Ill
2. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 147-155* 118
Revelation overcomes the conflict between autonomy and heteronomy
by re-establishing their essential unity* • • Final revelation
includes two elements which are decisive for the reunion of
autonomy and heteronomy, the complete transparency of the ground
of being in the bearer of the final revelation. • • The presence
of the divine ground aa it is manifest in Jesus as the Christ
gives a spiritual substance to all forme of rational creativity*
(P. 147)
This ia but an example of the dynamic idealism reflected in the
language of Tillich as he develops his idea of the ground of unity
in essential being*
cf* Kenneth Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, (London> SCK
1983) P* 176* Here Hamilton compares the method and approach of
Tillich with that of John Dewey, who speaks as a naturalist, on the
subject of revelation indicating that Tillich shares such ground with
the approach of naturalism* Romanticism blende both idealism end
naturalism in various veye.
3* Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology. Vol* I, p. 66 of. also III, p* 40
4i Ibid*. I, p. 24-25
5* Paul Tillich, On the Boundary. (London: Collins, 1967)
Op oit*. I, p. 76
7. Ibid*. I, p. 75ff
8. Ibid.. I, p. 191 The power of infinite self-transcendence is an
expression of man's belonging to that which ia beyond nonbeing,
namely to being-lteelf. • • Being-itself manifests Itself to
finite being in the infinite drive of the finite beyond itself*
9* Paul Tillich, On the Boundary, p. vii (introduction by J* H. Thomas)
10. Ibid., p. xvii
11. Ibid., p. 68ff
12* Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. I30ff
13. ibid*, in, p. Ill
The Self In the System
Tillich's quest for en adequate doetrine of the Self, bo frequently
frustrated by the very abstruse quality of his theologlslng which loses the
Self in generalities and abstractions, carried through into the final and
definitive definition set forth in the third volume of his systematica published
just two years before his death. In his first volume where he sets forth hie
methodology! the Self-World correlation became the basis of his ontology, but
the priority of the Self is hinted at in such phrases as "Man is a Self who
has a world."1 Much space end effort is given to the exploration of the
world, but in the end the world is seen as having meaning and value only
when it is grasped and shaped by human reason, a Amotion of the Self in
its life process.
When hs proceeds to volume two, the grasping-shaping function is
seen in a struggle to maintain meaning and value in life over against the
great existential factors at work which mitigate against the unity of life
end of the Self. Bxistentially man experiences estrangement from God, from
his world, and even from his Self. Hence hie concept of the Hew Being, in
Jesus the Christ, is seen as a part of the struggle for Selfhood. Perhaps
Tillioh achieved only limited success in his interpretation, but the central
theme, the search for Selfhood, has dominated both volumes.
Now in volume three he hums to set forth his doctrine of the Self
in a systematic way. In a vary real sense this doctrine has been the
operative basis of the entire systematica, every other doctrine simply pro¬
viding a context of meaning and relationship for the understanding of the
Self. We have noticed at several plaoes that the existential and the onto-
logical aspects of his thought are at odds, represented as separate poles
in a great number of relationships, and held together in Tillich's mind by
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a ground of unity which he terms the principle of identity. When we look
back and see that the doctrine of the Self holde such a place of priority,
yet in the discussion the ontologioal aspects are intelleotualiaed aa hold¬
ing the place of priority, we can see that the Self-World conflict was
indeed real inside Tillich's own mind. But having laid out the bulk of
hie system in systematic form, he now turns to deal with the Self. We can
best make sense of hie systematic method by noticing that ha has been pro¬
viding us with a context of thought against which wa are to understand the
doctrine of the Self, but the Self is the operating heart of the system.
It le a curious thing that Tillich is preoccupied with the doctrine
of the Self throughout hie lifetime, yet he exhibits a suspicion of the
existential manifestations of the Self, preferring a theoretical approach.
It le curiously parallel to the great lova that Kierkegaard professed for
hie fiancee yet in spite of his existential theorizing could never rise to
translating that professed love into a concrete marriage relationship. It
is this type of treatment of his subject matter that leade me to suggest
that Tillich waa really shy and uncertain when it came to hie search for
selfhood, yet his preoccupation with this search meant that he had a tremen¬
dous personal investment in its outcome. In this sense the whole of the
three volumes become Tillich's search for identity, more than his search
for ontology. His theology can be read aa autobiographical material. This
personal investment would account for his backing sway from concrete material,
aa wa noticed that he did time and again, in hie attempt to be objective and
to compensate for hie existential concern.
Tillich begins his formal discussion by focusing on the term spirit
as the dynamic principle operating in the "totally centered self". He
tried to maintain the unity of life by describing the process of aotualissa-
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tion of human personality focusing la the dimension of spirit as personal
centre* The freedom of the "totally centered self" moves, according to
Tillich, within the process of aetualisation to the fulfilment or aotualisa-
tion of the potential within itself. This is tile function of life. He then
distinguishes three functions of life, namely self-integration under the
principle of ecntorednoos, eelf-Croatian under tho principle of growth, end
aelf-transcendence tuider the principle of sublimity. Bach of these three
functions he describes in terms of the tensions within certain polarities,
and the whole process of self-identity end self-alteretion is rooted in the
basic self-world correlation. Within the whole process of aetualisation
there ie the very real danger of existential distortion at each and evary
stage, hence the presence of ambiguity right in the life process itself.
By "canteredness" Tillich dees not mean "whole* or "Oestalt*. since
he has in mind the model of a circle for the structure of the self with
particular focus in the "centre". While Postalt has a similar kind of model
in view, the foeue however ie on the perimeter of an integrated "whole". Be
ia suggesting that various forces converge on a "centre" and it ia these
forces which interact to direct the life processes. Such a centre ie but
a point of convergence, not a distinct entity.
With this understanding of integration, the possibility of disinte¬
gration is very reel through participation in concrete situations. Failure
to achieve integration can occur two weyei
Either it ie the inability to overcome a limited, stabilised.
Immovable oenterednesa, ia which case there ie a center,
but which does not have a Ufa process whose content la
changed and increased; thus it approaches tits death of mere
self-identity. Or it is tits inability to return because of
the dispersing power of the maaifoldnasa, in which ease there
la life, but it la dispersed and weak in osntersdness, and
it faces tits danger of losing its center altogether - the
death of mare self-alteration. The function of self-
Integration ambiguously mixed with diaintegratloxuvorke
between these two extremes in every life process.
He then discusses the power of disintegration in terms of health
and disease at the organic level including psychological disorders, showing
.
how the processes of disintegration can thrssten self*integration. Then
in terms of the spiritual level he discusses morality. "Morality is the
fij \ l''V. .
■ 5
function of life by which the realm of the spirit comes into being. "
through molality, Tillich maintains that the centered self constitutes
""""a person-; 4om Mt "** -Mrai Mt of32but as a decision which actualizes the personal. Such moral decision met
bo constantly renewed in the life process. Without moral decision man
relates only to his environment, but through morality man relates to his
world, transcending his environment as such. Such transcendence of environ*
meat is to rise to the spiritual level.
In this line of approaching moral decision, the question then oust
be faced as to the nature of moral imperative. Is this completely relative?
Tillich attempts his answer in terms of the relation of one person to
another person. How a self relates to another self as personal is his
pointi
The encounter with another person implies the unconditional
command to acknowledge him ea a person. The validity of
the moral imperative is basically experienced in such en¬
counters ... The question • Who is my neighbour? - with
all its problems remains valid because of the one answer
given by Jesus in the story of the Good Ssmarltan. This
answer shows that the abstract notion of 'acknowledging
the other one as a parson* becomes concrete only in the
notion of participating in the other one (which follows
from the ontologic&l polarity of individualization and
participation) • Without participation one would not know
what 'other self* meansi no empathy discerning the differ¬
ence between a thing and a person would bo possible. H>ven
the word 'thou' in the description of the ego-thou encounter
could not be ucod, because it implies the participation that
ia present whenever one addresses somebody as a person. . .
It certainly cannot be a participation in the particular
eharaoterlatiee • « • The moral imperative demands that one
aelf participate in the center of the other self and conse¬
quently accept his particularities even if there is no con¬
vergence between the two individuala aa individuals* This
acceptance of the other aelf by participating in his personal
center is the core of love in the sense of agaoq. the New
Testament tern*4
It la baffling how one point of convergence of a number of dynamic
factors, according to Tillieh's model of the centered eolf, which rise with
power to actualize the spiritual dimension or personal in one individual
can relate to another such point of convergence in another Individual and
call it love in the New Testament sense. It is obvious that ha la using
the term 'self1 in et least two ways here if not three* The integrating
centra or focus is the non-substantive location of the self* The actualized
and spiritually developed power centra of the parson la the self in another
sense* Then the morally developed parson whose decisions are not forced by
obedience but by freedom which transforms law sad obedience (yet docs in
fact respond to the moral imperative), this self ic able to relate to other
suoh selves in love (but the mutuality of this love is not explored so that
there is not actual support for the suggestion that 'tola personal self can
relate only to other personal salves)*
His example of the Good Samaritan, unfortunately, muddies the water
even further* Certainly the usual reading of the parable suggests that the
Samaritan participated in the external circumstances of the wayside victim,
without regard to the dynamics of personality and society which const!luted
the responses of the others along the road, simply out of a human compas¬
sion which was mora primitive than the conditioned responses. It is diffi¬
cult to argue that the Samaritan was affirming the man's personhood at
the expense of hie Jewishness (a vital part of hie identity) because
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this implicitly it to deny hit pereonhood under the olotk of t generality*
Zt it more to the point to argue that the Samaritan accepted the full
personhood, including hit Jewishnese, of the man and that agape love hat
something to do with bridging this unbridgable gap* The affirmation of
peraonhood it the result rather than the definition of agape love* And
for thia reason the key to the parable it the person of Christ, who has
tone just thia through His incarnation and atonement.
When he turns to discuss self-creativity at dynamics and growth, which
follows on aftar the dimension of self-integration, Tillioh makes the follow*
ing distinction*
Self-integration constitutes the individual being in its
centerednesa; self-creation gives the dynamic impulse which
drives life from one centered state to another under the
principle of growth* Centeredness dose not imply growth,
but growth does presuppose coming from and going to a state
of centeredness* Likewise, disintegration is possible, but
not necessarily* destructive* • « takes place within a
centered unity*"
under the heading of self-creativity he dleeussed many of the factors
which impinge upon the self, mainly originating in the social environment,
which stimulate growth by causing the centered self to rise to new levels
of equilibrium* In grappling with technology, culture, and humanistic
education the individual must transcend them or face disintegration. This
is the weakness of each and the strength of the individual self, that the
self oan go on to rise to self-transcendence.
When he turns to discuss self-transcendence he makes use of geo¬
metric models once again*
Life, in degrees, la free from itself, from a total bondage
to its own finltuds* Zt is striving in tha vertical direction
toward ultimata and infinite being* The vertical transcends
both the circular line of centerednesa and toe horizontal
line of growth. In tha worda of Paul (Rom* e* 19-22), the
longing of all creation for the liberation from the 'sub-
ection to futility' (R.S.V.) and 'the shackles of mortality1
N.E.B.) is described with a profound poetic empathy. These
words are a classical expression of the self-transcendence
of life under all dimensions.
To help us conceptualize what he means by self-transcendence,
Tillich suggests that the idea of greatness and dignity used aa a quali¬
tative term conveys this notion* It suggests a powar of being, perhaps
reflecting in some way ultimate being and meaning in life* Greatness
implies risk since the bounds of finitude are challenged in this freedom*
It broaches the question of mystery since it penetrates beyond finitude.
It has overtones of the awe of the holy since it reflects the absolute.
Such greatness implied by self-transcendence oontains a sense of
dignity*
Self-transcendence in the sense of greatness implies self-
transcendence in the sense of dignity* It might seem that
this term belongs exclusively to the peraonal-eommunal realm
because it presupposes complete centerednees and freedom* But
one element of dignity is inviolability, which is a valid
element of all reality, giving dignity to the inorganic ae
well as to the personal. The sense in which life in the
personal realm is inviolable lies in the unconditional
demand of a person to be acknowledged as a person* Although
it is technically possible to violate anybody, morally it is
impossible because it violates the violator and destroys him
morally.'
Such greatness is achieved through the dimension of self-awareness,
characteristic which marks man off from the rest of the created order.
Under the dimension of self-awareness, self-transcendence
has the character of intentional!^; to be aware of one's
self is a way of being beyond one's self* The subject-element
in all life becomes a subject, and the object-element in all
lifa becomes em object - something that is thrown opposite
the subject (ob-jectua). The greatness of this event in the
history of nature is tremendous, and so is the new dignity
following from it* The state of being beyond one's self in
terms of self-awareness, even the most rudimentary, ia a mark
of greatness surpassing that in all preceding dimensions. * •
It is not the dimension of the spirit which is here referred
to but that of self-awareness, which, however, reaches into
the dimensions both of the organic and of the spirit*9
121
These are the degrees of life which stretch upward vertically to¬
wards the transcendence of life under the dimension of the spirit, which
for Tillich is his definition of religion. The end of self-integration is
morality) the end of self-creativity is culture) and the end of self-
transcendence is religion. This is the pathway to self-actualization.
Another way of approaching this process is through Tillioh's analy¬
sis of the dynamics of faith which he sets out In a hook by that title
(The Dynamics of Faith, 195?)* $y discussing faith as the central act
around which the prooeas of self-transcendence takes place, the process
can be seen in a light other than a chance progression by the self-enlighten¬
ed few who manage to attain to it. It is necessary to introduce this concept
of faith at this point to relieve Tillich of the charge of neglecting to
describe just how this process is achlevsd.
Faith is a total and centered act of the personal self, the
act of unconditional, Infinite end ultimate concern. The
question now arises* what is the source of this all-embracing
and all-transcending concern? The word 'concern* points to
two sides of a relationship, the relation between the one who
is concerned and hie concern. In both respects we have to
Imagine man's situation in itself and in hie world. The
reality of man's ultimate concern reveals something about
his being, namely, that he ie able to transcend the flux of
relative and transitory experiences of his ordinary life. • •
Man is able to understand in an immediate personal end
central act the meaning of the ultimate, the unconditional,
the absolute, the infinite. This alone makes faith a human
potentiality.
Human potentialities are powers that drive toward actualiza¬
tion. Man is driven toward faith by his awareness of the in¬
finite to which he belongs, but which he does not own like a
possession. This is in abstract terms what concretely appears
as the 'restlessness of the heart' within the flux of life. • •
The term 'ultimate concern' unites the subjective and the
objective side of the act of faith - the fides qua creditor
(the faith through which one believes) and the fides quae
creditor (the faith which is believed). The first is the
classical term for the centered act of the personality, the
ultimate concern. The second is the classical term for
that toward which this aot is directed, the ultimate
itself, expressed in symbols of the divine* This dis¬
tinction is very important, but not ultimately so, for
the one side cannot be without the other* There is no
faith without a content toward which it ie directed*
There ia always something meant in the act of faith. And
there ia no way of having the content of faith exeept in
the act of faith. • • •
The some experience expressed in abstract language is
the disappearance of the ordinary subject-object scheme
in the experience of the ultimate, the unconditional* In
the act of faith that which is the source of this act ia
present beyond the cleavage of subject end object* It is
present as both and beyond both.°
Thus self-transcendence for Tillich through the dimension of the
spirit riaes by the dynamics of faith to complete the circle of unity with
the Absolute as he learned it from Schelling. The principle of identity
with the absolute by the individual spirit finally removea all contra¬
dictions even though the pathway has been strewn with existential hazards,
forces, end ambiguities* For Tillich the relationship between man end
the absolute has never been destroyed, the potential is there to be
developed, and the rise through the various stages of progress in life
is open to all. Faith is essentially the experience of opening oneself
to the Absolute, of developing the power of the personal spirit, of
actualizing -the self* He began by subordinating all aspects of human
personality to spirit, now spirit is related to Spirit by the principle
of identity with the resulting disappearance of the subject-object
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The New Being in the System
Tillich'c distinction between the idee of personality and the ideal
of personality which he expounded in "The Protestant Era* as we have seen,
has a parallel in the doctrine of the Self. Ve have pointed out the
distinction between the self as known and experienced over against the Self,
as conceived and manifested in its essential nature. At another level, how*
ever, we can sea how Tilllch distinguishes the Self ae set forth in his system
as an analysis of everyman'e condition, over against the Self as the realisa¬
tion of the full potentiality of being manifested in and through the "New
Being1*. Apparently this concept of tie "New Being" is not identical with
the Self ae expounded, although in many ways it Is the fulfilment of the Self
as it should bo in all its relationships and potentialities, the "lew Being"
in this one sense is the Self which has transcended selfhood eo as to achieve
true Selfhood. In this sense, therefore, the "New Being" le the goal of all
human life.
Ae Tillioh addressee himself to explain the "Hew Being", which he
always identifies with Christology, we are left with the dilemma of whether
he is expanding the doctrine of the Self to include Jesus Christ as the paragon
of Selfhood, or whether he is accommodating his Christology to the terminology
and direction of his system. In either esse we are left with the puzzling
question as to what he really means by the "New Being".
J. H, Thomas points out the logical difficulties in this concepts
We must now seek to understand what Tillloh means when he talks
of Christ as the bringer of the New Being. In other words, how
does he understand the 'meaning* of ths Incarnation? ... The
New Being in Jesus as toe Christ is expressed in his whole
being, and neither his words nor his deeds nor his sufferings
nor yot his 'inner life' make him the Christ. These are all
expressions of too New Being which is toe Quality of his being. • «
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The first question that must surely cry out for an answer
is - What kind of concept is that of the New Being? When I
attended hie lectures in 1953 I asked him about this end ex¬
plained that it seemed to me that if one spoke of it as a
class concept then one would hare to say that it was a class
which had only one member. There la nothing wrong in this
because one can in the same way apeak of 'God* as a one-member
class. Howewer, Tillich's reply was that he was more Platonic
than Z was and did not accept this Aristotelian logic. There¬
fore he would describe the Hew Being as neither genus nor
species but a power. This suggests to me that Tillioh is
not clear about the logical status of his key Christologieal
concept.
Koreorer, if the *New Being' le the 'power of Jesus Christ
which oonquere estrangement' are we to understand that for
Tillioh the assertion that Jesus ie the Christ is nothing
mors than an explanatory hypothesis? This cannot be the case;
for Tillich regards the 'New Being' as almost synonymous with
♦Christ'. In the context of this discussion ... the asser¬
tion 'Jesus is the Christ because he is the bearer of the New
Being' could properly be described ee a tautology. It seems
difficult to resist the conclusion that in this translation of
the classical Christology, Tillich has achieved a rendering
which can also only be understood by reading the original. For
if one tries to understand it from within the system one meets
hopeless confusion in the use of the term 'being' to denote the
essential existence of God (if not indeed to 'name' God) and also
to denote reality. What Tillich means to say about Jesus when
he talks about the New Being* the Hew Testament says with Just
ae much clarity by means of the proclamation that the Kingdom
of God has come, for God wae in Christ reconciling the world
unto himself.*
It is curious the way Tillioh usee the term 'Christ' as a category or
class in an Aristotelian sense while denying that 'New Being' can be used in
this sense. Be becomes almost mystical in his concept of Being with the
manifestations of Being taking on this semi-aystleal aura as ha speaks of
•New Being'* 'ground of being*, or 'Being itself'. Perhaps his definition
of New Being as power doss in fact come eloeer to his perception of Being*
while logically this yields a very unsatisfactory definition. It la almost
as If Tillich hers is using a concept of dimensions of Being as the basis for
his distinctions* while his discussion centres on manifestations of Being
which can then be described using logical terminology* i.e.* Being in the
dimension of 'New Being' becomes manifested in Jesus who can as a result be
classified as the 'Christ** The tern 'Christ' therefore refers to a quali¬
tative difference of the being of Jesus which is more than the self-transcen-
denoe leading to true Selfhood, although the manifestation of the 'New Being*
in Jesue Christ would include this*
With this semantic problem in mind we should now turn to see how
Tillich relates his dootrine of the New Being to his system* for hi® this
is the high point of the whole ^rstem to which it all points* I feel* how¬
ever* that in the end of the day ha usee his Chrlstology as the grand example
of how the Self-World polarity is held together* if not resolved* within one
person* Jesus of Nasareth* Since these underlying problems are never
resolved* we ere never sure whether Jesus is the highest example of human
Selfhood* one among many* or unique (and if ao in what ways)*
The way oat of our existential estrangement from God end from our
world and even from ourselves is* for Tillich* in and through the New Being*
In his collection of sermons under the heeding "The New Being"* published
in 1956# he expresses the gospel in these termsi
This is the messagei A new reality has appeared in which you
are reconciled* To enter the New Being we do not nood to show
anything* Wa must only be open to be grasped by It* although
we have nothing to show* Being reconciled - that is the first
mark of tha New Reality* And being reunited ie its second mark*
Reconciliation makes reunion possible* The New Creation is the
reality in which the separation ie reunited* The New Being ie
manifest in the Christ because in Him the separation never over¬
came the unity between Rim and God* between Him end mankind* be¬
tween Rim and Himself. * • In Him we look at a human Ufa that
maintained the union In spite of everything that drove Him into
separation. He represents and mediates the power of the New
Being becausegEe represents and mediates the power of the undis-
rupted union*
Tillich supports his contention that Jesus is the Christ and therefore
the bearer of the New Being by a discussion of the paradoxical. For him the
paradox is the new reality in Christ whereby this man can be in Himself the
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New Being and thus represent to all mm what God intends men should ha. Ha
is mediator and saviour in this sense*
He doee not represent man to God but shows what God wants man
to be* Hs represents to those who live under the conditions of
existence what man essentially is end therefore ought to be under
these conditions. • • It is essential man who represents not only
man to man but God to man} for essential man, by his very nature,
represents God. He represents the original image of God embodied
in man, but he doee so under the conditions of estrangement be¬
tween God and man. • • The paradox of the Christian message is that
in one personal life essential manhood has appeared under the con¬
ditions of existence without being conquered by them.5
fbr Tillich, Jesus of Nazareth can ba called the Christ in that He is
the one who brings in the new state of things, the New Being heralding the
New Creation. Be is the one man who fulfilled or actualized his potential
self, rising in the power of the spiritual to self-transcend®nee and main¬
taining unity with the ground of His being, with his world, and with Him¬
self. It is important for Tillich that the historic Jesus be seen in this
perspective. Hie Chrlethood is not euprahietoric, nor a theological appendage
granted by Christian piety and tradition years later, nor again is it super¬
natural as in the case of a demigod. Hie Christhood is, for Tillich, to be
understood in historic teres, ae the expression of the paradox of Hie being
which is the one sample par excellence of true humanity, the realisation of
the potential in every man.
He goes into great detail in hie Chrletology showing that Jesus is
set forth in the Gospels as one who experienced all the anxieties of fini-
tude, all the conflict* of existential estrangement, all the contradictions
of the human predicament, without yielding to the temptations of hubris or
concupiscence. Jesus accepted the limitations of Hie own finitude, always
yielding to the Father's will even to the end. Tillich feels that the term
"sinlessnese of Jesus" ie misleading since It holds a negative and legalistic
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of existence. Bit on the other hand the tragio element in human destiny i«
not absolute or determinate as the Ksnichaean position suggests, since free-
dan is possible for the personality unified and centered In the act of
decision. In this way the New Being was manifested in Jesus to overcome
estrangement.
Tillich rejects the traditional way of developing Chriatology by dis¬
tinguishing between the person and the work of Christ. He feele that the
concept of the New Being encompasses all since it Is the New Being which
makes Jesus the Christ.
Many of the semimechanistic mistakes in the doctrine of salva¬
tion could have been avoided if the principle had been accepted
that the being of the Christ Is his work and that his work la
hia being, namely, the New Being which is hie being. . • (The
significance of Jesus as the Christ Is his being; and the prophetic,
priestly, and royal elements in it are immediate consequences of
hie being (besides several others), but they are not special
'offices' connected with his 'work', Jesus as the Christ is the
Saviour through the universal significance of hie being as the
New Being.6
She work of Christ, then, for fillieh is manifestation. Revelation
and salvation are one and the esse activity. Christ is Saviour in this
sense.
The term Mediator is likewise related to revelation rather than to
atonement.
A third kind of being between God and man would be a half-god.
Exactly this was rejected in -the Arian heresy. In Christ the
eternal Cod-Man unity has appeared tinder the conditions of
existence. The Mediator is not a half-god. ... God reveals
himself to ua and reconciles us to him through the Mediator.
God la always the one„vho acts, and the Mediator is the one
through whom he acts.
The manifestation of the New Being in Jesus involves the universal
significance of the eternal dimension in the person of the bearer of the
New Being. Yet the relationship between the Christhood of Jesus and the
130
particularity of tba mm Joaua can only bo reprseented symbolically aeeord-
ing to Tillich, and this ia the key to understanding the incarnation and the
atonement, the virgin birth and the resurrection* History and etarnity mat
ba distinguished. Chrietologiee which attempt to hold both dimension® to*
gether are considered inadequate by Tillich, doing violence to both Jesus1
humanity and Cod Himself.
While the birth of Jesus in Bethlehem belongs to the symbols
corroborating the Grose* the etory of the virgin birth belongs
to the symbols corroborating the Heeurrection. It expresses
the oonviotion that the divine Spirit who has made the man
Jeeue of Nazareth into the Messiah has already created him
as his vessel* so that the earing appearance of the New Being
is independent of histories! contingencies and depandent on
Cod alone. It is the ease motif which led to the Logos
Chrietology* even though it belongs to another line of
thought* The factual element in it is that historical dee*
tiny determined the bearer of the New Being* even before
hie birth. But the actual story is a myth* the symbolic
value of which must be seriously questioned. It points
toward the docstio-monophysite direction of Christian think*
ing and is itself an important step in it* By excluding
the participation of a human father in the procreation of
the Messiah* it deprives him of full participation In the
human predicament.
Tillich feels that ideas of incarnation are linked with adoption-
lstlo approaches to Chrietology* having Biblical roots no doubt* but are
inadequate to express clearly who Jesus la as the Christ. In this he has
more trouble than did his mentor Sshelling over the term incarnation* but
ho dose allow that it might have limited* though carefully guarded* ueei
When Christianity usee the term 1 Incarnation' it tries to
express the paradox that ha who transeande the universe
appears in it and under its conditions. In this sense
every Chrietology is an incarnations! Christology. But
the connotation of the term leads to ideas which can hardly
be distinguished from pagan transmutation myths. If the
agenato in the Johannlna sentence* Logos earx easaeto. the
'Word became flesh', is pressed* we ere in the midst of a
mythology of metamorphosis. And it ie natural that the
question should arias concerning how something which becomes
something else can remain at the earns time what it la* • •
The Incarnation of the Logos la not metamorphosis but his
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total manifestation In a personal life* But manifestation
in a personal life la a dynamic process involving tensions,
risks, dangers, and determination by freedom as veil as by
destiny. Ibis is Hie adoption side, without which the Incarna¬
tion accent would make unreal Hie living picture of His Christ.
• • • da Protestantism assarts His Justification of the sinner,
eo it demands a Christology of Hie participation of the Christ
in sinful existence, including at the same time, its con¬
quest. , • It is the paradox of God accepting a world which
rejects him.9
Here wo havo corns to tha pivotal point in Tillioh's Christology.
Bow tha two "natures* art related is a paradox* Jesus of Nazareth is truly
human, charing a common humanity with the whole race under common con¬
ditions of existence. Jesus the Christ is His Haw Being manifesting
sternal life by God's Spirit, and thereby besoming the Mediator of divine
revelation as universal Saviour*1^ Either we must consider him as universal
Christ focusing upon his identity with God, the ground of all being,
revelation of Hie eternal dimension which is the goal of all men; or wo
must consider him as hlstoriesl human Jesus, our example of man fulfilling
his divine calling. Otherwise all being Is one*
Tillich's concept ef Jesus as being the bearer ef Hie New Being
suggests that Jesus in and of himself is not to bo Identified as His Few
Being, but Hist He Haw Being is something distinct from the humanity of
Jesus, Ihe Few Being is actualized in its Chrietly manifestation, and
apart from His manifestation it remains but potentiality. 1st this
potentiality sight have been actualized in other men, indeed in all men
of Ho faith to some extent* In Hie sense, then, He New Being is more a
dimension ef life or being rather Han a "nature" such as Christ's divinity
is generally considered to be in traditional theology. It is of Ho dimen¬
sion of divine Spirit which is Ho ground of unity for Tillich as being
itself, yet as essential life only becomes existential through intercourse
with the right human spirit. Tillich's consistent distinction between the
ontological and the existential ie reflected in hie Chrlstology in this
paradox between Jesus and the Christ* with the New Being concept used as a
bridge. But in the end the New Being must be located in tenae of the
Chrietly potential not the human Jesus. For this reason it must be seen
ae revelation from (Sod and good news for man.
Tillich ia not happy with thia location of the New Being cm one
aide of the paradox* since he intends that it should be a bridge to explain
how Jesus participates fully in both humanity and in divinity. He is not
prepared to take a pantheistic position and identify all being in the divine
He does recognise that there ie a difference* but it is a difference between
the ontologieal end the existential unified in a common ground of being,
rather than a qualitative difference aa such. His commitment to a given
unity, however, coupled with hla denial of pantheism* does leave the door
open to the dominance of the existential. Man and nature do exist after
ell. If there ia anything beyond man and nature it suet indeed ooae by
revelation. Ma revelation* moreover, Tillich eaya la open to evexyman,
as tha New Being ia tie actualisatlon of essential humanity. This sounds
like God-consciousness very similar to the teaching of Schleiermacher.
In contrasting hie view with that of Schleiermaaher, Tillich has
an interesting passage which is quite revealing. T5»e parallel le striking!
Some traits of the ehrlstologieal position taken hers are
similar to Sehleiermacher'a Christology, as developed ia
hla Glaubanslehre. He replaces the two-nature doctrine by
a doctrine of a divine-human relation. He speaks of a God-
consciousness in Jania, the strength of which surpasses the
Ood-consciousness of ell other own. He describee Jesus aa
the tfrbild ('original image') of whet man essentially ia and
from which hs has fallen. Tha similarity is obvious) but it
ie not identity. • • The phrase 'essential unity between God
and man' has an ontologieal character) Schleiermacher's God-
consciousness has an anthropological character* • . In Urbild
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the Idealistic transcendence of true humanity over human
existence is clearly expressed, while in *New Being*, the
participation of him who le also the Urbild ('essential man')
is decisive. The New Being is new not only over against
existence hut also over against essence, in so far as essence
remains mere potentiality. The Prbild remains unmoved above
existence| the New Being participates in existence and con¬
quers, it. Here again an ontologloel element makes the differ¬
ence.
Schlelermacher and Tillich come at the two-nature doctrine from
opposite sides of the street, as it were. Schleiermacher begins with the
human spirit and the particular receptivity that faith gives in terras of
dependency and God-consciousness. Tilllch begins with the divine essence
and seeks to show how the New Being becomes manifest existentially in the
historical Jesue through full participation in the human situation by over¬
coming existential estrangement and maintaining unity with God and the world.
Jesus is man in both oases.
Tillich faels that Sehleiermacher never does rise beyond his
anthropological limitations while his New Being concept does. Yet it is
more than juet possible that it was the apologetic approach taken by
Schleiernacher -that established this limit rather than hie theological
thinking. He is examining the role of faith, including the role of faith
in the life of Jesus Christ. Tillich, on the other hand, is thinking
ontologicelly and arguing from that point of view, consequently it is
not surprising that he discusses ontology. The objection Tillich raises
in his contrast is lass obvious whan ws read what Sehleiermacher himself
wrote in hie speeches On Religion?
When, in the mutilated delineations of His life I con¬
template the sacred image of Him who has bean the author
of the noblest that there has yet been in religion, it
is not the purity of His moral teaching, which but ex¬
pressed what all man who have come to consciousness of
their spiritual nature, have with Him in commonj ...
and it is not the individuality of His character, the
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elect union of high power with touching gentleness, for
avery aeUi, staple spirit swot In • special situation
display mm traces of a groat charactor. All those
thing* art merely human. But tho truly divine element
la tho glorious clearness to which tho groat idea So
case to exhibit attained in Hie eoul. This idea was
that ail that la finite requires a higher aediation to
he In accord with the Baity, end that fear man under the
power of tho flnito and particular, and too roady to
imagine the divine itself in this form, ealvetion is
only to he found in redemption*
If all finite things require the aediation of a higher
being. • • what mediates mist not again require mediation,
and cannot he purely finite. It suet belong to both
eidee, participating in the Bivine Essence in the seme
war and in the same aaase in whieh it psrtleipatea in
human nature. ... This consciousness of tho singularity
of His knowledge of God end of His existence in God, of tho
original way in which this knowledge was in Hie, end of tho
power thereof to oomaualeate itself and awake religion, wee
at once the consciousness of Hie office as mediator end of
Bie divinity.12
Schlolermaeher•a concept of Jesus as being the bearer of "the greet
idea" la certainly parallel to finish's concept of tho bearer of tho "Pew
Being". Sohleierascher distinguishes between the human virtues of Jeeus
as the exponent of the Christian religion sotting an example for all men
which all men will find attainable as man of faith, and the divine element
In Jeaua whieh constitutes Him ea mediator between God and men for their
redemption. Tillieh distinguishes between the human life of Jesus of
Kasareth lived out under the oemnon existential conditions under which
all men must live, and the Hew Being revealed in the Christ ea essential
man maintaining relationship with God's Spirit in the unity of Hie life
which constitutes Him as mediator between God and men by revealing the
pathway to reconciliation. Eeither Schleieraaeher nor Tillich feels that
Jeeue ie the only necessary mediator, but both agree that historically it
has worked out that way, and therefore in Jeaua ell men are provided with
the elaeaie example, 00 to speak.
It is interesting that both Sohleiermacher and Tillich lay great
stress upon the way the mediator participates fully in both humanity and
divinity, hence both focus upon the two-nature doctrine in their
Chrietologlea. Yet both deny the traditional two-nature doctrine since
both hold an essentialist concept of the Divine rather than the Biblical
concept of a transcendent Creator separated from His creatures by Bis infin¬
ite qualitative difference. Sere we have Schleiermaeher expressing his
essentialist doctrine in terns of idealism, "the great idea"; whereas
Tillich expresses his doctrine in terms of the ground of all being. Both
wrestle with how the Divine Spirit relates to the human spirit of the man
Jesus without destroying His humanity.
Tillich makes a genuine attempt to find for Jesus Christ a vital
place in hie aystsn. He refers to the "Chrietologioal norm" and the
"ChrlBtologioal answer to existential finitude". But ona is laft with the
impression that Jesus Christ is being used ss a mere exaaq>le of the idea
of the Hew Being* and that He is not crucial to the system as such. Since
He has made His mark in history, Tillich includes Him in the system* The
system stands quite independent from Christ and the place of Christ is
over against the system rather than aa foundational to the system. Ha ie
included aa the "norm" because Tillich»e own commitment ie olear, but since
Ha la not basic to the formulations Ha can easily be bypassed.
David Hopper concludes his analysis with this evaluation of Tillichi
Tillich's Christology, of course, has bean the center of aueh
criticism already* Karl Berth, George Tavard, Kenneth Hamilton,
Robert C. Johnson, along with many others, have variously ex¬
pressed dissatisfaction with Tillioh'a understanding of the
person and work of Christ. I cannot but agree with much of
this critimi^for, however broad Tillich'e starting point
in ontology, the place that ha finally allows for Christ is
really too narrow, too restricted. Independent of the
revelation in Christ, Tillich is able to assert that 'esasn-
tial humanity includes the onion of God and man'. (S.T. II,
p. 94)• This, ha saya, is a derivative of 'the dialectics
of the infinite and the finite'• As a result of this prior
determination Chrletology itself is reduced to the statement
that 'essential manhood has appeared under the conditions of
existence'. (ibid)• In effect, Tillich brings the whole of
Chriatology down to a single theory of the atonement, the
moral exemplar theory. On this point the New Testament and
ohureh history permit a much wider expression of faith.
This the church mnet sorely oonelder.*3
Tillich's Christology as en example of hie doctrine of 'tee self in
its normative manifestation, suffers from the same weaknesses as does tee
dootrine itself over against tee Biblical context from which it comes.
Just as he extracted tee Biblical idee of spirit and slcvatsd it above
other dimensions or levels of the personality, subordinating bote tee
organic or biological and tee psychological elements in order to give
priority to the "spiritual dimension" of tee "centered self"; so he ex¬
tracted the Biblical idea of New Being, white he thinks of as tha
actualized spiritual dimension of the centered self rising to self-
transcendenoe, and subordinated existential humanity which la subject
to failure and Incompleteness and even Jesus Himself. Re goes so far to
protect the humanity of Jesus that in the end He is true humanity but
nothing beyond that. Tha ooncrete and historic person yields to tha idea.
Just as tea Biblical idea that a man la a soul and has a body end
a spirit la ignored, consequently tea way tea soul relates to itself, to
others in tha community, and to God within existential bonds defined by
tha oovenent concept is attenuated by Tillich so that tee "spirit" becomes
loet in abstraction; so the Biblical idea of Jesus Christ ee Mediator be¬
tween God and man, being in Himself bote God and men, is ignored. The
term "mediator" is reduced to symbollo value standing for example. In
bote cases tee covenant relationship is not considered by Tillieh who tiles
to achieve a ground of unity on the basis of the elements extracted.
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Tillloh1* understanding of spirit in the process of self-actuallza-
Hon and of Hew Being breaking Into manifestation within humanity in the
person of Jesus of K&zareth who ia in that sense the Christ, the one who
has achieved self-actualization, establishes the priority of potentiality
over existential reality.
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Tillich's Autobiographical Approach to Thoology
Within the confines of hie formal system, Tillich has set forth his
understanding of the way the essential self is in its oenteredness and how
it can rise through the process of self transcendence to fulfil its potenti¬
ality as the "image of God". Be has set forth many of the implications of
tills process, the structure of being manifesting belng-itself. The "hinge",
whereby the essential self overcomes the existential conditions under which
it llvoe, is explained, indicating the limitations of each condition. The
"symbols" which enable the essential self to know belng-iteelf are con¬
sidered. The most pressing question as to whether or not tills in feet has
boon accomplished in human history is answered in the New Being revealed in
Jesus the Christ who is the bearer of the New Being. Hence, for Tillich,
the system answers the essential quest!one of the human self and its con¬
ditions, pointing the course that man should follow to rise from hie exis¬
tential condition of estrangement and anxiety, without hope in the world.
The thesis that I have put forth la that within the Self-World
correlation, the basis of his system, Tillich has argued for the dominance of
the World, ontology understood in essentiallst terns, and fitted the Self into
tills formal pattern, while in fact the aspects of the Self as It is known and
experienced asserts a constant tension so that in effect it is the existential
Self which dominates the scene upsetting the neat classifications of the sys¬
tem of thought. In particular it is Tillich's own self which asserts itself
in his quest for identity, and the system is his autobiographical attempt to
answer the questions raised. Now sines his own oelf raises existential
questions, the essentialist answers given do not meet the tensions but only
point to a way of describing them. This means that the answers given are
primarily formulations which meet the occasion of the moment and which are
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subject to constant review. The historic feet that Tilllch did not sub¬
stantially change his mind concerning the system as presented does not remove
this possibility. Even in his analysis of the rise of the Self through self-
transcendence, it is the uniqueness of the Self that stands out as the final
conclusion in the midst of a system which attempts to explain everything in
universale. Evan the New Being, although described in universal terms, in
fact finds expression in Jesus Christ, the one concrete example. The way to
self-transcendence ie strewn with too many hazards to make a completely
abstract analysis much mors then a signpost pointing to a distant goal. We
will now return to TilItch's own life end pilgrimage and oonsider his auto¬
biographical approach.
In chapter one reference was mads to where Tillids gives three causes
for his "so-called romantic relation to nature"; namely, his personal experi¬
ence of 'mystical participation' in nature, the impact of German poetic litera¬
ture which is fhll of expressions of nature myetieiem, and hie Lutheran back¬
ground which influenced him to reject the doctrine of the so-called "Extra
Calvinisticum". This he explains in toe autobiography which appears in Kegley
and liretail's anthology of essays on Tillich.1 This basic bias was instilled
from earliest childhood, shaped by hie background and experiences. Philo¬
sophically this was given direction by his early acquaintance with Sohelling
and Fichte, which he later developed in hie thesis work at univarsity*2 Theo¬
logically his Lutosranism reasserted itself'over toe years, toe first test
being hie struggle for autonomy over against toe authorities in his life
symbolised by his father, and the second being hie debate with Karl Barto
who confirmed him in hie position by attacking him, ^ Confirmation in his
Lutoeranism resulted in hie firm rejection of toe Extra Celvinisticam along
with Berth's position which waa that the Word of God carried ite own authority
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and all men must be confronted with this directly. The Extra Calviniatloug
io the doctrine that there is an infinite qualitative difference between the
creature and the Creator and these two are not to be confusedi whereas the
"Infra Lutheranua" is the opposite doctrine that the divine can assume and
indwell the oreaturely which can then manifest the divine presence. These
doctrines affect the understanding of Chrlatologjr and the Sacraments. For
Tillich the |pfra I,qtfaeranua is basic to his system.
Armed with his philosophical and theological orientation which waa con¬
sistent with his earliest training and romantic experience, Tillich set out in
hie search for identity convinced that there waa an underlying unity to every¬
thing which need only be expressed in an ontological framework of thought.
Subsequently the existential circumstances of hie life, notably the first
World War and the intellectual ferment in Germany which had political implica¬
tions prepared Tillich for reading the existential philosophers and theolog¬
ians sympathetically. First he broke with idealism as such, then with
liberalism, later with the neo-orthodox, and yet later with positivism and
phenomenology. Interest in social issues and history led Tillich to take
existential concerns seriously and he was impressed by Nietzsche and Heidegger.
However, hie basic commitment was to ontology and ho attempted to assimilate
5
all these influences within the scope of one system. Almost by accident,
certainly by history, Tillich came to his task.
In following Tillich'a personal development we have seen that even as
early as his 1912 thesis he is convinced of a ground of unity existing between
any coincidence of opposites which might well appear en the surface to be
irreconcilable. This it the pattern of his life as well as a principle of
his methodology. While growing up in the shadow of his distinguished father,

































of the struggle with hie father1* authority, and it boom* a basic principle
of life for hia and a way to self-realisation* Since these methods arose oat
of his own life experience they ere an aid to understanding the man, not Just
the nan's thought* Seen in this light, his doctrine of the Self represents
Tillieh's own odysaey along llfe'a road, which path he describes as the
preeess of self-realisation*
Tillieh explains how this process was followed in relation to his
involvement in Religious Socialise after the first World Wart
la sgr search for this common criterion Z discovered that the
modern trends of thought which are rooted in the Enlightenment
ere substantially Christian, in spite of their critical attitude
toward ecclesiastical Christianity* They are not, as they ere
often called, pagan* Paganise, especially in nationalistic garb,
first appeared after World War X in connection with the complete
disintegration of Christian human!am. There is no such thing
as apologetics in the face ef 1Mb kind of paganism* The only
question is survival or extinction. This is the seme struggle
that prophatie monotheism has always carried on against demonic
polytheism* Apologetics was possible in antiquity only because
polytheism was suffused with humanism, and in humanism Christian¬
ity and antiquity had a common criterion at thslr disposal. • •
It waa only after the war that the reality end nature of this
Christian humanism wears brought fully home to mo* My contact
with the Labor Movement, with the eo-oalled dechristlanisod
masses, showed mo clearly that here too, within a humanistic
framework, the Christian aubstanca waa hidden, even though this
humanism looked like a materialistic philosophy that had long
sine# been discredited by art and seisnes* An apologetic message
to tie masses wee even more neeeseaxy and mora difficult turn to
the Intelligentsia since the former's opposition to religion was
heightened by elssa antagonism, the Church's attempt to frame en
apologetic message without considering the class struggle was
doomed to complete failure at the outset* Defending Christianity
in this situation required active participation in the olass
struggle* Only religious socialism could carry the apologetic
massage to the proletarian masses***
In hie early career Tillieh was involved In a movement which could not
help but shape hie thinking end approach for the future. Hie kalros doctrine
was worked out under these circumstances, but this doctrine, which underlies
his understanding of the Protestant Principle in Christian history, is rooted
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In his personal experience, points to Involvement In divine action in
history, and leads into participation in the community of the Bee Being
(a corollary doctrine to those others). The ground of unity is actually
his apologetic purpose within a humanistic context of thought and action*
This dynamic presentation is missed when the abstracted form appears in
12
the Systematica with its formal presentation of essential relationohips
within the system. This later reflection must be reoognlsed as secondary
to the existential presentation which in faet we get when we reed hie
autobiographical outline of how and why these ideas took the particular
shape that they did*
milch'a personal history did lead him into the situations from
which he was to gain his insights, and also lad him to modify his approach
or emphasis as ha developed within differing contexts end circumstances.
Perhaps the classic example of this modification is seen in his
theological dieouselone centering on the kairos doctrine and the Protectant
Principle giving way to diceuccionc concerned with the individual and the
New Being. Thie shift in focus follows hie own odyssey and interests* There
was always a tension between hie personal search for identity end social
concerns imposed by history upon him since he lived in Germany at the time
when he did, however, with the release from aooial pressures in their acute
fore he had time to reconsider hie own personal search. It may be no acci¬
dent that the autobiographical prefaces were written after his fiftieth
year near tha close of the flret half of the twentieth eentuxy* He wee re-
fleeting upon his personal pilgrimage and tha foroes which shaped hie life
and thought.
Historically ha axplored these aspects one at a time over against a
particular social context, but he held than in tension in hie own thinking
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and they became poles within hie later theological discussion. Their final
resolution lay for Tlllich In the fullness of eelf-reallcation when both
Individual destiny and social destiny becomes universally actualized In the
ground of all being which will come In the community of the New Being* Mean¬
while Tillich carried these poles in a state of tension within himself and
reflscted them in his system of thought. Even to see these two aa underlying
polarities in his personal tension, reflecting his own Ufa and experience,
is to go Ew fountfe He apparent shift in his thinking from the German
context to the American context. History gives rise to thinking* Understood
from the vantage point of hie life's end, the®© thoughts can be seen as the
polarities they were in his own experience. This shift from one pole to the
other corresponded to his deepening understanding of his own Identity which he
terms a boundary situation between polarities, yet with farther implications in
his doctrine of the Self and in his Christology. However, these poles are
never dealt with together in the system and it is only when we see them as
underlying the system as his own personal tension can we see how, for example,
the New Being and the Protestant Principle are vitally interrelated within the
tensions experienced by the author. This explains that both doctrines are
in fact integral to the system even if all the connections are not explained
in terms of the ontologieal ideas* Xt is in the reflection of this personal
existential dimension, that Tillich's commitment to Christology must be seen
even in the midst of his discussion of the social dimensions of his thought
which are often presented in such an apologetic way (Christian apologetics)
that it obscures his own faith.
In considering Tillich's autobiographical approach and personal
investment in the writing of his theology we have seen that the underlying
tensions: the Self-World correlation, the ©xistentialiet-eesantialiet
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polarity, and the mankind-individual relationship underlie the system. This
last underlying tension arises from his autobiographical approach. We have
seen that the system does not stand or fall by itself, but that even to
understand what Tillich intends it is necessary to know the man himself and
the background of his life and times in order to understand Just what he ie
trying to do and what he means by the questions raised and the answers dealt
with in such a consistent and systematic method. This, however, is true of
ray system of thought since it ie rooted in history. The thing which ie so
distinctive about Tillich'e whole approach is the large place given over to
existential concerns.
Kenneth Hamilton attacks Tillich on the possibility of erecting a
system at all which will in any way deal with existential matters. He
follows Kierkegaard in this position, since Kierkegaard faced a parallel
situation in his day with the systematizing approach of Hegel and the
Hegelians. Hamilton refers to Kierkegaard!
Kierkegaard believed an existential system to be a contra¬
diction in terms, yet he remarked that the speculative
philosopher who created the system wished to be an existing
individual at the same time as he abolished existence* • .
He thought that he oould be an individual without subjec¬
tivity, an individual who existed sub specie aeterni. The
whole of Tillich's system is based on the claim that it is
possible - and necessary - for man to escap® from subjec¬
tivity and arrive at the 'really real'. * • Therefore he
trusts ontology to put him into touch with reality and
interprets everything in terms of the universal and the
eternal, using the system as the fitting means by which
to come to the knowledge of the whole.*5
Hamilton goes on to admit that Tillich does not forget about the
empirical world. He speaks about people, places a high value on history
end culture, and claims to stand very definitely with the existentialists.
In the end, Hamilton rejects Tillioh's existentialist posture with the
charge that he is in fact an idealist, although not a classical
essentialist philosopher of the Hegelian stamp. The system ie opposed to his
existentialism.
While Tillich has rejected Hegel *■ dialeotic as a principle
for interpreting the Universe, accepting in its place
inspiration from Sehailing* a Positive Philosophy, yet
the result is no departure fro® idealism. For Sehelllng's
modification of Hegel does not break with the idealistic
claim to grasp reality as a whole* The speculative basis
of truth ia maintained, although it is widened from the
PHTf eo •» to include setilSiSa* There
ia no surrender hero to existential categories, because
revelation la defined in eeaentialiat terms.14
Hamilton misses the point that Tillleh is not erecting en existential¬
ist system, hut he la writing an essentialist system. However, his history
forces him to reflect and write out of existentialist concerns and these in
turn return to haunt his system as the "really real" he is searching for*
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Conelueion
For Tillich the basic ontologioal structure of reality is expressed
in the Self-World correlation* In order to hold these two together he
seeks the ground of unity* through "the principle of identity1*, as it is
manifested in the Absolute or Being-itself. His analysis* as ve hare
seen, tries to express the essence of this ontologlcal structure within
his formal system of theological concepts* As long as he is dealing with
abstract categories and concepts he le consistent. He is able to apply hie
methodology which aims at expressing the underlying identity "by holding
correlated polarities in tension, while identifying levels of being to
resolve apparent discrepancies* This la the key to understanding hie sys¬
tem. Ve have seen how these aims and ideas developed in the eouree of hie
life and career which was deeply invested in nineteenth century thought-
forms and attitudes. His methodology was learned early free hie mentor
Sehelling* yot hie career was lived out and Judged by the firet half of
this present century*
The testing of hie ideas and systematic formulations arose from the
historic and personal experiences to which he wee subjected* Hie central
doctrine of the Self was challenged by his existential selfhood which meant
that hit theological answers were given to existential questions. In this
sense at laaat his theology is autobiographical* The organisation of hie
Systematic Theology le hie attempt to give theological answers to five basic
human questions as we have seen. I have tried to support the thesis that he
was preoccupied with tine human situation and attractsd to the existentialist
position* especially in his understanding of anxiety* hubris, flnitude, and
courage* Yet because these were always discussed and analyzed in an abstract
and objective way* Tlllich tried to subordinate this subject matter* so to
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•peak, to his formal treatment of ontology and essence. Hie selection of
"Existentialist" authors, including Plato and Schelling, bears this out
since existence to them vaa merely a topic for analysis. Tillich, however,
did try to give a larger place to existence within his system, although he
could never surrender Ma nineteenth century search for harmony and identity
and finally reduced exiatential reality aa experienced to symbols within
Mo syatom.
As wsll as in Ma personal search for selfhood, this testing of hie
ideas arose from the historic setting of Me home in wartime and postwar
Germany, then in the rise of Hitler and Ma exile to America. "Many of his
ideas regarding religion, culture, history, and the breaking into history
by the Abaoluto concept), all were developed in Ma wrestling with
this experience and that of Ma national confreres. Religious Social!©a gaa
an attempt to give both theoretical and practical expraseion to these ideas.
Hero the pattern of Tillich providing the systematic and theoretical answers
to the practical existential situation waa established. Somehow the prac¬
tical concerns dominated the theoretical, not because they were more cogent,
but they were more urgent. Then ultimately, these ideas wars reduced to a
doctrine of history within Tlllleh*e systematic formulation, with all prac¬
tical teeth removed and quite abstracted from their Religious Socialist
matrix. Again, the nineteenth century search for harmony and identity pre¬
dominated in Tillioh, although making necessary his detachment and objectivity
from the actual experience of lift in order to seMeve this order. Again, Ma
theology ia autobiographical in toe sense that it is Ma later reflection and
analysis upon ideas developed through Ma own life experiences.
While it la true to say that the centra of the system is the Self, there
is continuing tension as to whether it la the doctrine of the Self in its
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formal expression or the self as experienced by the author himself* The
autobiographical wrestling with ideas and situations would suggest the latter,
while the placing of the Self-World correlation in the heart of his system
confirms the former. Certainly the world ie subordinated in fact to the
Self with which it le seen in tension, since Tillieh begins with existential
and therefore personal questions. While Tillich rejected, and rightly so,
the appellation "existentialist theologian", ho did address himself to the
human situation as his starting point and his most penetrating insights
derive from this base, Hia passion for ontology produced the eyetea, his
theology, but like the world in the correlation it appears as but a context
or framework for the Self.
These tests of his systematic formulations reveal the underlying and
unresolved tensions within his system. There le the tension between the
dootrine of the Self over against the self ee experienced; between the exis¬
tential question which requires the wrestling with reality and the theologi¬
cal answer given in terms of abstraction, essence, end ontology; and between
the individual self, hie later emphasis finding its focus in the concept of
the New Being, and the self as related to others end involved in the movements
of history. This last tension ie suggested in Til11oh's acknowledged shift in
eophasis from Religious Socialism to the New Being with all the personal
Implications involved. This shift demonstrates that the underlying tension
implicit in his autobiographical approach le capable of affecting hia systematic
task.
By contrasting Tillich with Heidegger it becomes dear that Tillich is not
prepared to follow through on his existential starting point, as Heidegger in¬
sists is the only valid way, awdt Vy retreating into eeaentialist analysis
for hie theology hie real position is apparent. He is like Schelling in that
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he subordinates existence to essence. He ie like Schleiarraaehor in that he
develops the principle of identity along romantic lines, relating existence
to the doctrine of creation so that the Few Being becomes but an idealised
example. Over against Heidegger, a prime exponent of one twentieth century
approach to existence, Tillich appears like an idealist philosopher who is
using modem language and analysis to update and expand old approaches and
concepts. Tillich ie not prepared to "leap into the circle" with Heidegger
and to wrestle with reality without the support of an objective frame of
reference whether termed "theology" or something else. Until this basic
stance is clear, however, the terminology becomes confused since the words
referring to existence are capable of many shades of interpretation. Tillich
uses these terms in a general way which becomes a descriptive way) whereas
others like Heidegger are using these terms in quite specific ways related
to their own stance. For Tillich, however, this underlying tension continues
throughout hie works since he is constantly pulled toward the reality he
experiences directly even while he ie attempting to be objective.
The basic correlation of the Self and the world makes possible the way
the self becomes aware of the world end also of itself. Self-awareness is
based in self-eenteredness. World-awareness leads to self-transcendence.
From this proposition Tillich seeks to show how man rises from his existential
knowledge of his finituds to higher knowledge of ontology. This is the
"hinge" in Tillich*s thought thereby he seeks to overcome the basic tension
between reality as it ie experienced under the givenness of creation within the
bounds of human finituds and reality as it is ontologically. The operating
category is freedom which allows men to transcend himself and fulfil his
destiny as the image of Sod. Does man cease to exist when he transcends
himself and reaches his teles? Somehow the translation of the existing self
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into an essential self* even perfectly manifesting the ground of being*
has the ring of death about it* She abstracted "spirit" that Tillieh points
to somehow lacks the vitality that spirit must have to be spirited and not
*
merely a shadow or ghost. The Hebrew ■trees on the wholeness of the human
parson* which I have examined in some detail* has life* The hinge could
work if it was a way of relating two levels of life or of personality* teat
it falls down because it is not eo much a real hinge ae perhaps a trans¬
former*
The Biblical notion of freedom is not a freedom from our creaturely
limitations as such, but rather a freedom from bondage in order to fulfil
our creaturely calling* It is s relational matter involving the whole
person and the whole of society* aiming at the redemption of the whole
world* The transformation taught in the Hew Testament le not a translation
into an essential self (s Greek notion)* but le an empowering to fulfil our
creaturehood in relationship to God* I have not introduced this Biblical
notion in any proof-text type of approach to knock Tillieh down* but I feel
that the Hebrew understanding* end the New Testament authors reflected this,
provides a viable alternative to Tillieh's highly schematised approach. 1
feel that "covenant" is a far richer end more meaningful concept* for example*
than milch'e "hinge" (my term) which has the effect of losing the human self
along the way. % transforming the self into an essential being the exis¬
tential self loses out* Tillich's use of spirit ss s "symbol" suggests that
hs is aware of this lack of reality and the need to employ more dynamic tame
and concepts.
The heart of the system ie how Tillieh relates the level of the exis¬
tential questions to the level of his theological answers. The way hs has defined
theology makes it little different from philosophy in ? practice* both being the
search for universal* and finding the basis of all unity through reason. Ho
refloats a Kantian understanding of reason in that the structuring loaos
of the Self is what Kant terse the aesthetic judgment faculty. Tillich
speaks of the grasping-shaping function of the reason applicable both to
philosophy and theology. God is non-objoetlflablo and the world of phenomena
la essentially agnostic according to Kant. Therefore the ground of any know,
lodge of God, aa also of any knowledge of the world of phenomena, is the
self. Philosophy le limited to reason alone, while theology employs revela¬
tion. But how theology employs revelation involves many thorny problems and
Tillich addresses himself to these in detail. The romanticism of both
Schelling and Sohlelerm&oher greatly influenced Tillich to find the answers
to theae questions primarily in terms of the Self not the world, following
the pattern set by Kant. Revelation for Tillich la primarily the experience
of the self living in self-awareness under conditions of finitude, that is
-the human spirit besoming swart of reality. By the application of reason
this self then becomes aware of the Self of the Absolute and le able to rise
in faith to transcend itself*
This process of self-transcendence through faith may well be assisted
by culture and religion if theae are properly seen as symbols to be used in
our personal search. Here is Tillich's mysticism in clsar focus. 1 have
pointed out that his discussion of faith in this oontext which is abstract mad
theoretical almost loses sight of the function of faith. let when he is dis¬
cussing faith over against anxiety It is dynamic. Once again the existential
aspects seem to be more urgent and vital than the ontologieal when hs expands
■ - ' . rt
these in the system. The relationship of the self to the Self, and of the
Self to God complicates the picture since self-transcendence implies for
Tillich that it is possible for the self to be related to God. We seem to
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be given a mystical answer when faith is under discussion, a philosophical
answer when reason is under discussion, and a religious answer when "spirit",
probably the basic symbol, ia tinder discussion. Just where the Self of
doctrine and theoxy fits into this relational pussle is not always clear.
In faot, we might even wonder whether this ontological analysis is required.
Zt is when he discusses the doctrine of the Self formally within the
system that Tillich uses the concept of spirit to set forth the dynamic
principle of the "totally centered self", which actualizes its potential in
such a way as to achieve self-transcendence. The spirit la the motivating
power which integrates life in the centre of the self end then moves this
centre to rise to higher levels of being. Tillich'e vague term "participa¬
tion", by which he refers to this movement of the spirit has mystical over¬
tones. The centered self constitutes itself as a person, yet somehow being
a person ia to rise beyond the self, participating in the Mew Being which
transcends the self. 1 have pointed out that Tillich is using the term "self",
as also "parson", in several ways, leading to confusion. When, however,
Tillich speaks of self-transcendence in terms of faith and existential con¬
cern he le much clearer end more faithful in the concept of spirit with
which he began. In fact in this context he is closer to a Biblical understand¬
ing of a personal spirit which actualizes the self through relationships with
the divine Spirit and with other human spirits.
The question arises at this point whether the concept of the Mew Being
is integral to the system, referring to the doctrine of the Self as the goal
and climax of self-transcendence thus resolving the Sslf-Vorld tension, or is
unique referring to Chrlstology in Christian theology. There is confusion in
the way Tillich uass the term, sometimes giving one impression and another time
giving the other* At any rate it is clear that the New Being does refer to
Jesus as the Christ, the bearer of the New Being. If it refers to everyman,
and Jesus Christ ie but one example of fulfilment, than it must he a part of
the doctrine of the Self* The identity of Christ is at stake in this dis¬
cussion as it has been since the beginning of Christianity in theological
discussions about the "two natures" of Christ. This is the pivot of any
theology. Tillich is not prepared to locate the New Being cm either side of
this paradox, since he regards this doctrine as the bridge holding both to¬
gether. The New Being is both human and the manifestation of divinity. In
contrasting Tillich with Schleiermachsr ve can see that Tillich begins with
divine essence, whereas Schlelermacher begins with human feelings. Yet in
spite of this starting point w# are never sure where Tillich actually stands.
Is the New Being a concept belonging primarily to the eeeentiallat system, or
ie it tie existential reality of the man Jesus?
We noted at every point that Tillich was personally invested in the
existential questions that he addressed himself to in his theology. The writ¬
ing of his theology was autobiographical in the sense that he was reflecting
on situations that arose within the various contexts of history in which he
found himself. In terms of the underlying tensions in his system we noted
that the Self-World correlation while basic to his system, also held within
itself unresolved questions as to the investment of Tillich'e own self. We
looked in detail at the tension between the existential and essential
polarities of each subject that he discussed. In both these Tillich argued
for the dominance of the general or universal - the world and the essential.
We saw, however, that in fact the concrete - the Self and the existential -
set the agenda and determined the course of his discussion. The third
underlying tension is more directly related to hie autobiographical approach,
namely the relation of the individual to society in general* In this regard
he considered socialism and history while he was involved in actual move¬
ments, then later extended these ideas into concepts of destiny and the
Kingdom of Cod. Increasingly, however, he was more preoccupied with matters
relating to the individual Self and the Hew Being* As ws have seen hie own
investment in the Self was great and often indistinguishable, certainly with
regard to the existential bass for his later reflections and theologizing.
Thus we conclude where we began* The doctrine of the Self in the
theology of Paul Tillioh is not an easy doctrine to isolate since it per¬
vades the entire theological system. It is, beyond any doubt, right at the
heart of Tillleh's thought as one of the vital components of the basic
ontologieal structure as he sees it* It is my contention that the doctrine
of the Self surreptitiously takes over as the operative basis of Tillich^
theological formulations, and that the rest of hie entire system can be
viewed as a context against which this basic doctrine might be put in per¬
spective. No matter what else can be said for or against Tillich's theology,
at least it was his own reflections about life end selfhood as he experienced
it and as he sought to sat his goals and aspirations in faith. To this ex¬
tent the Systematic Theology stands as the witness to the life and thought
of a great man, a great teacher, and a great Christian.
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